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ECONOMIC DEREGULATION AND CORPORATE DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
 
Why did firms pay dividends even though dividends were subject to higher taxation than 
other means of income distribution? This question has been puzzling financial economist for 
decades. Miller and Modigliani (1961) propose a theory of irrelevance based on the perfect 
financial world assumptions, in which a firm’s value is not affected by its dividend policy. 
Although a relaxation of the assumptions leads to predictions otherwise, the seminal work of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) has inspired a growing academic interest in exploring firms’ 
dividend policy. Voluminous studies have attempted to answer the fundamental question – “why 
do firms pay dividends” and its accompanying question – “how do firms formulate their dividend 
policy.”  
Generally speaking, three theories have been developed around the questions concerning 
corporate dividends. The information content theory posits that dividends reveal a firm’s 
proprietary information that is unable to be disclosed directly through other means and that 
dividends also reflect managers’ forecast of corporate earnings prospects (see, e.g., Bhattacharya 
(1979); Miller and Modigliani (1961); Miller and Rock (1985)). Its variant signaling hypothesis 
further suggests that firms use dividends to signal their quality in order to differentiate 
themselves from lower quality firms (see, e.g., Healy and Palepu (1988); Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989)). The agency theory argues that firms distribute cash flows in the form of dividend to 
shareholders to minimize agency costs to the extent that hoarding cash tacitly encourages 
managers to overinvest (in projects with negative net present value), facilitates their perquisite 
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consumption, and insulates them from capital market monitoring and discipline (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976); Jensen (1986); and Easterbrook (1984)). This function of dividends is all the 
more important when the market for corporate control is severely constrained by regulations in 
the regulated industries, and dividends thus serve as an alternative to the threat of takeover as a 
way of reducing agency costs.
1
 The tax-based clientele theory suggests that firms pay out 
dividends to attract target investor constituencies in different tax brackets. For example, high 
dividends are used to attract informed institutional investors that are tax-advantaged and can 
furnish more effective monitoring (see, e.g., Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000); Redding (1997); 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986)), and firms may initiate or omit dividends to cater to changing 
demands of investors (Baker and Wurgler (2004)).  
There are two major theories concerning how firms formulate their dividend policy, 
which have their antecedents in the capital structure literature: the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory. The trade-off theory (see, for example, Fama and French (2002); Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973); Myers (1984)) suggests that firms balance the costs and benefits of paying 
dividends to derive an optimal dividend policy. Specifically, they consider the benefits of 
reduced agency costs associated with dividend payout and the costs of possible future cash 
shortage and potential increased conflicts between equity and debt holders. The pecking order 
theory suggests that firms prefer internal financing to safe debt, safe debt to risky debt, and 
finally risky debt to equity financing. As such, given profitability, firms like to retain a greater 
portion of operating income rather than dispense it through dividend payment to shareholders. 
This theory implies that there is no optimum dividend payout.  
Despite intensive research and theoretical development, empirical evidence from testing 
                                                        
1
 It is documented in the literature that corporate takeover activities are significantly restricted in regulated industries, 
the utilities industry in particular. For details, see, e.g., McLaughlin and Mehran (1995) and Cox and Portes (1998).  
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predictions of some of these theories appears to be weak or sometimes contradictory. For 
example, empirical tests indicate that dividend changes are at best poor predictors of future 
earnings levels or earnings changes (see, for example, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997); 
Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005)). Also, although empirical evidence is largely 
consistent with agency explanations that dividends dissipate firms’ discretionary cash flows to 
help reduce agency costs, questions arise as to why the more tax-advantageous share repurchase 
should not be used completely in lieu of dividend payment, given that repurchase achieves the 
same goal of disgorging cash without committing the firm to regular cash outlays. As for the 
clientele theory, contradictory evidence is provided by, among others, Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005), which shows that although institutions choose to stay away from firms that do not pay 
dividends, they in fact prefer those firms that pay fewer dividends, which is somewhat 
inconsistent with the tax-based clientele hypothesis. Further, while Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack (1995) fail to detect any significant institutional clientele migration following dividend 
omissions, Brav and Heaton (1998) do find pension funds reduce their holdings of dividend-
omitting stocks in conformity with the strict “prudent man” rule after the enactment of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Interestingly, Hoberg and Prabhala 
(2009) challenge the “catering” theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004) by contending that the 
relation between transient investor fads of dividends and dividend changes disappears after 
controlling for the risk factor. 
Yet making the dividend issue even more puzzling and complicated is the evidence 
presented by Fama and French (2001). They report strikingly disappearing dividends – that is, 
during the two decades between 1978 and 1999, cash dividend-paying firms drop from 66.5 
percent to 20.8 percent. There is some evidence that this declining propensity to pay dividends 
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also occurs outside the U.S., although the evidence is not as compelling as in the U.S. (Denis and 
Osobov (2008)).
2
 As such, it appears that dividends have remained largely the same puzzle as 
described in Black (1976).
3
 The mixed evidence has left the most fundamental question of why 
firms pay dividends largely unanswered.  
Economic deregulation, which swept the U.S. from the 1970s to the 1990s, offers a 
unique setting to study the dividend issue. The deregulation process, hailed as “one of the most 
important experiments in economic policy of our time” (Winston (1993)), is characterized by 
governments’ withdrawal from active role in governing business decision-making and activities 
such as pricing, output, entry and exit (Hahn (1990); Winston (1993)). Deregulation opens the 
door to a competitive operating environment, which is fundamentally different from the one pre-
deregulation. The deregulation course has significant effects on the U.S. economy.
4
 More 
importantly, as a major economic shock to firms’ operating environments, economic deregulation 
provides a “natural experiment” to empirically test various predictions of financial theories.5 For 
example, previous research documents that the deregulation process has significantly affected 
deregulated firms’ corporate governance mechanisms (Kole and Lehn (1997)), capital structure 
                                                        
2
 Denis and Osobov (2008) extends the study of declining propensity to pay to such developed financial markets as 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan and finds similar trend in those countries. Interestingly, 
the factors that explain the drop in dividend payment in the U.S. market maintain their explanatory power beyond 
the U.S. borders.  
3
 Black (1976) first used the term “the dividend puzzle” to describe the perplexing nature of firms’ dividend payment 
in his article with this term as its title. “The harder I look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle 
with pieces that just don’t fit together,” he writes in the essay. Numerous researchers have since tried to find answers 
to the puzzle; however, the main questions relevant to the puzzle remain unresolved. 
4
 A little more than three decades ago, regulated industries produced approximately 17 percent of U.S. economic 
output; by 2007, however, those industries – entertainment, transportation, telecommunications, petroleum and 
natural gas, utilities, and financial services, whose large parts are completely deregulated – made up roughly 7 
percent of the U.S. gross national product. This figure was first provided by Winston (1993) and used extensively by 
deregulation researchers subsequently, e.g., Kwoka (2002). For details, see U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
releases. http://www.bea.gov/. 
5
 Deregulation is mainly regarded by researchers as an exogenous shock. See, e.g., Kole and Lehn (1999). However, 
extant theories about the exogeneity of deregulation is argued against by Ovtchinnikov (2010b), which suggests that 
deregulation reform was in response to worsening industry conditions and pressures from special interest groups, 
thus “not unexpected and exogenous.” 
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choices (Ovtchinnikov (2010a)), and investment policies (Ovtchinnikov (2010b)).  
In the same vein, economic deregulation should impact firms’ dividend policy as well. 
Since the new competitive environment in which firms are operating is vastly different from the 
environment when regulations are in place, deregulation touches upon every aspect of the 
business world, providing a more level playing field and introduces new rules for the game. For 
example, deregulation tends to increase information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders 
(e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995); Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999); Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a)), reduce agency costs associated with shareholder-regulator conflicts (e.g., Easterbrook 
(1984); Smith (1986)), and change the composition of clientele (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2004); 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). These are among the elements believed to be closely associated 
with firms’ dividend policy. As such, the theories regarding information content, agency-
principle conflict and shareholder clientele have theoretical predictions with regards to corporate 
dividend policy for firms whose industry undergoes the deregulation process.  
Conspicuously absent from this literature, nevertheless, is whether and to what extent 
economic deregulation impacts firms’ dividend policy. This study aims to fill this gap by 
examining the evolution of dividend policy in response to the changing operating environment 
along the economic deregulation process. Specifically, I examine the effects of deregulation on 
firms’ propensity to pay dividends, how deregulation affects the level of dividends paid, whether 
deregulation makes firms’ dividend policy more sensitive to operating income, and how 
information content of dividend changes in response to deregulation. The new perspective I 
attempt in this research will shed some insights that can be conducive to a better understanding 
of the complex “dividend puzzle” and contribute to the effort of demystifying the puzzle.  
I begin by investigating whether deregulation impacts firms’ propensity to pay dividends. 
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Smith (1986) argues that firms under regulation pay high dividends to control agency problems 
between shareholders and managers as well as between shareholders and regulators. Distributing 
cash in the form of dividend not only reduces cash flows available for spending at the discretion 
of managers but also creates demands for external financing that helps keep regulated firms in 
the financial market, which provides monitoring and serves as a reminder of the current cost of 
capital to regulators and stakeholders alike. Deregulation eventually helps remove the agency 
problem between shareholders and regulators (regulators are gone, probably forever, for these 
industries), and the deregulated firms and their non-regulated counterparts are faced with similar 
situations of agency problems. Therefore, from an agency perspective, I predict a decline in firms’ 
inclination to pay dividends following deregulation. Deregulation also abolishes restrictions on 
investment so that deregulated firms are faced with an expanded investment opportunity set (see, 
e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995); Smith and Watts (1992)).
6
 In addition, deregulation-induced 
competition increases operating and earnings uncertainty, raising the possibility of financial 
distress. Accordingly, the operating environment changes are expected to reduce firms’ 
predilection to pay dividends. On the other hand, the signaling theory suggests that the 
competitive environment induced by economic deregulation may incentivize quality firms to 
signal their strength in the face of growing competition, thus making those high performers more 
willing to pay dividends. Ultimately, the propensity to pay dividends of deregulated firms along 
the deregulation process is an empirical question. 
Next, I examine whether economic deregulation affects the level of dividends paid. The 
distinctive double agency problems between shareholders and management, and between 
                                                        
6
 Smith and Watts (1992) contend that regulation restricts a firm’s investment opportunity set and “makes 
observation of the manager’s actions easier.” Empirical evidence is supplied by Barclay and Smith (1995), who find 
that regulated firms, like large firms, have more long-term debt, consistent with the argument that firms with more 
investment opportunities have less long-term debt in their capital structure. 
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shareholders and regulators, encountered by firms in the regulated industries also imply that 
those firms have higher dividend payout ratio, e.g., paying out the bulk of cash flows to reduce 
agency costs and create opportunities for market monitoring and discipline. The elimination of 
agency conflicts between regulators and shareholders makes it less necessary for deregulated 
firms to maintain high dividend payouts. Similarly, changes in the operating environment, such 
as expanded investment opportunities, heightened competition, and increased level of cash flow 
volatility, make internally generated funds more valuable to financing future investment 
opportunities and hedge against potential cash flow shortfalls. All these, therefore, lead to a 
prediction of lower dividend payout by deregulated firms along the process of economic 
deregulation. On the other hand, the clientele theory suggests that in an effort to maintain their 
tax-based clienteles, firms would avoid drastic dividend policy changes despite fluctuations in 
earnings and in times of earnings uncertainty (Graham and Kumar (2006); Lewellen, Stanley, 
Lease and Schlarbaum (1978)). Conversely, changes in the composition of clientele may lead to 
firms’ amending their dividend policy to accommodate new needs (e.g., Becker, Ivković and 
Weisbenner (2011)). Kole and Lehn (1999) report a concentration of equity ownership by outside 
block-holders after deregulation. This shift toward higher block-holdings may not give rise to 
higher dividend payouts since institutional investors favor fewer dividends to more dividends 
(Grinstein and Michaely (2005); Jain (1999); Strickland (2002)). Meanwhile, the signaling 
theory predicts that high quality firms would more likely use dividends as a signal to distinguish 
them from lower quality firms in a competitive environment. Therefore, the impact of the 
economic deregulation on dividend payout ratio is also an empirical issue. 
I proceed to investigate whether firms’ dividends are adjusted at greater speed toward 
target dividend payout ratio in response to deregulation. Lintner (1956) suggests that firms set 
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target dividend payouts and would adjust their dividends toward the targets based on firms’ 
earnings conditions. Firms under regulation are protected from market competition, and 
dividends may be a less important component of firms’ effort to adjust to the overall risk they are 
faced with. However, deregulation positions deregulated firms on the same playing field as non-
regulated firms and may require firms to react faster to elevated competition and heightened 
uncertainty. Accordingly, I predict that firms’ dividend policy will become more sensitive to 
changes in earnings and the adjustment toward target dividend payout will occur more quickly, in 
response to changes in the operating environment induced by economic deregulation. 
I then study whether the deregulation process changes the information content of 
dividends. Economic deregulation is expected to make firm operations less transparent and 
increase the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Krishnaswami, Spindt and 
Subramaniam (1999); Ovtchinnikov (2010a)).
7
 The theories of information content and signaling 
argue that the dividend signaling becomes more important in situations of high information 
asymmetry, thus eliciting greater stock price reactions to financing announcements in this 
scenario (Smith (1986)). I thus explore the impact of economic deregulation on the information 
content of dividends by investigating changes in the stock market valuation reaction to 
announcements of dividend changes along the economic deregulation process and the relation 
between dividend changes and future earning and changes in earnings. 
Lastly, I examine changes in firms’ external financing activities during the post-
deregulation periods. On the one hand, the argument that regulated firms pay high dividends to 
dissipate free cash flow to control the double agency problems and to procure capital market 
                                                        
7
 Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) examine the proportion of privately placed debt in firm debt 
structure and find that firms with favorable information about their earnings prospects but subject to great 
information asymmetry use more private debt. Regulated firms, however, are found to have lower proportions of 
privately placed debt. Ovtchinnikov (2010a) notes two likely reasons for higher degree of information asymmetry 
after deregulation: the removal of regulatory monitoring and the firm inclination to keep proprietary information 
from rivals and the general public in more competitive environments.   
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monitoring and discipline indicates high frequency of external financing activities of firms under 
regulation. On the other hand, enhanced competition and expanded growth opportunities in the 
wake of economic deregulation may increase firms’ needs for external capitals, leading to more 
active external financing activities. Thus, how deregulation impacts firms’ external financing 
behavior is an empirical issue.     
My empirical results reveal that economic deregulation does not have significant 
incremental impact on firms’ decisions regarding whether to pay dividends after controlling for 
the effect of changing firm characteristics and the general trend of declining propensity to pay 
dividends. However, there is evidence that economic deregulation affects dividend payers’ 
decisions on how much to pay. Using the difference-in-differences approach to control for the 
effects of time trend, I find that not only firms in the deregulated industries, but also those 
surviving deregulated firms, lower their dividend payout ratio along the deregulation process. 
More importantly, empirical evidence shows an upward trend in the speed of adjustment of 
corporate dividend policy to optimal levels and a declining trend in firms’ target payout ratio, 
indicating that deregulated firms respond to the changing operating environment brought about 
by economic deregulation by connecting their dividend policies more closely with earnings. 
In an attempt to examine whether the changing operating environment brought on by the 
economic deregulation affects the information content of dividend, I investigate the evolution of 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement of dividend changes and the 
association of dividend changes with future earnings and profitability. The empirical results 
provide little evidence of an upward trend in CARs or an association between dividend changes 
and future earnings, rendering little support to the prediction that firms are more likely to signal 
information using dividends in the post-deregulation periods. In analyzing the changing external 
10 
 
 
 
financing activities, I find that deregulated firms increase external financing activities steadily 
immediately after the deregulation initiatives and accelerate equity and debt issuance as the 
deregulation process progresses. This pattern mirrors the evidence I document earlier regarding 
the magnitude of dividend payouts: the further into the deregulation process, the greater the 
impact of deregulation on corporate dividend policy. The overall evidence indicates that changes 
in dividend policy along the deregulation process are partly a result of enhanced market 
monitoring and discipline arising from the more frequent external financing activities of 
deregulated firms.     
The study is related to two lines of literature. The first is the literature on economic 
deregulation. Economic deregulation puts an end to the government role in controlling price, 
rates of return, entries or exits, and production, and heralds in an environment of competition 
which leads to changes in firms’ investment opportunity set, earnings volatility, profitability, 
financing costs and bankruptcy costs, etc. Prior research has documented that firms react to the 
changing environment by adjusting their financing policy and capital structure (Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a)) and governance structure (Kole and Lehn (1999)). I complement this line of research by 
investigating the impact of the economic deregulation on firms’ dividend policy. Unlike changes 
in firm capital structure that occur almost in immediate response to economic deregulation, 
adjustments in corporate dividend policy are shown to be gradual, which not only is consistent 
with the notion that dividends are sticky, but also reflects the complexity in formulating checks 
and balances in mitigating the agency problem. The overall results indicate that economic 
deregulation has some bearings on corporate dividend policy, as well as on different aspects of 
corporate financing, investment and operation decisions.  
Second, the study adds to the literature on dividend policy and its determinants. As 
11 
 
 
 
mentioned earlier, there is a rich body of research on dividend policy; however, the empirical 
evidence has been mixed and some of the research designs and methodologies suffer from 
endogeneity. I use the economic deregulation as an exogenous shock to test various theoretical 
predictions concerning dividends, and contribute to this field of research by showing how firms 
evolve their dividend policy in response to changes in the operating environment induced by 
economic deregulation. My evidence provides little support for the information content of 
dividend hypothesis and the clientele theory of dividend. The overall findings are generally in 
support of the agency explanation of dividends. 
The remainder of this research proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
introduction to industrial regulation and deregulation. Section 3 discusses the related literature on 
dividend policy and economic deregulation; and Section 4 explains some important 
methodologies used in the research. Section 5 develops hypotheses. Section 6 outlines the 
construction of the data. Empirical results are presented in Section 7. Section 8 discusses and 
concludes. 
 
2. A Brief Introduction to Regulation and Deregulation in the U.S. 
 
In this section, I first present a brief introduction to the regulation and deregulation of the 
U.S. industries. I then outline what happened to the industries that were gradually relieved of 
regulatory binds during the deregulation process. The five industries that are of interest in this 
research are: entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications and 
transportation.
8
  
In the U.S., economic regulation was typically kicked off in the 1870s, as signified by 
                                                        
8
 The outline of the regulation and deregulation of the industries is based mainly on information from Vicsusi, 
Harrington and Vernon (2005). For details, see their book “Economics of Deregulation and Antitrust”. 
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two important events: a decision by the Supreme Court establishing the legal basis for the 
regulation of monopolies, and an appeal by the railroad industry for regulation of the industry, 
which led to it becoming the first major industry subject to economic regulation at the federal 
level. There had since been three waves of regulatory legislation. The first two waves took place 
between 1909 and 1916, and between 1933 and 1940, which drastically extended federal 
regulatory powers to a number of the vital industries in the country. The third peak of legislative 
activities occurred during the period 1973-1980, resulting in partial or full deregulation of many 
of the regulated industries. 
The question of “why is there regulation” remains open so far. The first theoretical 
hypothesis, now called the “public interest theory” or the “normative analysis as a positive 
theory (NPT)”, attributes the imposition of regulation to market failures that plagued industries. 
The theory holds that regulatory moves reflect pressure from the public to correct market failures, 
as characterized by misallocation of scarce resources by unfettered market forces or mispricing 
of items such as air, water, and public health and safety. However, NPT is not supported by 
empirical evidence.
9
 Based on observations that regulation benefited producers, a new 
hypothesis, referred to as the “capture theory” (CT), was developed, which asserts that either 
legislators or regulators cater to the industry’s demands for regulation, thus subject to “capture” 
by the firms they regulate. Although there is evidence in support of the CT, this hypothesis is 
also vulnerable to criticisms such as why it was the industry, not one of the other competing 
interest groups, that captures regulation.
10
 The major theoretical breakthrough came in 1971 in 
                                                        
9
 This is illustrated by the argument advanced by Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington (2005) that "[m]any industries 
have been regulated that are neither natural monopolies nor plagued by externalities; for example, price and entry 
regulation in trucking, taxicab, and securities industries". NPT, as a public interest theory, “puts forth the hypothesis 
that regulation occurs when it should occur because the potential for a net social welfare gain generates a public 
demand for regulation". 
10
 Criticism of the Capture Theory also includes its failure to provide a theoretical explanation of how the regulators 
are captured, of why the practice of cross-subsidization is common in regulated industries (this is against the 
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the “economic theory of regulation” (ET), put forth by Nobel laureate George Stigler. The theory 
has two fundamental premises: First, the basic resource of the state is the power to coerce; and 
second, agents are rational in choosing utility maximizing actions. According to the ET, 
regulation is a channel through which an interest group motivates state power to redistribute 
wealth from other parts of the society to its own benefit.
11
    
As time went by, regulation became widely blamed for pervasive economic inefficiency 
and highlighted the need for deregulation. Deregulation was initiated in the early 1970s to 
substantially reduce or eliminate government control over the market forces, with the goal of 
allowing businesses to perform better in a competitive environment, and of strengthening the 
economy through de-control. The length of the deregulation process varies for different 
industries, with the shortest being five years for the industry of entertainment, and the longest 20 
years for the industry of transportation. 
Regulation of the entertainment industry dated back to 1934 when limited spectrum space 
(radio channels) was required to serve “the public interest, convenience and necessity”. 
Deregulation started in the late 1970s when price controls over pay channels of cable were lifted. 
The deregulation process completed with the deregulation of basic cable service rates, marked by 
the passage of the Cable Communication Policy Act of 1984. Deregulation in radio focused on 
content and entry, initiated in 1981 by the Federal Communication Committee (FCC).  
Regulation of petroleum started in 1909 and early regulation of petroleum targeted 
quantity. The regulation in quantity became extinct by the early 1970s and regulation shifted to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
predication of the Capture Theory that regulated firms in general would earn higher rates of return than their non-
regulated counterparts), and of why regulations stipulated by regulatory authorities were opposed by regulated firms. 
11
 A natural conclusion of the Economic Theory of Regulation (ET) is that large firms always prevail in their efforts 
to mobilize the state power to their advantage because of high benefits, small firms do not organize for political 
strength because of low potential benefits and consumers do not organize because of high costs and low individual 
benefits. Criticism of this theory includes its main focus on the demand for regulation and little attention to the 
supply-side story. Modification of the theory looks at the supply-side calculus. 
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price. Price de-control started from the late 1970s and ended in 1981. Regulation of natural gas 
began in 1938 on interstate transportation and sale, and then covered Wellhead rates. De-control 
was called for in 1978 and completed in 1989.   
Utilities were regulated mainly by the state governments and regulation focused on entry, 
rate of return, and service range. The first federal move in deregulating the industry occurred in 
1978; in 1996 further deregulatory steps were taken to unbundle the operations of generating, 
transmitting, distributing and marketing electricity to allow customers more choices. 
Regulation of the telecommunications industry started in 1910 with the control of inter-
city telecommunications market. The industry was a regulated monopolist until the late 1950s.  
Regulation on entry and rates was not lifted until the mid-1970s. In January 1982, AT&T agreed 
to cut connections with its 22 telephone operating companies after a seven-year antitrust lawsuit 
brought by the U.S. Justice Department. The company broke up on January 1, 1984. The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 preempted all state laws that limited competition in the market 
for local and long-distance telephone services, making a significant step toward deregulating the 
industry.  
Transportation regulation dated back to the second half of the 19
th
 century when railroads 
were the predominant form of long-range transportation. Regulation was mainly on rail rates, 
price, entry and exit. Competition arose from the development of alternative modes of 
transportation such as trucking. The major deregulatory initiatives affecting railroads and 
trucking came in 1980. Subsequent steps further deregulated the surface transportation industry. 
Regulation of airlines started in 1934, mainly on rates, routes, entry and exit. Deregulation began 
in 1977 and ended in 1983.  
Table 1 lists major regulatory initiatives leading to deregulation of the industries of 
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entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications and transportation from 
the 1970s to the 1990s.   
 
3. Literature Background and Theoretical Predictions 
 
 
There are three principal theoretical argumentations in the finance literature on why 
companies pay out dividends: the information content theory and its accompanying signaling 
hypothesis, the agency theory and its variant free cash flow premise, and the theory of clientele. 
In this section, I first review previous studies following the three theoretical threads, then discuss 
dividend policy of firms in regulated industries and theoretical explanations for their particular 
characteristics. Finally I review prior studies on economic deregulation and its effects on capital 
structure, corporate governance or other facets at the firm level.  
3.1 Information content of dividend and the signaling hypothesis 
In the perfect, frictionless financial market of Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividends 
are irrelevant to firm value – the value of a firm is determined by the rate of return of its assets, 
i.e., only future cash flows and growth opportunities of the firm are relevant to firm valuation, 
and the firm value does not change whatever its dividend policy is. However, in the real financial 
world, it is observable that stock prices do change following announcements of dividend change. 
To reconcile the empirical evidence with the full information model of Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), an explanation was advanced suggesting that dividend changes affect stock prices by 
way of market’s perception of firm value – a phenomenon Miller and Modigliani (1961) refer to 
as the “information content” of dividends.  
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Dividends carry information content mainly due to the information asymmetry that exists 
between corporate insiders and outside investors. In a world of imperfect information, managers 
are believed to know more about their firms than outside shareholders, and unexpected changes 
in dividend payout convey certain private information that has been unknown to the public, 
which, under the efficient market assumption, is immediately incorporated by the market into 
stock prices. Hence a firm’s dividend policy changes tend to have remarkable signaling effects.  
The signaling hypothesis of dividends posits that a firm purposefully makes use of its 
dividend payments to communicate certain proprietary information to the market. This 
hypothesis can trace its root to Akerlof’s (1970) Lemon Principle based on markets of used cars 
where buyers are unsure about the quality of merchandise. The Lemon Principle highlights the 
importance of quality signaling which enables buyers to tell good commodities from lemons, so 
that benign markets can survive and rational transactions can go on. Spence (1974) first extends 
the signaling model into labor markets characterized by uncertainties and asymmetric 
information. Bhattacharya (1979, 1980) and other financial economists like Talmor (1981) and 
Hakansson (1982) follow to develop the signaling models of corporate dividend policy, in which 
dividends are costly signals sent out by firms to communicate quality, and are hard for firms of 
inferior quality to imitate. Kalay (1979), on the other hand, tests whether dividend cuts are forced 
reductions due to existing dividend constraints and do not convey managers’ expectations of firm 
earnings prospects, and finds that the hypothesis that there exists information content in dividend 
reductions cannot be rejected.  
The asymmetry in information exists not only between insiders and outsiders, but also 
between dividend increases and decreases, which is captured by the market reactions to the 
opposite moves: Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) report an average stock excess return of 1.25 
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percent for dividend increase announcements but an average stock excess return of –3.71 percent 
for dividend decrease announcements. In addition, Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) report 
dividend initiations are associated with an average stock price increase of over 3 percent whereas 
dividend omissions are associated with a stock price drop of some 7 percent.  
The asymmetric positive (negative) market reaction to dividend increases (decreases) 
may have posed a critical challenge to managers formulating dividend policy. They appear very 
cautious in setting up dividend payout levels, and take a conservative approach toward increasing 
dividends unless they are highly confident that a permanent increase in future earnings is going 
to happen (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996)). This partly explains why dividends 
are relatively “sticky”, i.e., dividends do not react to earnings changes rapidly but remain 
relatively stable over a certain period of time vis-a-vis more volatile corporate earnings in the 
same period. On the other hand, managers try to avoid making decisions that later have to be 
reversed (Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985); Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005)). 
They are exceptionally concerned about cutting dividends, and, according to Brav, Graham, 
Harvey and Michaely (2005),
12
 would like to pass up some lucrative investment opportunities, 
raise external funds, or even sell a portion of assets before considering dividend reductions. All 
these highlight the exorbitant costs of cutting dividends to firm value, image and managers’ 
reputational capital.       
Empirical studies on the information content of dividend hypothesis have been 
attempting to capture the information conveyed to the marketplace by dividends. Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969), Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Asquith and Mullins 
                                                        
12
 For details, see Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005). In a survey of financial executives and follow-up 
interviews with score of them, Brav et al. (2005) document that managers appear to convey the consensus that 
dividends are of first-order importance for a firm to stay aloof from trouble and they would like to sell assets or even 
raise external funds before considering a dividend cut. 
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(1983), among others, find that dividend increases (decrease) convey positive (negative) 
information, which is used by the market to update its valuation of a firm’s future cash flows. 
Koch and Sun (2004), on the other hand, provide evidence that investors update their 
expectations regarding the persistence of past earnings changes based on dividend changes. 
However, Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) 
document that they fail to find supportive evidence to the hypothesis.  
If dividends carry information, then what precisely is the information dividends convey 
to the market? Using monthly data, Nissim and Ziv (2001) report dividend changes are 
associated with earnings changes in each of the following two years, and with the level of future 
profitability. They suggest that the failure of prior research to detect dividend-earnings 
correlation may have been caused by specification issues, measurement errors and/or omitted 
variable bias. As a rebuttal, Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) emphasize the non-
linear relationship between dividends and future earnings, and empirically demonstrate that as 
soon as the non-linearity is accounted for in modeling the earnings process, dividend changes are 
no longer information laden as regards future earnings levels or changes. They thus conclude that 
the relation (or lack thereof) between dividend changes and future profitability is inconsistent 
with predictions of the signaling hypothesis, an extension of the information content theory. 
Guay and Harford (2000), however, show that firms use dividends as a distribution method (as 
against share repurchase) to reveal the permanence of their “past and contemporary cash flow 
shocks”.   
    When signaling becomes a component in the corporate strategy toolkit, the use of 
dividends to convey information turns to be directional. Researchers find managers try their best 
to avoid reversing dividend policy decisions and would like to exhaust all possible resources to 
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fulfill their recurring commitment to shareholders (Lintner (1956)), before cutting or omitting 
dividends. It is thus well documented in the literature that firms widely engage in dividend 
smoothing against relatively volatile cash flows. More recent papers show that the corporate 
behavior of stabilizing dividend payment versus varying cash flows observed by Lintner (1956) 
over half a century ago is in practice in a large number of firms (see, e.g., Brav, Graham, Harvey 
and Michaely (2005); Michaely and Roberts (2006)). 
 Given the widespread practice of dividend smoothing, dividends do not “vary one-to-one 
with the prospects of the firm” (Kumar (1988)), and relations between dividends and anticipation 
of the firm’s earnings appear non-linear. Modeling firm dividend behavior in a world of 
asymmetric information, Kumar (1988) acknowledges that dividends do have information 
content, but describes the transmission of information through dividend increases or decreases as 
“coarse signaling” that reflects the “broad quality” of the firm’s earnings prospects. Consistent 
with Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978) and Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005), Kumar 
(1988) indicates that dividends are poor predictors of future earnings. Another reason he gives 
for dividends’ poor ability in predicting earnings is what can be called the “agency issue of 
information signaling” – the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders motivate 
managers to “strategically” refrain from completely revealing their private information. In fact, 
managers are incentivized to manipulate the disclosure of information, or even misrepresent 
private information to invoke market reactions that serve their own agenda. As such, it is difficult 
to imagine a signaling equilibrium in which senders signal honestly and receivers trust the 
information; only a partial signaling equilibrium exists. 
Even though signals are reliable, the ways signals are interpreted by receivers 
(shareholders) vary significantly, conditional on certain circumstances. Kohers (1999) 
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investigates dividend initiations and omissions and the direction and magnitude of industry 
responses they evoke, and finds that information content of the two types of events are not “polar 
opposites” and market reactions to them are distinct. While the information transmitted by 
dividend initiations is largely perceived by the market as “firm-specific,” dividend omissions are 
more likely to be inferred as representing industry-wide conditions. Empirical results indicate 
that announcements of dividend omission trigger negative market reactions that ripple through 
the same industry, demonstrating industry-wide effects. Announcements of dividend initiation, in 
contrast, induce negative market reactions to their industry competitors while generating positive 
market reactions to initiators themselves – the more homogenous the industry, the more negative 
the reactions to the rest of the industry. 
3.2 Agency cost theory of dividends and free cash flow hypothesis 
 Agency problems arise from the separation of ownership and control of modern 
corporations (Berle and Means (1932); Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The most widely studied 
agency issues are those between shareholders and managers. Self-interested managers would 
maximize their own benefit at the expense of shareholders if proper monitoring or interest 
aligning mechanisms are lacking. To mitigate the agency problems, an internalizing approach is 
to associate managerial interests more closely with those of shareholders through increased 
managerial shareholding or the use of equity-based executive compensation. An externalizing 
approach is to reinforce efficient and effective monitoring by the capital market and through 
strengthened corporate governance.  
This is where dividends can play a constructive role in alleviating the agency problem. 
Two hypotheses exist in this respect. One is the renowned free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen 
(1986), which posits that by paying out dividends, firms reduce the free cash flow available to 
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managers and thus lower agency costs that might result from managerial activities such as 
overinvestment, stealing, or consumption of perquisites. Free cash flows are the excess cash after 
firms satisfy their internal needs of financing investments to sustain future growth. An 
implication of the hypothesis is that dividends remove the extra cash left over from corporate 
investment policy, and that firm’s investment policy takes precedence over dividend policy. This 
is akin to the description of the so-called “residual dividend” policy.  
The other hypothesis is Easterbrook’s (1984) “keeping firms in the capital market”. This 
hypothesis argues that the primary function of regular payment of dividends is to force firms to 
seek external resources to meet their investment needs from the capital market, thus subjecting 
firms to more frequent market scrutiny by analysts, bankers, investors, debtors, and other capital 
suppliers. However, disposing of a large fraction of earnings has its downside – it may lead to 
underinvestment or expose the firm to higher floatation and transaction costs when external 
capital is raised. Thus the relation between dividend payout and agency problem is within the 
context of trade-off paradigm. Dividends per se can also cause agency problems, that is, agency 
conflicts between shareholders and bondholders (John and Kalay (1982)), in addition to the 
underinvestment problem due to the depletion of low-cost capital in the form of dividends (e.g., 
Myers (1984)). Aware of the possible transfer of wealth from creditors to owners, bondholders 
use debt covenant to restrict distribution of dividends, which, in turn, may become problematic – 
a delicate balance has to be stricken so that restrictions on dividend distribution should not result 
in a firm’s investing in negative net present value (NPV) projects and loss of efficiency in 
decision making that could affect the firm’s survival (Fama and Jensen (1983); Myers (1977)).   
 There has been a series of academic research to test the agency explanation of dividends. 
For example, Rozeff (1982) provides empirical evidence that firms with higher growth 
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opportunities, higher firm-specific risks or leverage, and higher inside ownership or smaller 
number of outside shareholders are more likely to pay less in dividends. The author argues that 
firms choose dividend payout levels aimed at an “optimal dividend policy” that minimizes total 
costs – the summation of agency costs and transaction costs of external financing. Easterbrook 
(1984) emphasizes the monitoring role of intermediaries such as investment bankers, auditors 
and the media in controlling agency costs and suggests that dividend payment helps create the 
demand for external financing, thus inviting market monitoring.  
 Johnson (1995) offers empirical results in support of the agency costs hypothesis – where 
dividend payments are high, average stock price reactions to debt issues, regarded a substitute to 
dividends in controlling the agency problem, are shown to be insignificantly different from zero. 
Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) report lower debt and dividend levels in high inside ownership 
firms, suggesting high manager-shareholder interest alignment alleviates agency problems, 
which in turn eases the need for frequent monitoring to be generated by heavy borrowing and/or 
high dividend payment. A more recent paper, John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva (2011) finds that 
remotely located firms pay higher dividends, indicating that firms formulate their dividend 
policies to make up for the deficiency in monitoring and oversight caused by the distance of 
locations, and to mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and management. It’s no 
surprise that they report the relation between geography and dividends is more pronounced in 
firms with high free cash flow but few investment opportunities, which are indicators of severe 
agency cost problems.  
On the other hand, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) indicate dividends are not an 
increasing function of institutional holdings or concentration of holdings, underlying that the 
relationship between dividends and institutional holdings is more of a substitutive nature with 
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regard to corporate monitoring. Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) argue that dividends are 
more effective in mitigating the agency problems when alternative mechanisms are lacking. They 
show that two substitutes – incentive-based executive compensation that better aligns the 
interests of managers and shareholders (internalizing approach), and large share ownership by 
block-holders (externalizing approach) – attenuate the functional effects of dividends. Empirical 
results provided by Noronha, Shome and Morgan (1996) do not invalidate Easterbrook’s (1984) 
agency motives for dividends as the authors claimed; rather, they extend the premise by 
identifying alternative agency-controlling mechanisms in place that collaborate to ease the 
burden borne by dividends in agency problem mitigation. The concurrent existence of multiple 
mechanisms to monitor and control the agency problems may offer partial explanation for what 
Fama and French (2001) refer to as “disappearing dividends.”    
3.3 The clientele theory 
The tax-based clientele theory suggests that firms pay out dividends to attract target 
investors in different tax brackets. A number of studies provide evidence to the existence of 
dividend clienteles (e.g., Becker, Ivković and Weisbenner (2011); Graham and Kumar (2006); 
Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007)); some other studies report that high dividends are designed to 
attract informed institutional investors (see, e.g., Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000); Redding 
(1997); Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Specifically, Graham and Kumar (2006) show that retail 
investors in general like non-dividend paying stocks, but among them the fondness of holding 
dividend paying stocks increases with age and decreases with income. Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005) find that institutional investors prefer to hold dividend paying stocks.  
The clientele evidence has been two-dimensional. While investors pick stocks with 
dividend characteristics that fit their needs, firms formulate their dividend policies in response to 
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demands from clienteles. Becker, Ivković and Weisbenner (2011), for example, find significantly 
positive association between firms’ dividends with the population of seniors in geographic areas 
where the firms are located. More directly, the “catering” theory advanced by Baker and Wurgler 
(2004) asserts that firms initiate or omit dividends to cater to changing demands of investors. 
Empirical results from testing various predictions of the theory have shown to be inconclusive. 
Contradictory evidence is provided by, among others, Grinstein and Michaely (2005), who show 
that despite their strategies of avoiding non-dividend-paying firms, institutional investors in fact 
prefer those stocks that pay fewer dividends to those that pay more dividends. This indicates that 
higher institutional holdings or concentration may not lead to higher dividends, or higher total 
payouts, which is inconsistent with the tax-based clientele hypothesis (Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005); Jain (1999); Strickland (2002)). While Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) fail to 
detect any significant institutional clientele migration following dividend omissions, Brav and 
Heaton (1998) do find pension funds reduce their holdings of dividend-omitting stocks in 
conformity with the strict “prudent man” rule after the enactment of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Hoberg and Prabhala (2009) challenge the “catering” 
theory by contending that the relation between transient investor fads of dividends and dividend 
changes disappears after controlling for the risk factor, and providing empirical evidence in 
support of the argumentation. 
3.4 Dividend policy of regulated firms 
The literature has documented that in addition to maintaining higher leverage levels, 
firms under regulation pay out more in dividends than their non-regulated counterparts (Lozano, 
de Miguel and Pindado (2005); Moyer, Rao and Tripathy (1992); Wansley (2003)). For example, 
Wansley (2003) reports that during the 21-year period from 1980 through 2000 non-regulated 
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firms on average pay out a substantially smaller portion of their earnings than do most regulated 
industries.  
The agency theory offers a general explanation for corporate dividend policy, which also 
applies to firms under regulation. Easterbrook (1984) argues that the primary function of regular 
payment of dividends is to keep firms in the capital market, where monitoring of the 
management is more cost-effective. The implicit assumption of this approach is that alternative 
devices that can mitigate the agency problem, such as higher managerial ownership, block-holder 
shareholding, or institutional shareholding, are either not as cost-effective, hard to come by, or 
inclined to give rise to other agency-related problems. By dispensing a major portion of cash 
flows as dividends to shareholders, firms have to access capital markets for external financing. 
When issuing debt or common stock to raise capital to finance investments at higher frequencies, 
firms have more opportunities to be subject to intense market scrutiny by analysts, bankers, 
investors, debtors, and other capital suppliers. Therefore, high dividend payments by regulated 
firms tend to reduce the agency costs between shareholders and managers and help maximize the 
market value of firms.  
Obviously, this agency-cost explanation based on the trade-off of costs and benefits does 
not address the specific problem of why firms under regulation pay higher dividends. High 
dividend payments are justifiable only when the benefits resulting from such payments more 
than offset the costs of repeated, and perhaps more frequent, external financing. It is true that for 
regulated firms, in additional to the universal agency conflict between shareholders and 
managers, there is another layer of agency problem – the agency conflict between shareholders 
and the regulator. The shareholder-regulator agency conflict comes into being because regulators, 
often as appointees with short tenures, may represent the interests of “ratepayers” to keep 
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economic profits low, thus undermining shareholder interests. There thus arises the need to 
monitor and discipline regulators. Smith (1986) hypothesizes that the capital market serves as a 
reminder of financing costs when firms sell equity and that by paying higher dividends, firms 
under regulation subject themselves and their regulators more frequently to market discipline so 
that the regulators get clues in the regulatory process such as the determination of rates of return 
for regulated firms. This implies that high dividends help create more demands for regulated 
firms to frequent capital markets to experience discipline. Moyer, Rao and Tripathy (1992) 
examine the high dividend payout ratio and dividend yield of regulated electric utilities and find 
support for the Smith (1986) hypothesis that regulated firms employ the high dividend policy as 
a response to regulatory risk and in an effort to control it. Indeed, a regulated firm was allowed a 
“reasonable rate of return” decided by the regulator. Shareholders thus adopt the strategy of 
forcing the firm to capital markets regularly to mitigate regulatory opportunism. Hagerman and 
Ratchford (1978)
13
 also argue that if firms’ acquisition of more debt to increase the probability of 
financial distress and the costs of bankruptcy is aimed at raising the rate of equity allowed by 
regulatory authorities, their frequenting the equity market typically informs the regulator of the 
market costs of equity financing. Lozano, de Miguel and Pindado (2005) offer Spanish evidence 
indicating high dividend payments by regulated firms are employed as a means of seeking 
control of the price level. Unlike non-regulated firms that directly go to capital markets for 
financing when needed, they note, regulated firms have to use dividend policy to “create” 
demands for new funds to embrace market monitoring and check regulator’s proclivity to keep or 
even lower prices. They regard high dividend payments as incremental “transaction costs” 
incurred by regulated firms relative to non-regulated firms in resolving the shareholder-regulator 
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 See Hagerman and Ratchford (1978). By examining a sample of 79 electric utilities in 33 states in the U.S., the 
authors find that the allowed rate-of-return on equity is increasing in the debt-equity ratio. 
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agency conflict.  
Another explanation for high dividend payments of regulated firms, which can be 
referred to as “comparable return hypothesis,” is provided by Wansley (2003). He argues that 
regulated and non-regulated firms differ fundamentally in their dividend policy, and the 
differences are ascribed to the investment opportunity sets historically available to regulated and 
non-regulated firms. Regulations limit investment opportunities of regulated firms and thus their 
capital gains potential for equity investors as compared with non-regulated firms. It is recognized 
that investment return in equity has two components: the capital gain component and the 
dividend yield component. To make their equity at least as attractive and lower financing costs in 
the competitive capital market, regulated firms have to offset the shortfall in capital gain 
potential by raising the dividend yield component of the return to make their overall risk-
adjusted return comparable to that of non-regulated firms. 
In summary, firms under regulation appear to use high dividend payouts to mitigate two 
kinds of agency conflicts: those between shareholders and managers and those between 
shareholders and regulators. By deciding to pay out a major portion of earnings, shareholders of 
regulated firms put both the managers and regulators under frequent capital market monitoring 
and discipline, and seek investment returns comparable to those of holding non-regulated stocks. 
3.5 Deregulation effects on different aspect of corporations 
Despite voluminous studies of deregulation and corporation policies, academic research 
on the dynamics of change in firms from the five deregulated industries of entertainment, 
petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications and transportation effected by economic 
deregulation has been limited. Kole and Lehn (1999) investigate deregulation effects on 
corporate governance of the U.S. airline industry by reporting increased concentration in equity 
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ownership, increased CEO compensation, increased use of stock options as a component of 
executive compensation, and decreased board size. Deregulated firms respond to the economic 
shock by adapting to the new environment in governance structure and become more and more 
like non-regulated firms. Moreover, the speed and level of adaptation is positively associated 
with firm survival. Firms that are unable to adapt or do not adapt quickly enough fail due to 
increased competition and rate cutting induced by deregulation, as indicated in Weiss (1990). 
Palia (2000) compares education quality levels of CEOs pre- and post-deregulation and finds that 
regulated business environments attract CEOs with lower-quality education and that deregulation 
enlivens the labor market so that higher-quality education CEOs join firms in the deregulated 
industries. 
 On the other hand, Gaspar and Massa (2006) find that increased competition brought 
about by deregulation contributes to firms’ idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns and that 
lowered product market power due to elevated competition not only weakens the firms’ ability to 
smooth out idiosyncratic fluctuations, but also raises information uncertainty. Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a) studies impacts of deregulation on firm leverage and finds that firms reduce leverage in 
reaction to the significant decline in profitability, asset tangibility and increase in growth 
opportunities resulting from deregulation. In cross-section, deregulation also significantly alters 
the sensitivity between leverage and its determinants. His findings offer support to the dynamic 
trade-off theory.
14
 In a follow-up study, the author investigates the dynamics of mergers and 
acquisitions in the wake of economic deregulation, and finds that inferior industry performance 
in the regulation era leads to the initiation of economic deregulation to redress regulatory 
                                                        
14
 Ovtchinnikov (2010a) employs the portfolio matching procedure which has in fact a big problem: the portfolios of 
non-regulated firms are fixed when matched with the deregulated industries; there will be no new entrants into the 
portfolios, which will wear off through attrition. On the other hand, the deregulated industries experience dynamic 
changes as new firms joining in and old firms exiting. By comparing the changing deregulated industries with fixed 
portfolios (fixed in the sense that no new entrants into the portfolio), Ovtchinnikov (2010a) is therefore 
methodologically flawed. As such, there is reasonable doubt over the validity of its empirical results and inferences. 
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inefficiency, suggesting deregulation is more of an endogenous than an exogenous occurrence. 
The market forces unleashed by deregulation drive a wave of mergers and acquisitions in which 
bidders and targets are on average previous poor performers with excess capacity (Ovtchinnikov 
(2010b)). Thus post-deregulation mergers and acquisitions offer an avenue for firms to exit from 
the market, which was virtually non-existent pre-deregulation. 
 
4. Hypotheses Development 
 
 
In this section, I develop the hypotheses based on theories concerning corporate 
dividends and dividend policies. I primarily focus on five dimensions of dividend policy: the 
propensity to pay dividend, the amount of dividend paid, the sensitivity of dividends to earnings, 
the information content conveyed by dividend changes, and the link between dividends and 
corporate financing activities.   
4.1 Evolution of firms’ propensity to pay dividend in response to economic deregulation 
 
The first question I investigate is whether deregulation impacts firms’ propensity to pay 
dividends. Since economic deregulation substantially changes the operating environment as well 
as the nature of the firms, firms are expected to adjust their dividend policy accordingly. 
Dividend payment is one of the channels to control agency costs (Easterbrook (1984); Jensen 
(1986); Smith (1986)). Specifically, Smith (1986) suggests that regulated firms pay dividends to 
control the double agency problems between shareholders and managers, and between 
shareholders and the regulator. Distributing cash not only reduces the free cash flow available to 
managers for spending at their discretion but also creates demands for external financing that 
helps keep regulated firms in the financial market, which provides monitoring of management 
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and reminds regulatory authorities of the current cost of capital. If this argument is valid, firms 
under regulation are expected to be more inclined to pay dividends relative to non-regulated 
firms. Deregulation eventually removes the agency problem between shareholders and regulators, 
together with the abolition of the regulatory bodies, leaving the deregulated firms to face similar 
situation of agency problems as their non-regulated counterparts. Therefore, from an agency 
perspective, I predict a decline in firms’ propensity to pay dividends following deregulation.  
Deregulation also eases and gradually lifts restrictions on firms’ investment activities so 
that deregulated firms are faced with an expanded investment opportunity set. To meet greater 
capital demands engendered by more investment opportunities, the pecking order hypothesis 
predicts a lower proclivity to pay dividends for deregulated firms if the investment-dividend 
identity holds. It is rational that firms would finance investment projects first and foremost using 
internally generated capital, considering the significant transaction and flotation costs associated 
with external financing (Myers and Majluf (1984)). In addition, deregulation-induced 
competition increases operating and earnings uncertainty, raising the possibility of financial 
distress. Therefore, in a dynamic pecking order world, firms are also expected to be more 
inclined to retain earnings than pay out dividends, in an attempt to prepare for greater 
uncertainties in earnings brought about by deregulation. 
Based on these arguments, I propose the following hypothesis, in alternative format: 
H1: The high propensity to pay dividends of firms under regulation will decline along the 
deregulation process and the determinants of the propensity to pay of deregulated firms will 
ultimately converge with those of non-regulated firms. 
 
4.2 Evolution of dividend payout in response to economic deregulation 
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The agency theory not only predicts that firms under regulation are more inclined to pay 
dividends than non-regulated firms, but also foretells that if they pay, they pay higher dividends. 
By paying out larger proportions of earnings in cash dividends, regulated firms are in greater 
need of financing new investments with external funds, thus eliciting more frequent and cost-
effective financial market monitoring of the management and updating regulators with current 
costs of financing to mitigate the double agency problems they are faced with (e.g., Smith 
(1986)). Since deregulation releases firms from regulatory control, the trade-off model of agency 
costs suggests reduced benefits of dividend payment. As such, the agency theory predicts that the 
dividend payout ratio of deregulated firms would decline and the determinants of dividend 
payout will gradually converge with those of non-regulated firms. The pecking order theory 
holds out similar prediction, that is, the expanded investment opportunity set and heightened 
competition lead to lower dividend payouts to conserve the least expensive internally-generated 
cash flows both out of necessity and as a precautionary action.  
The clientele theory, on the other hand, suggests that firms may change their dividend 
policy in response to demands of their tax-based clienteles. Since deregulation affects the 
operating environment of the firm, prior literature provides evidence that there exist changes in 
the clientele after deregulation, characterized by more concentrated inside and outside block-
holdings (Kole and Lehn (1999); Rennie (2006)). A migration to more concentrated institutional 
holdings, however, may not cause firms to increase dividends since high-tax clients prefer fewer 
dividends (Desai and Jin (2011); Grinstein and Michaely (2005)).  
The signaling theory, nevertheless, predicts that higher quality firms are likely to increase 
their dividend payouts to signal firm quality and distinguish them from lower quality firms in a 
more competitive environment induced by deregulation; whether the increases will raise the 
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average dividend payout of deregulated firms is an empirical question. Based on the theoretical 
predictions discussed above, I propose the following hypotheses, in alternative form: 
H2: Deregulation will cause firms to reduce their dividend payout ratios and the 
determinants of dividend payout will eventually converge with those of non-regulated firms. 
 
4.3 Evolution of speed of adjustment of corporate dividend policy to optimal levels 
 
Firms subject to regulation are protected from competition, and have limited growth 
opportunities and little operating risk. Their dividend payouts primarily serve to control the 
double agency problems besetting them (Smith (1986)). Thus the link between investment 
opportunities, operating earnings and dividends is weak. After the launch of the deregulation 
process, the firms being deregulated have to consider intensified competition, expanded growth 
opportunity sets and increased business risk when allocating their funds. All these necessitate the 
formulation of optimal dividend payouts based on corporate earnings and more speedy 
adjustment to the target dividend payout ratios in accordance with the trade-off of costs and 
benefits. Following this line of reasoning, I expect more responsive adjustments of dividends to 
earnings changes and closer links between dividend payouts and corporate earnings in reaction to 
economic deregulation. Hence the new hypothesis: 
H3: Dividend payouts will be adjusted at greater speed toward optimal levels for firms in 
deregulated industries relative to when their industries are regulated. 
 
4.4 Evolution of information content of dividend policy changes 
 
As discussed above, firms under regulation use dividends mainly to cope with the double 
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agency problems, not as a vehicle to signal firm quality in an environment where competition is 
lacking and managerial discretionary actions are largely restrained. Under regulation, firms are 
overseen by regulators, whose supervision drastically reduced managements’ discretion in 
investment, financing or operation decisions (Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999); 
Ovtchinnikov (2010a)). Deregulation brings the role of regulators to an end and allows managers 
to take the reins of decision-making. In addition, as deregulation-induced competition comes to a 
head, firms have rational reasons to conceal information from competitors (Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a)). The expansion of managerial power and responsibilities and the growing complexity in 
decision-making in situations of intensified competition may encumber efficient communication 
of information. Therefore, deregulation increases information asymmetry. Given that increased 
information asymmetry highlights the need for quality signaling, I expect that following 
deregulation, firms will be more prone to using dividends as a signaling mechanism. On the 
other hand, dividends are expected to be more information-laden about earnings changes post-
deregulation versus pre-deregulation. Employing the theory of information content of dividends, 
Guay and Harford (2000) argue that stock price reaction is greater to a firm’s dividend increase 
when the payout decision is contrary to the cash flow permanence perceived by the market. This 
suggests that the less expected the information content of dividends, the greater the market 
reaction. Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) distinguish the sources of dividends and 
share repurchases by stating that dividends are paid with higher permanent operating cash flows 
while repurchases with higher temporary, non-operating cash flows. The information content 
theory thus predicts that market valuation reaction to dividend increase and decrease 
announcements will be stronger after deregulation than before deregulation. In addition, the 
relation between dividend changes and future changes in earnings will be stronger post-
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deregulation relative to pre-deregulation. Hence I have the following two hypotheses:  
H4A: Stock market valuation reaction to announced dividend increases and decreases 
will be stronger for deregulated firms compared to when they are regulated.  
H4B: The relation between dividend changes and future earnings will be stronger when 
firms are deregulated relative to when they are not. 
4.5 Evolution of corporate financing activities in response to deregulation 
To mitigate the agency problem appears to be one of the major forces that drive firms’ 
dividend policy. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that regular dividend payments dissipate a sizable 
portion of firms’ cash flows, thus helping keep firms in the capital market. By subjecting 
management to financial market monitoring and discipline each time a firm issues debt or equity, 
shareholders benefit from reduced agency costs. Moreover, firms in regulated industries have to 
cope with an additional agency problem – agency conflicts between shareholders and regulatory 
authority. Smith (1986) thus argue that the policy of higher dividend payments is employed by 
firms under regulation because they induce more frequent trips to financial markets, which 
updates the regulator of current financing costs and help in determining appropriate rate of return 
for shareholders. Economic deregulation brings about significant changes to the operating 
environment of firms previously under regulation. For example, deregulation removes 
restrictions on firms’ investments, thus greatly expands their growth opportunity set. In the 
meantime, deregulation heralds in competition, thus putting into test firms’ overall performance, 
strength and business strategies and increasing uncertainties over their earnings capacity and 
survivability. All these galvanize the demand for additional capital to meet investment needs to 
reinforce competitive advantage and maximize their benefits, and prepare for possible ups and 
downs in operations. Based on this line of reasoning, deregulated firms are expected to be more 
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active in seeking external financing to secure sufficient funding in coping with competition. This 
leads to Hypothesis 5:  
H5: Firms increase the frequency of external financing activities after deregulation 
relative to when their industries are regulated. 
 
5. The Industry Matching Method and the Three “Snapshot” Periods 
 
It is well documented that dividend policies exhibit certain time trends. For example, 
firms are becoming less likely to pay dividends (e.g., Fama and French (2001); Denis and 
Osobov 2008)) and there is a downward trend in target payout and speed of adjustment of 
dividends to earnings (Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005)). To identify whether the 
economic deregulation per se induces changes in dividend policies, I construct a matched control 
industry for each deregulated industry and use difference-in-difference approach in empirical 
analyses to control for the contemporaneous time effects and draw inferences. 
Industries are defined based on the Fama-French (1997) 48 industries.
15
 There are at least 
two reasons to follow the Fama and French (1997) classification of industries. First, the Fama 
and French (1997) approach of categorizing all the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms into 48 
distinct industries groups firms with similar industrial characteristics and at the same time limits 
the number of industries within a manageable range. Second, Ovtchinnikov (2010a) specifically 
justifies the use of broad industry definition in studying regulated industries by pointing out that 
although a deregulation initiative may be directed at only a particular industry segment, it 
inevitably impacts all firms in an industry since industry segments are closely interrelated.  
 The industry matching approach is to obtain a control sample that accounts for dynamic 
                                                        
15
 The five deregulated industries based on Fama and French 48 industry classifications are entertainment (7), 
petroleum and natural gas (31), utilities (32), telecommunications (33), and transportation (41). 
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changes in the composition of an industry. This method matches each deregulated industries with 
a non-regulated industry based on the three fundamental factors in dividend decisions. I follow 
the procedures of the portfolio matching method employed by Ovtchinnikov (2010a) except that, 
instead of matching a deregulated firm with a fixed portfolio of non-regulated firm, I identify an 
industry that is closest to a deregulated industry in terms of size, growth opportunities and 
profitability in the year preceding the year in which the first significant deregulation initiative 
was undertaken. The reason why I choose the three variables is because they are identified by 
prior literature as major determinants of the firm’s dividend policy (e.g., Denis and Osobov 
(2008); Fama and French (2001)). The industry matching method takes the following steps: First, 
I calculate the industry average of size, growth opportunities and profitability of each 
deregulated industry in our sample – entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, 
telecommunications, and transportation in year -1, i.e., the year preceding the launch of the 
deregulation process; Second, I calculate the industry average of size, growth opportunities and 
profitability of the remaining 39 industries based on the Fama-French definition of 48 industries 
(I have already excluded four finance-related industries) in the same year for each deregulated 
industry; Third, I compute the sum of absolute values of (MeanValuedereg – 
MeanValuenonreg)/MeanValuedereg for each of the variables. The smallest sum indicates that a non-
regulated industry is closest to a deregulated industry based on the three attributes. When a non-
regulated industry happens to be the match of two deregulated industries, I choose the second 
best match for one of the two deregulated industries. Thus, for each of the five deregulated 
industries I find a matched industry of control firms.
16
 
This industry matching method has advantages over Ovtchinnikov’s (2010a) portfolio 
                                                        
16
 The five matched control industries are business services (35) for entertainment (7), pharmaceutical products (13) 
for petroleum and natural gas (31), automobiles and trucks (24) for utilities (32), chemicals (14) for 
telecommunications (33), and aircraft (25) for transportation (41). 
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match method in that this approach accounts for dynamic changes in the composition of an 
industry, including occurrences of new entrants, mergers and acquisitions, and delists. The 
portfolio matching method, however, results in control portfolios whose composition is fixed in 
year -1 and does not change except through firm attrition.  
To facilitate comparison, I follow Ovtchinnikov (2010a) and take three “snapshots”, each 
of five years, of the periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation. The 
regulation period is defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first 
significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The partial deregulation 
period is defined as the five years starting from the year of the significant deregulatory initiative 
(0, 4). The complete deregulation period is defined as the five years immediately following the 
year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5).  
To prevent contemporaneous macro-economic factors and time series patterns from 
contaminating the effects of deregulation on firms’ dividend policy,17 I use the difference-in-
differences approach to test whether deregulation significantly affects firms’ dividend payout. 
Specifically I compare changes in deregulated firms’ dividend policy with changes in dividend 
policy of firms in control industries in the periods of regulation, partial deregulation and 
complete deregulation to draw inferences about the effects of deregulation on the dividend policy 
of deregulated firms. Since firm behavior in the absence of deregulation is captured by the firms 
in control industries (i.e., control firms), inferences can thus be drawn that any differences in 
firm performance between deregulated firms and control firms are primarily attributable to the 
process of deregulation. 
                                                        
17
 The length of the deregulation process varies for each deregulated industry. For example, it takes the 
entertainment industry five years to get free from regulation. However, the process lasts two decades for the 
transportation industry. During the long time interval, many factors, such as business cycle, technological trends, 
and supply and demand shocks, may have a contributive effect on the change in attributes of deregulated firms 
(Ovtchinnikov (2010a)). 
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6. Data, Sample, Variable Definition, and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, I describe sample construction, sample distribution, variable definition 
and descriptive statistics.  
6.1 Data and sample construction  
I collect financial data from Compustat and daily stock return data from CRSP for all 
firms between 1966 and 2008. Since 1976 was the year in which economic deregulation was first 
introduced into the transportation industry – the first industry that was being deregulated, 
extending the sample period to 10 years prior to deregulation enables us to calculate earnings 
volatility and check firm attributes in the state of regulation. The year of 2008 was the last year 
Compustat financial information was available when this research started. Following previous 
literature, I exclude financial service firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because their financing 
decisions may be driven by factors fundamentally different from those for other deregulated 
firms in the sample, such as statutory capital requirements. I also exclude cross-listed, non-U.S. 
firms. To avoid possible data entry errors, observations with negative value on total assets, sales 
and dividends are excluded. The data requirements result in a sample of 245,029 firm-year 
observations. Our sub-sample of deregulated firms over the three “snapshot” periods (15 years in 
total) consists of 17,906 firm-year observations on a total of 2,762 distinctive firms. I construct 
control industries through industry matching method (all the firms in control industries serve as 
control firms for firms in their corresponding deregulated industries) following the procedure 
described in the previous section to obtain a matched control sample of 12,581 firm-year 
observations on 1,998 distinctive firms.  
6.2 Sample distribution and dynamic changes 
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Panel A of Table 2 reports the number of firms for each of five deregulated industries in 
each relative year (relative to year 0, the year in which the first major deregulation initiative is 
undertaken in an industry) of the three “snapshot” periods. The industry of utilities has the 
largest number of firm-year observations (5,036), followed by petroleum and natural gas (4,744), 
telecommunications (3,609), transportation (2,641), and entertainment (1,876). The number of 
firm-year observations increases along the deregulation process from 4,977 in regulation period, 
to 5,943 in partial deregulation period, and to 6,986 in complete deregulation period, with the 
industry of telecommunication having the largest increase (from 121 distinctive firms in the 
regulation period to 384 in the complete deregulation period) and entertainment having the least 
increase (from 100 to 148). 
Panel B tracks the number of surviving deregulated firms along the deregulation process  
and Panel C presents the percentage of surviving deregulated firms in each year of the 
deregulation period relative to the number of firms in year -1, the year before the first major 
deregulation initiative is taken in an industry. A firm is defined as a surviving deregulated firm if 
it exists in year -1 and any year during the post-deregulation periods. As the data show, the total 
number of surviving deregulated firms has decreased from 1,071 in year -1 to 889 by the end of 
period of partial deregulation (year 4) and to 414 in the last year of the period of complete 
deregulation (year +5), suggesting that some 60 percent of the firms exit along the deregulation 
process. The industry of transportation has the largest attrition with 172 firms in year -1 and only 
36 in year +5 (a survival rate of only about 20 percent), while the industry of utilities has the 
highest surviving rate of nearly 59 percent, from 353 firms in year -1 and to 208 firms in year +5. 
The analysis in the next subsection will present whether the disappearance is due to delisting, or 
merger and acquisition. 
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Table 3 reports the number of new entrants, exits and surviving firms in each year of the 
post-deregulation period relative to year -1 in each of the deregulated industries. A firm is 
defined as a new entrant in year t if it does not exist in year -1 but enters into the sample in year t, 
an exit if it exists in year -1 but disappears in year t, and a surviving firm if it exists in year -1 
and continues to exist in year t. The data show dynamic changes in the composition of the 
deregulated industries and the changes appear to speed up with the advance of the deregulation 
process. For example, for all the deregulated industries, there are 410 new entrants (a new entrant 
rate of 38.28 percent relative to the number of firms in year -1) and 182 exits (an exit rate of 
16.99 percent) at the end of the partial deregulation period (year 4) while the corresponding 
numbers are 942 (87.96 percent) and 657 (61.34 percent) at the end of the complete deregulation 
period (year +5). Except for the industry of utilities, all other deregulated industries have new 
entrant rates and exit rate exceeding 60 percent in year +5.  
I further present a more aggregated picture for the new entrants, exits and surviving firms 
for the “snapshot” periods (e.g., partial and complete deregulation periods) in Table 4. The 
definitions of new entrants, exits and surviving firms are the same as in Table 3 with one 
exception: the status of a firm is determined based on whether it exists in any year of partial 
(complete) deregulation period instead of a specific year as in Table 3. Table 4 in general tells a 
similar story. For example, over the partial deregulation period, there are 450 new entrants, with 
a new entrant rate of 42.02 percent (450/1,071) and 40 exits, with an exit rate of 3.73 percent 
(40/1,071). However, during the complete deregulation period, the total number of new entrants 
increases to 1,297 with the new entrant rate being 121.10 percent and the number of exits climbs 
to 553 with the exit rate being 51.63 percent. The industry of telecommunications has the highest 
new entrant rate (298.21 percent), followed by entertainment (133.03 percent), transportation 
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(131.40 percent), petroleum and gas (118.96 percent), and utilities (29.75 percent). For exit rate, 
the industry of transportation ranks the first (74.42 percent), followed by petroleum and natural 
gas (62.45 percent), telecommunications (54.17 percent), entertainment (41.28 percent), and 
utilities (34.28 percent). 
The overall evidence in this subsection presents a picture of dynamic change in the 
composition of the deregulated industries along the deregulation process, consistent with the 
findings of Ovtchinnikov (2010b) that economic initiative triggers restructuring activities and 
cause structural change in the deregulated industries.  
 
6.3 Key variable definitions 
In this subsection, I define the key variables. Some variables may be defined in the 
specific subsections. All the variable definitions are in Appendix A. There are two categories of 
variables. The first category is about dividend payout ratio and the second category is about firm 
characteristics that are related to dividend policies. 
I use six measures of dividend payout plus dividend yield in analysis. The first measure, 
Dividend/Earnings, is defined as cash dividends divided by earnings before extraordinary items 
for common shares of the previous fiscal year. The second measure, Dividend/Asset, is estimated 
as cash dividends dividend by total assets in the previous fiscal year and the third measure, 
Dividend/Sales, is calculated as cash dividends divided by revenues in the previous fiscal year. 
The last two measures, Dividend/Cash Flow and Dividend/Net Income are computed as cash 
dividends divided by cash flow (net income + depreciation) and net income, respectively. Since 
dividend yield is also used by managers as a target in deciding dividend payout
18
 and guide by 
                                                        
18
 Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) mention that some chief executive officers interviewed target 
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Grullon and Michaely (2007), I include this variable in my analysis. As in Grullon and Michaely 
(2007), Dividend Yield is defined as common cash dividends scaled by previous fiscal year-end 
market value of equity, which, in turn, is computed as common shares outstanding multiplied by 
fiscal year end stock price.   
Following previous research, I compute profitability, E/AT, as earnings before 
extraordinary items plus interest expense plus income statement deferred taxes if available and 
scaled by total assets. Market-to-book ratio (MTB), a proxy for investment opportunity, is 
estimated as the market value of equity divided by book value of equity. MV/AT, the ratio of 
market value of asset to book value of asset and also a proxy for growth opportunity, is computed 
as (total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity)/total assets. dAT/AT is yearly 
change in total assets, computed as the difference between total assets scaled by total assets. 
Earned/contributed equity mix, RE/BE, is retained earnings scaled by book value of equity. I 
compute leverage (Bklev) as long-term debt plus short-term debt scaled by book value of total 
assets. Volatility is the volatility of stock returns, computed as the standard deviation of daily 
stock return in a fiscal year. Operating cash flow, OCF, is the ratio of operating income before 
depreciation to total assets. I measure each year’s operating cash flow volatility, OCF Volatility, 
as the standard deviation of operating cash flow of that year and the preceding four years. A 
firm’s age is the time (number of years) from its listing in CRSP.19 All variables, except firm age 
and dummy variables, are winsorized at the 1st percentile and 99th percentile to ease the concern 
of outliers.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
dividend yield in implementing their firms’ dividend policy. 
19
 For accuracy, I check firm listing information from CRSP against information contained in a data set used in 
Jovanovich and Rousseau (2001). The dataset also provides information about firms’ year of founding and year of 
incorporation. I obtained the data set from Prof. Jovanovich’s website http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/jovanovi/. 
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6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the key variables for deregulated firms over the 
three “snapshot” periods (15 years). All the statistics are estimated based on the pooled data. The 
mean (median) Dividend/Earning, Dividend/Asset, Dividend/Sales, Dividend/Cash Flow, 
Dividend/Net Income, and Dividend Yield are 0.33 (0.13), 0.02 (0.01), 0.03 (0.01), 0.16 (0.04), 
0.29 (0.02) and 0.03 (0.01), respectively. The disparity between mean and median values 
suggests that large dividend payers dominate the dividend payment, consistent with the evidence 
documented by Denis and Osobov (2008). The positive skewness of dividend payment is also 
found by Grullon and Michaely (2007).  
The mean (median) firm size is $2,211 (228) million in terms of total assets and $3,096 (291) 
million in terms of market value. The mean (median) profitability and operating cash flow is 
0.003 (0.055), 0.093 (0.123), respectively. As to the proxies for growth opportunities, the mean 
(median) of the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, asset growth, and sales 
growth is 1.758 (1.188), 0.079 (0.068), 0.272 (0.096), respectively. The mean (median) 
earned/contributed equity mix is 0.170 (0.376), consistent with the median value of 0.341 
documented by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006). The value of book leverage (mean = 
0.354, median = 0.346) is in line with the numbers documented by Ovechinnikov (2010a). For 
the measures of firm risk, the mean (median) stock return volatility and operating cash flow 
volatility is 0.032 (0.027) and 0.066 (0.029), respectively.   
 
7. Empirical Tests 
 
In this section, I empirically test the hypotheses developed in Section 4. I first investigate 
changes in the propensity to pay dividends of firms affected by the deregulation process. I then 
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proceed to examine the evolution of dividend payout ratio, i.e., how much to pay in dividends. 
Based on Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model and its variant Fama-Babiak (1968) model, I 
analyze whether firms’ dividend policy becomes more sensitive to the past and current earnings 
in response to economic deregulation. The test of change in the information content of dividends 
follows. I finally study the financing activities of deregulated firms.     
7.1 Effects of deregulation on firms’ propensity to pay dividends 
In this subsection, I focus on the effects of deregulation on firms’ decision regarding 
whether or not to pay dividends. As documented by previous research, firms under regulation are 
more inclined to pay out dividends than non-regulated firms, in an effort to control the agency 
problems exacerbated by the excess free cash flow and the scarcity of investment opportunities 
(Easterbrook (1984); Moyer, Rao and Tripathy (1992); Smith (1986)). Given that deregulation 
changes firms’ operating environment by removing government control and direct involvement 
in business operations and ushering in competition, I expect deregulation to have significant 
negative effects on deregulated firms’ propensity to pay dividends. I also hypothesize that the 
determinants of deregulated firms’ propensity to pay dividends will eventually converge with 
those of non-regulated firms as a result of the deregulation drive. 
7.1.1 Time trends in dividend payment along deregulation process 
 
I begin by investigating dividend behavior of firms in the deregulated industries along the 
deregulation process. Specifically, I classify any deregulated firm (both surviving firms and new 
entrants) as a payer if a firm pays dividends in year t and a non-payer otherwise. To identify what 
drives the change in the number of non-payers—those who fail to initiate dividends and those 
who abandon dividend payment, I follow Fama and French (2001) and further classify a non-
payer as a former payer if the firm pays dividends in any previous year and a never-paid if firm 
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has never paid dividends since it appears in CRSP. Figure 1 presents the percent of each of these 
four groups of firms in each year relative to year 0, the year in which the first major deregulation 
initiative is taken in an industry, in the three “snapshot” periods. As shown in the figure, firms in 
the deregulated industries become less and less likely to pay dividend over time, with non-payers 
gradually outnumbering payers along the deregulation process. During the period of regulation, 
dividend payers account for approximately 70 percent of the sample firms; in the partial 
deregulation period, the proportion of firms paying dividend slides to about 50 percent; the 
fraction of dividend payers further drops to below 40 percent in the period of complete 
deregulation. A closer analysis reveals that while the fraction of former payers registers a minor 
growth, the percent of firms that never paid dividends increases drastically in the periods of 
partial deregulation and complete deregulation, suggesting that there is a flow of new entrants 
into the deregulated industries that never pay dividends.  
Overall, the analyses show a conspicuous declining trend of dividend payer in 
deregulated industries along the deregulation process. While there is some evidence that former 
payers abandon dividends, the declining trend is primarily driven by firms that have never paid 
dividends. In fact, I find that firms that enter into the deregulated industries after the launch of 
economic deregulation account for 85 percent of the never-paid group. This observation 
necessitates separate analysis of surviving deregulated firms to isolate the effect of new entrants 
on the overall dividend payment. 
7.1.2 Dynamic changes of deregulated firms along deregulation process 
 
Economic deregulation changes the operating environment of all firms in the deregulated 
industries, which affects firms’ performance and behavior. It is conceivable that new entrants 
would follow the new rules of competition. Of particular interest is how the firms that exist 
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during the period of regulation adapt their behavior to the new operating environment and how 
they fare along the deregulation process. To explore this issue, I trace a group of firms that exist 
in year -1, the year prior to the year in which the first deregulation initiative was undertaken in 
an industry (year 0), all the way through the five-year partial deregulation and five-year complete 
deregulation periods. 
Table 6 presents the dynamic changes that take place to dividend payers and non-payers 
in year -1 in each of the ensuing deregulation years. Panel A shows a continual and monotonic 
attrition of dividend payers along the years of deregulation. In the first year of deregulation, 
nearly 5 percent of the firms that pay dividend in year -1 lose payer status due to either dividend 
abandonment, or merger and acquisition, or delisting. By year 4, the last year in our defined 
partial deregulation period, only 81 percent of the year -1 payers remain steadfast in their 
dividend payment, nearly 7 percent stop paying, another 7 percent are merged or acquired, and 
the remaining 5 percent simply disappear because of delisting for various reasons. The ending 
year of the complete deregulation period sees further erosion of the rank and file of the year -1 
dividend payers: nearly 40 percent keep paying dividends, while the other 60 percent dividend 
payers lose the payer status: 8 percent stop paying, 27 percent are lost to mergers and 
acquisitions and another 25 percent to delisting from stock exchanges. The evidence that a fair 
number of firms are lost to merger and acquisition is consistent with the findings of 
Ovtchinnikov (2010b) that deregulation opens up the market for corporate control in the affected 
industries and there is a tidal wave of mergers and acquisitions following the deregulation 
initiatives. The increasing percent of stop-paying firms (from 5 percent in year 0 to 8 percent in 
year +5) provides some evidence that former regulated payers abandon dividends in the 
aftermath of deregulation.   
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Panel B presents a picture of dynamic changes along the deregulation process for non-
payers in year -1. Consistent with the notion that dividend payers are in better financial and 
economic shape than non-payers, non-payers fall victims to delisting faster and in greater 
magnitudes than payers. Specifically, by year +5, the last year of the period of complete 
deregulation, nearly 55 percent of the year -1 non-payers disappear because of delisting and 
another 22 percent are either merged or acquired, while about 16 percent remain avoiding 
dividend payment. Only 7 percent of the former non-payers start to pay dividends. The evidence 
that a modest percent of surviving firms maintain non-payer status plus a drastic increase in the 
percent of never-paid firms documented earlier confirm the previous observation that new 
entrants play an important role in the declining trend of dividend payment.  
There are two possible causes that contribute to the decline in the number of dividend 
payers each year along the deregulation process: First, the decline in dividend payers may be 
caused by changing firm characteristics, i.e., deregulated firms shift toward those firms with 
characteristics typical of non-payers; second, the decline may be caused by a declining 
propensity to pay dividends, i.e., firms with the characteristics typical of payers become less 
likely to pay dividends. In the following discussion, I first examine the evolution of firm 
characteristics along the three “snapshot” periods and then employ out-of-sample analysis to 
investigate the propensity to pay dividends induced by economic deregulation.   
7.1.3 Evolution of deregulated firms’ characteristics 
 
Table 7 presents firm characteristics identified to be determinants of whether to pay 
dividend for all the deregulated firms, dividend payers and non-payers separately. The statistics 
are estimated based on the pooled data. A firm is classifies as dividend payer (non-payer) if it 
pays dividend (does not pay dividend) in year t and it is included in the estimation of statistics of 
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dividend payers (non-payers). Panel A reports descriptive statistics for all deregulated firms. To 
maintain comparability of the measure over time despite increases in the size of the sample and 
changes in its distribution by market capitalization, I follow Fama and French (2001) and define 
a firm’s size, NYP, as the proportion of NYSE-listed firms with the same or smaller market 
capitalization than the firm itself. Other variables are as defined previously. 
The comparison of firm characteristics between dividend payers and non-payers reveals 
that dividend payers are larger (AT), older (AGE) and more profitable (E/AT) while non-payers 
have more volatile return (Volatility), higher growth opportunities (MV/AT), and higher growth 
rate (dAT/AT, Saleg). Consistent with previous evidence that the company’s earned/contributed 
equity mix estimated as the ratio of retained earnings to the book value of equity (RE/BE) is 
significantly associated with the propensity to pay dividends (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2006)), the data in Table 7 show that the mean (median) value of RE/BE is 0.480 (0.472) for 
dividend payers versus -0.180 (0.136) for non-payers, indicating that dividend payers have 
higher internally generated capital. Interestingly, the non-payers have negative retained earnings 
in our sample. The same phenomenon is documented by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) 
and Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) for the Compustat universe non-payers. 
Collectively, the analysis suggests that the convention that dividend payers tend to be larger, 
more mature, and more profitable also applies to firms in the formerly regulated industries.  
To examine whether deregulated firms shift toward those with characteristics typical of 
dividend non-payers, I present the evolution of firm characteristics in the three “snapshot” 
periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation in Table 8. Panel A shows 
the dynamic changes of firm characteristics for all deregulated firms and Panel B show those for 
surviving deregulated firms. Surviving firms are those that exist in any year during the period of 
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regulation and continue their existence into the periods of partial deregulation and complete 
deregulation. Following Denis and Osobov (2008), we report averages of annual medians in the 
three “snapshot” periods. 
The data in Panel A of Table 8 demonstrate a steady decline in profitability along the line 
of the deregulation process, with E/AT starting at 0.067 in the regulation period, dropping to 
0.062 during the partial deregulation period and reaching 0.041 in the complete deregulation 
period. This decline is more pronounced for non-dividend payers as indicated by the numbers 
(from 0.049 to 0.019 to 0.008). A further analysis suggests that the larger decline for non-payers 
is induced by firms that never paid dividends. In fact, out of the non-payers, the never-paid firms 
experience the sharpest decline in profitability, from 0.050 to 0.019 to 0.004 respectively, 
whereas those that abandon dividend payment (former payers) show much more stable 
profitability.  
As shown in Panel B, surviving deregulated firms also exhibit declining profitability, but 
the magnitude is smaller. In particular, E/AT for all the surviving firms change from 0.067 to 
0.066 to 0.050 over the three “snapshot” periods and the corresponding numbers for never paid 
firms are 0.050, 0.038, and 0.032. Taken together, the evidence indicates that the declining 
profitability is mostly driven by new entrants that never pay dividends.  
Further analysis on the number of observations of dividend payers during the complete 
deregulation period for all the deregulated firms (2,774) and surviving deregulated firms (1,642) 
indicates that some new entrants pay dividends. However, the analysis on the number of 
observations of never-paid firms in the total deregulated firms and the surviving deregulated 
firms (3,881 vs. 486) shows that a large number of new entrants do not pay dividends and these 
firms dominant the never-paid subsample.    
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In support of the argument that the deregulation process brings about the expansion of 
deregulated firms’ investment sets, the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets 
(MV/AT) grows almost monotonically for all deregulated firms, payers, and former payers. This 
is also the case for surviving firms. This evidence is unique to deregulated firms, as Denis and 
Osobov (2008) document a decline in growth opportunities over time for all Worldscope
20
 U.S. 
firms and Fama and French (2001) report a U-shaped change in growth opportunities for all 
CRSP and Compustat firms. Another interesting observation is that former payers – firms paying 
dividends in previous years and later abandon dividend payment, have market-to-book asset ratio 
of less than one during regulation and partial deregulation periods. Possibly because of 
heightened competition, both sales growth rate (Saleg) and asset growth rate (dAT/AT) exhibit a 
declining trend along the deregulation process.       
The declining trend also appears in all deregulated firms’ proportion of equity that is from 
retained earnings (RE /BE). For example, the retained earnings to equity (RE /BE) is 0.419, 0.411, 
and 0.273 for all the deregulated firms over the three “snapshot” periods, respectively. The 
decline is more pronounced for non-dividend payers (the corresponding numbers are 0.306, 
0.165, and 0.056) and never-paid firms (the corresponding numbers are 0.296, 0.149, and 0.042). 
However, the earned/contributed equity mix of the surviving deregulated firms has been 
strikingly stable along the deregulation process, indicating that the new entrants drive the 
declining trend of RE/BE. Consistent with Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) that 
individual stocks have become more volatile, all groups of the deregulated firms exhibit an 
upward trend on stock return volatility. Surprisingly, surviving firms do not share this trend and 
                                                        
20
 The Worldscope database is a product of Thomson Reuters. The database offers fundamental data on the world’s 
leading public and private companies, which include annual and interim/quarterly data, historical financial statement 
content, per share data, calculated ratios, pricing and textual information. 
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there is some evidence that return volatility decreases for the survivors. 
In sum, deregulated firms become less profitable and riskier, enjoy higher growth 
opportunities, and have a reduced rate of internally generated funds along the deregulation 
process. These trends are much more pronounced for new entrants that never pay dividends. It 
seems that deregulated firms have shifted toward the type of firms with characteristics typical of 
non-payers.  
7.1.4 Multivariate analysis of determinants of dividend payment 
 
In this part, I investigate the determinants of the firms’ probability to pay dividends for 
deregulated firms and whether the impact of the determinants has changed along the deregulation 
process. Guided by the previous studies (e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006); Fama and 
French (2001); Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008)), I estimate the following Fama 
and French (2001) logit regression model 
Payert = β0 + β1 NYPt + β2 Et /ATt + β3 MVt /ATt + β4 dATt /ATt + β5REt/BEt + εt          (7.1a) 
and Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) model 
Payert = β0 + β1 NYPt + β2 Et /ATt + β3 MVt /ATt + β4 Salegt + β5 REt/BEt  
+ β6 LAGEt + β7LVolatilityt + εt                                                                                                         (7.1b)  
The dependent variable, Payer, is set to one if a firm pays dividend in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Relative firm size (NYP), profitability (E/AT), growth opportunity (MV/AT), asset growth 
(dAT/AT ), sales growth (Saleg), earned/contributed equity mix (RE/BE), logarithm of firm age 
(LAGE), and logarithm of stock return volatility (LVolatility) are included as explanatory 
variables to control for heterogeneity in firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, expansions, 
internally generated funds, maturity, and risk. Follow previous studies, I estimate the logit 
regressions using Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Specifically, I estimate logit regressions 
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each year and average the coefficients of each explanatory variable. Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
approach addresses clusters within cross-section. To account for the possible serial correlation in 
the data, I estimate the standard errors robust to serial correlations of up to three lags using 
Newey-West procedure (Newey and West (1987)). 
Larger firms are expected to be more likely to pay. Similarly, more profitable firms, more 
mature firms, and firms with more internally generated funds are more likely to pay. Thus, I 
expect a positive sign for the coefficients on these variables. In contrast, firms with high growth 
opportunities, in the fast growing stage, and with high risk are expected to hold funds and 
accordingly are less likely to pay. Therefore, a negative sign is expected for MV/AT, dAT/AT, 
Saleg, and Volatility.   
For comparison purposes, I present two sets of results. Following Fama and French (2001) 
and Denis and Osobov (2008), I first include relative firm size (NYP), profitability (E/AT), 
growth opportunity (MV/AT), asset growth (dAT/AT), and earned/contributed equity mix (RE/BE) 
in Equation (7.1a) and report the results in Panel A of Table 9. This is referred to as the “short 
specification”. Then I follow Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) to replace asset 
growth with sales growth and add firm age (LAGE) and stock return volatility (LVolatility) in the 
regression specification – Equation (7.1b) – and report results in Panel B. This is referred to as 
the “long specification”. Under each set of analysis, separate regressions are estimated for all the 
deregulated firms, payers and non-payers as well as further for the entire sample period (1 + 2 + 
3), regulation period (1), partial deregulation period (2), and complete deregulation period (3) in 
the table. 
Results in Panel A and Panel B of Table 9 reveal that the coefficients on profitability and 
volatility have the expected positive signs and are significant consistently across all model 
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specifications, all groups of firms, and all the three periods, consistent with the notion that firms 
that are more profitable and have lower risk are more likely to pay dividends. The coefficients on 
firm age, growth opportunities, and earned/contributed equity mix have the expected signs and 
significant in most cases, providing some evidence that older firms, firms with fewer growth 
options and more internally generated funds have higher probability to pay dividends. Given that 
previous research finds that firm size, profitability, earned/contributed equity mix, and firm age 
have significantly positive impact on the decision to pay dividends and growth opportunities, 
sales growth, and firm risk have significantly negative impact, it seems that firms in deregulated 
industries share some common determinants of the probability to pay as non-regulated firms. For 
the time-series analysis across the three periods, I find that the impact of some determinants has 
changed over time. For example, the coefficients on earned/contributed equity mix turn from 
insignificant in the regulation and partial deregulation periods to significant in the complete 
deregulation period for all the deregulated firms. The coefficients on growth opportunities also 
change over time in some cases. More importantly, the coefficients on all variables for total 
deregulated firms in the complete deregulation period (3) turn to the predicted signs and become 
statistically significant in both model specifications. These changes seem to suggest that 
deregulated firms are moving towards converging with non-regulated firms in terms of the 
decision on whether or not to pay dividends along the process of economic deregulation. I will 
further explore the convergence in a later subsection. 
Turning to the coefficients on the intercept, I find a positive intercept for dividend payers 
and a negative intercept for non-payers in Panel A, suggesting that there appears to be path-
dependence in dividend payment, i.e., regardless the effects of firm characteristics, dividend 
payers in year t-1 exhibit a preference to continue dividend payment in year t while non-payers 
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in year t-1 are less likely to initiate dividends in year t. Fama and French (2001) and Denis and 
Osobov (2008) document similar evidence in support of the notion of dividend stickiness. 
However, after controlling for firm return volatility and firm age, the path-dependence for 
dividend payers disappears. This seems to suggest that dividend payers refrain from committing 
to dividend payment when taking risks into account. The finding is in support of previously 
documented evidence that risks play an important role in the decision to pay (Grullon, Paye, 
Underwood and Weston (2008); Hoberg and Prabhala (2009)).     
To summarize, deregulated firms share some common determinants of the probability to 
pay as non-regulated firms, but also exhibit certain distinctive attributes. It seems that the 
differences mostly arise from the regulation period and deregulated firms are moving towards 
convergence with non-regulated firms along the deregulation process with regard to the decision 
to pay dividends. Moreover, I provide empirical evidence that the path-dependence of dividend 
payers found by previous research disappears after accounting for the risk factor.   
7.1.5 Out of sample analysis to differentiate deregulation effects on propensity to pay 
 
Although Figure 1 presents a picture of an overall decline in the number of deregulated 
firms paying dividends along the deregulation process, the decline trend may be due to the 
changing firm characteristics and/or may just be reflective of the general trend of declining 
propensity to pay observed by Fama and French (2001) for the universe of CRSP or Compustat 
firms. In this subsection, I conduct empirical tests to identify the effects of deregulation on firms’ 
propensity to pay dividends. Hypothesis 1 implies that if deregulation is a factor that reduces 
corporate propensity to pay, deregulated firms should have different footprints than non-
regulated firms in the evolution of dividend-paying propensity. To test this hypothesis, I use out 
of sample analysis to estimate the change in propensity to pay dividends by filtering out the 
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effect of changing firm characteristics and then compare the changing propensity to pay for 
deregulated firms and control firms to account for the general trend.   
To construct the payout model, I follow Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov 
(2008) to run logit regression of firms’ probability to pay dividends on firm characteristics such 
as size, profitability and growth opportunities separately for deregulated firms and control firms 
each year in the regulation period (-5, -1) and average the coefficients from annual regression to 
obtain the coefficients in the benchmark period (Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimation 
procedure). I then apply the estimated model for benchmark period to forecast the percent of 
firms that are expected to pay dividends in each relative year during the partial deregulation and 
complete deregulation periods. The expected percent of dividend payers each year is calculated 
as the average of the expected probability to pay dividend in that year, and accounts for changes 
in firm characteristics. Any difference between expected percent and actual percent of dividend 
payers is the portion of variations “unexplained” by changing firm characteristics, and reflects 
“pure” changes in firms’ propensity to pay dividends. If the expected percent of payers is greater 
than the actual percent, referred to as “propensity to pay deficits” in Grullon, Paye, Underwood 
and Weston (2008), there is a declining propensity to pay dividends, and vice versa.   
Parallel to the determinants of payer analysis in Table 9, I first employ explanatory 
variables used by Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008) in the analysis, 
including size, profitability, growth opportunities, asset growth and the earned/contributed equity 
mix. Panel A of Table 10 presents the empirical results for all the deregulated firms and control 
firms. In the first four years of the deregulation process, deregulated firms exhibit an increasing 
propensity to pay with the differences between the expected percent of payers and actual percent 
of payers ranging from -5.5 percent to -0.4 percent. As the deregulation process progresses, 
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deregulated firms appear to experience accelerated decreases in their propensity to pay. In the 
first three years of complete deregulation, the differences between the expected percent and the 
actual percent of payers turn to positive 6.5 percent, 8.9 percent, and 8.6 percent, respectively. 
The number jumps to 11.4 percent and 11.1 percent in the last two years the complete 
deregulation period. In comparison, the change in the propensity to pay of control firms is much 
more moderate with the differences between the expected percent and the actual percent of 
payers ranging from 3.9 percent to 8.7 percent during the complete deregulation period. However, 
the differences in the change in the propensity to pay between deregulated firms and control 
firms are mostly insignificant, suggesting that the declining propensity to pay dividends of 
deregulated firms is just a reflection of the overall trend found in CRSP or Compustat industrial 
firms and it appears that it does not bear the mark of the impact of the deregulation undertakings.   
I further estimate the change in propensity to pay of surviving deregulated firms which 
exist from the period of regulation to the periods of partial deregulation and complete 
deregulation. I compare changes in their propensity to pay dividends with that of the surviving 
control firms along the line of deregulation process and present the results in Panel B of Table 10. 
The surviving deregulated firms exhibit an increasing, not a declining, propensity to pay 
dividends even though the magnitude is getting smaller with the progress of the deregulation 
process. The propensity to pay dividends remains almost unchanged for surviving control firms 
for most of the years over the same time interval. Moreover, the differences in the change in 
propensity to pay between surviving deregulated firms and surviving control firms are not 
significant. In fact, Denis and Osobov (2008) document similar phenomenon for their constant 
sample firms (surviving firms). They find that firms existing during the benchmark period and 
continuing to exist in the later period do not post a significant decline in the propensity to pay 
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dividends. Surviving firms in some countries such as the U.K., they report, even register an 
increase in their propensity to pay dividends along the years.  
Next, I follow Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) and replicate the above 
analysis by incorporating two additional variables (the logarithm of firm age and the logarithm of 
stock return volatility) and replacing asset growth with sales growth and report the results in 
Panel C of Table 10 for total deregulated firms and total firms in control industries and Panel D 
for corresponding surviving firms. In general, the results remain qualitatively unchanged but 
with smaller magnitude for all the deregulated firms and control firms. More specifically, the 
declining propensity to pay for deregulated firms during the complete deregulation period ranges 
from 3.8 percent to 6.5 percent while the corresponding number for control firms ranges from 6.5 
percent to 9.4 percent. The differences between deregulated firms and control firms are not 
significant during the complete deregulation period. I find similar evidence for surviving 
deregulated firms and control firms. By and large, the evidence offers little empirical support to 
the hypothesis that deregulation initiatives have profound incremental impacts on the propensity 
to pay dividends of firms in the industries undergoing deregulation.  
Since the above estimates are made based on the sample of control firms constructed 
through the method of industry-matching, I use alternative controls to test the robustness of our 
results regarding the effect of deregulation on firms’ propensity to pay dividends. Drawing on 
Ovtchinnikov (2010a), I use all non-regulated Compustat firms as control firms and repeat the 
analysis for each deregulated industry separately. Specifically, I run the Grullon, Paye, 
Underwood and Weston (2008) regression model using Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure for 
all Compustat firms over the period of 1971 to 1975 to obtain the coefficients. Then I apply the 
coefficients from this benchmark period to deregulated firms and control firms each year over 
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the partial and complete deregulation periods to obtain expected probability to pay.
21
 The results 
are reported in Table 11. Similar to the data in Table 10, there is no discernible pattern for the 
change in the propensity to pay dividends for firms in each deregulated industry during the 
partial and complete deregulation periods, and the difference between the changes in the 
propensity to pay of deregulated firms and controls are largely insignificant with the exception of 
the utilities industry only. However, the utilities industry exhibits an increasing propensity to pay 
relative to total Compustat firms, contrary to the prediction.  
As another test, I use the remaining 39 industries as defined in the Fama and French 
(1997) 48 industries (with the exclusion of five deregulated industries and four financial service 
industries) and randomly assign eight industries to each deregulated industry (seven industries to 
the industry of transportation) as controls. The results, reported in Table 12, are qualitatively 
identical to those in Table 11. Again the propensity deficits for deregulated firms are not 
significantly higher than those for control firms, suggesting that deregulation does not cause 
accelerated decline in the propensity to pay dividends for firms previously under regulation.              
7.1.6 Which is to blame, dividend abandonment or failure to initiate? 
 
 I document that both deregulated firms and control firms experience a decline in the 
propensity to pay dividends after the deregulation process kicks off and there is no significant 
difference in this respect between these two groups of firms. To further investigate whether 
deregulated firms exhibit distinctive features in dividend policies in response to deregulation 
initiatives, I examine whether the decline is caused by dividend abandonment or/and failure to 
initiate dividends for both deregulated and control firms in this subsection.  
                                                        
21
 Given that Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) specification which includes two additional variables – 
the logarithm of firm age and the logarithm of stock return volatility – appears more stringent than the Fama and 
French (2001) specification, I use GPUW specification in robustness check. 
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Following Denis and Osobov (2008), I first divide sample firms in year +5, the last year 
in the five-year period of complete deregulation, into those that exist in the last year of the 
regulation period (year -1) and those that enter into the sample thereafter. I then segment these 
two groups further into dividend payers and non-payers. In this way, “Year -1 Payers” are firms 
that pay dividend as of year -1 and “Year -1 Non-payers” are firms that do not pay dividends as 
of year -1. Similarly, “Post Year -1 Payers” are those firms that enter into the sample after year -1 
and initiate dividends any time between year -1 and year +5 and “Post Year -1 Non-payers” are 
firms that enter into the sample after year -1 and never pay dividend throughout the deregulation 
process. 
I estimate the shortfall of dividend payers by computing the difference between the 
expected number of dividend payers and the actual number of dividend payers at year +5 for 
these four groups of firms. The expected number of dividend payers is estimated by summing the 
expected probabilities of dividend payment for each individual firm in year +5. Similar to Table 
10, I apply the average coefficients estimated from the regulation period (year -5 to year -1) to 
the values of each individual firm’s characteristics in year +5 to calculate the expected 
probabilities to pay dividends. I present results in Table 13 for both deregulated firms and control 
firms under two logit specifications as those in Table 10, with “short specification” referring to 
the regression using Fama and French (2001) variables and “long specification” to the regression 
using Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables.  
Similar to Denis and Osobov (2008), Panel A of Table 13 shows that for control firms, the 
failure to initiate dividend by non-payers is the main contributor to the shortfall of payers in year 
+5 ((8 + 92 = 100) for the short specification and (14 + 67 = 81) for the long specification) and 
payers actually exhibit higher propensity to pay than expected ((-11) + (-27) = (-38)) for the short 
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specification and -13 for the long specification). Deregulated firms have similar situations as 
control firms. Panel B of Table 13 shows that the shortfall of payers for deregulated industries in 
year +5 is also mostly caused by non-payers’ failure to initiate dividend payment ((10 + 139 = 
149) for the short specification and (8 + 62 = 70) for the long specification) and payers actually 
exhibit higher propensity to pay than expected ((-19) + (-19) = (-38)) for the short specification 
and (-26) for the long specification). In addition, the dividend shortfall rate for deregulated firms 
(111/1,001 = 11 percent for the short specification and 46/720 = 6 percent for the long 
specification) is similar to that for control firms (62/1,029 = 6 percent for the short specification 
and 71/762 = 9 percent for the long specification). The results further confirm my previous 
conclusions that economic deregulation per se does not induce a declining propensity to pay 
dividends beyond the secular trend. 
7.1.7 Convergence of determinants of whether to pay between deregulated and non-
regulated firms 
 
Even though there is little evidence that deregulation induces firms to become less likely 
to pay dividends, I further investigate whether the determinants of whether to pay dividends for 
deregulated firms converge with those of control firms. Given that deregulation relieves those 
firms from government control and major decision-making and place them on the same 
competition field as non-regulated firms, it is expected that the elements that determine the 
decision of deregulated firms on whether to pay dividends gradually converge with those of other 
industrial firms. In this part of analysis, I further explore this issue.  
Following Ovtchinnikov (2010a), I estimate the following cross-sectional regression 
which compares the determinants of whether to pay between regulated firms and firms in control 
industries over the three “snapshot” periods: 
Payert = β0 + β1 (Xit ) + β2 (Xit *Deregit) + β3 (Xit *Deregit*Regit) + εit                        (7.2) 
61 
 
 
 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables, which include firm size (NYP), Profitability (E/AT), 
Growth Opportunity (MV/AT), sales growth (Saleg), earned/contributed equity mix (RE/BE), 
logarithm of firm age (LAGE), and logarithm of stock return volatility (LVolatility). The 
dependent variable, Payer, is equal to one if a firm pays dividends in a year and zero otherwise. 
Dereg is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is in one of the five deregulated industries and 
zero otherwise. Reg is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm operates in the period of 
regulation, and zero otherwise. εit is the error term.  
I make two comparisons: differences between firms in deregulated industries and firms in 
control industries during the regulation and partial deregulation periods as well as during the 
regulation and complete deregulation periods. When I compare the regulation period versus the 
partial (complete) deregulation period, the dummy variable Reg is set to one if a firm operates in 
the regulation period and zero if in the partial (complete) deregulation period. This effectively 
divides the data into two sets: one is for the regulation and partial deregulation periods and the 
another for the regulation and complete deregulation periods. The coefficients of interest are β2 
and β3, which capture differences in the impact of various firm characteristics on corporate 
decisions of whether to pay dividends between deregulated firms and control firms over the 
different periods. While β2 reflects the differences in the decision to pay between deregulated and 
control firms in the partial (complete) deregulation, β3 reflects the differences during the 
regulation period. Given that regulated firms have unique payout policies during the regulation 
period, I expect that β3 would be significant to reflect the differences in payout policies between 
regulated firms and control firms during that period. If economic deregulation induces 
deregulated firms to converge their dividend polices with those of non-regulated firms, β2’s are 
expected to be insignificant for most of the variables, especially during the complete deregulated 
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period.  
The comparison between the regulation and partial deregulation periods is reported under 
“Partial Deregulation” of Table 14 and that between the regulation and complete deregulation 
periods is presented under “Complete Deregulation”. As shown in both models, the coefficient β1, 
which captures cross-sectional correlation between a firm’s probability of dividend payment and 
the determining factors for non-regulated firms, is consistent with prior empirical results (e.g., 
Rozeff (1982); DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006); Denis and Osobov (2008)). In addition, 
the slope coefficient β3’s, which captures the differences between deregulated firms and control 
firms during the regulation period, are statistically significant except for the interaction term of 
NYPt, MVt/ATt and Saleg t in both models, suggesting a significant difference in dividend policy 
between regulated firms and non-regulated firms in the period of regulation. This is consistent 
with the fact that firms under regulation pay higher dividends than their non-regulated 
counterparts.  
More prominent are the coefficient estimates of β2’s in both regression models. In “Partial 
Deregulation”, the β2’s for sales growth, earnings, and volatility are statistically insignificant, 
while in “Complete Deregulation”, the β2’s for four out of the seven variables are statistically 
insignificant, suggesting only a limited convergence of determinants of the propensity to pay 
dividends between deregulated firms and non-regulated firms along the deregulation process.  
As a robustness check, I use all non-regulated firms as control firms and subgroup the 
sample into dividend payers and non-payers, and repeat the regression analysis for all firms 
(deregulated and control firms), surviving firms, payers and non-payers. As in Table 9, the payer 
subsample consists of dividend payers in year t-1, and non-payer subsample includes those that 
do not pay dividends in year t-1. All the variables are as previously defined. Table 15 reports the 
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results. As shown in the first two data columns of Panel A, the determinants of whether to pay 
dividends for all firms show limited convergence after deregulation with the β2’s for the 
interaction terms of firm size, profitability, earned/contributed equity mix, age and return 
volatility being statistically significant, which is qualitatively similar to those in Table 14. For 
surviving firms, the β2’s for firm size, profitability, earned/contributed equity mix and return 
volatility remain statistically significant, also suggesting limited convergence in the determinants. 
However, for dividend payers, there appears a nearly full convergence in the determinants, with 
the β2’s for intercept and return volatility being statistically significant. This implies that there 
remains only a little difference between deregulated firms and control firms in terms of the 
determinants of whether to pay dividends in year t for a dividend payer in year t-1. Specifically, 
the β3’s on all the interaction terms of explanatory variables are not significant, suggesting that 
deregulation has virtually no impact on a year t-1 dividend payer’s propensity to pay in year t, 
which appears consistent with the notion that dividends are sticky. For non-payers, however, the 
estimates show limited convergence. Overall, the empirical evidence indicates limited 
convergence in the determinants of firms’ propensity to pay dividends between deregulated firms 
and control firms following deregulation.         
 
7.1.8 Summary and discussion  
 
Several inferences can be drawn from the above analyses. First, deregulated firms 
demonstrate a downward trend in their propensity to pay dividends along the deregulation 
process, and this declining propensity is more pronounced for firms that newly enter into the 
deregulated industries and never pay dividends. Second, firm attributes have changed for 
deregulated firms along the deregulation process. It seems that deregulated firms shift toward the 
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type of firms with characteristics typical of dividend non-payers. Third, after controlling for the 
changing firm characteristics, there is little evidence that deregulated firms are less likely to pay 
dividends than control firms. It seems that the downward trend in the probability to pay 
dividends for deregulated firms just reflects the general trend of all Compustat/CRSP firms and 
deregulation initiative per se does not bear a significant impact on firms’ decisions on whether to 
pay. Lastly, deregulated firms share some common determinants of the likelihood to pay as non-
regulated firms, but exhibit certain distinctive features, although there appears a nearly full 
convergence of determinants for dividend payers. There is limited evidence that the differences 
have gradually disappeared with progress of the deregulation process. Overall, I find little 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that the propensity to pay dividends of firms formerly 
under regulation is significantly impacted by economic deregulation and there is only limited 
convergence between deregulated firms and non-regulated firms in the determinants of whether 
or not to pay dividends in response to deregulation initiatives. 
7.2 Evolution of dividend payout ratio in response to deregulation 
In this subsection, I examine the evolution (or pattern) of dividend payout ratio in 
response to the economic deregulation shock and whether the decisions on how much to pay of 
deregulated firms converge with control firms along the deregulation process.  
I use six measures to gauge dividend payout.
22
 The first measure, defined as the total 
dollar amount of dividends scaled by earnings before extraordinary items captures how much of 
                                                        
22
 Researchers differ widely in their use of proxies for dividend payout. For example, Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 
(1992) calculate the variable as the ratio of dividends to operating income by calculating dividend payouts for the 
year and preceding four years, eliminating the high and low value and then averaging the remaining three, to 
mitigate the potential measurement problem. However, this method in computation still results in negative dividend 
payout ratio, which is undefined. Wansley (2003) calculate dividend payout as the ratio of dividends per share to 
earnings per share from Compustat. I find that missing values in these two variables lead to loss of observations in 
my sample.  
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earnings is paid out to shareholders (Rozeff (1982); Grullon and Michaely (2002)). Similarly, I 
use cash flow and net income to scale the total dollar amount of dividends to gauge payout ratio 
(Ang (1975); Bhattacharya (1979); Brittain (1966)). I further measure dividend payout as the 
ratios of the total dollar amount of dividends over total assets of previous year and total sales of 
previous year; following Grullon and Michaely (2007), I also use dividend yield as the sixth 
measure of dividend payout. Consistent with prior literature, I define dividend yield as common 
cash dividends scaled by previous fiscal year-end market value of equity. 
7.2.1 Total deregulated firms 
 
Table 16 reports the dividend payout ratios for total deregulated firms and control firms 
in the three “snapshot” periods. As shown in the data, there exists a declining trend in dividend 
payout ratio across the three periods for deregulated firms and this trend accelerates during the 
complete deregulation period. A similar trend is also observed in firms in control industries. 
Consistent with the argument that firms under regulation pay out higher proportions of their 
earnings to control the double agency problems, I find that deregulated firms in the regulation 
period have significantly higher dividend payout ratios than firms in control industries. With the 
progress of economic deregulation, this disparity narrows down as the differences in payout ratio 
between deregulated and control firms move from 0.197, 0.006, 0.026, 0.086, 0.184, and 0.020 
in the regulation period to 0.161, 0.006, 0.017, 0.063, 0.150, and 0.007 in the complete 
deregulation period for Dividend/Earnings, Dividend/Assets, Dividend/Sales, Dividend/Cash 
Flow, Dividend/Net Income, Dividend Yield, respectively.  
Figure 2 further shows the dividend payout ratios in each relative year during the three 
periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation. The trend shown in the 
graphs is similar to what is observed in Table 16. Firms in the regulated industries historically 
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pay higher dividends than firms in control industries, and the differences still exist throughout 
the deregulation process. On the other hand, the graphs show some evidence that the differences 
in dividend payout narrow down during the complete deregulation period, indicating that 
deregulated firms reduce dividend payouts more than control firms.  
7.2.2 New entrants 
 
To investigate whether the declining trend in dividend payout ratios presented in Figure 2 
is mainly driven by dividend behavior of new entrants, I present the evolution of payout ratios in 
Figure 3 for new entrants – firms that do not exist during the regulation period and come into 
existence after the initiation of deregulation process. Three observations emerge from the graphs 
in Figure 3. First, new entrants in both deregulated industries and control industries have lower 
payout ratios than their old peers. Second, new entrants in deregulated industries seems to follow 
the “tradition” by paying higher dividends than new entrants in control industries even after the 
initiation of deregulation process. Last, the trend of payout ratios for new firms in control 
industries is relatively stable while it is more volatile for new entrants in deregulated industries. 
Given the lower payout ratios of new firms, it appears that the new firms partly drag down the 
payout ratios for total firms documented previously.    
7.2.3 Surviving firms 
 
The above analysis presents an overall picture of how payout ratios have changed along 
the deregulation process for total firms and new entrants. However, I could not draw a 
conclusion that the economic deregulation process induces firms to lower their dividend payment 
since both deregulated firms and control firms exhibit similar declining trends in payout ratio and 
new entrants might contribute to the overall decreases. To control for contemporaneous macro-
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economic factors and time series patterns, I use the difference-in-differences approach to test 
whether the deregulation per se significantly affects firms’ payout ratio. To achieve this, I 
compare changes in deregulated firms’ dividend policy with changes in control firms’ dividend 
policy in the periods of partial deregulation and complete deregulation. Following Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a), the difference-in-differences estimator is computed as follows. For each firms in the 
deregulated and control samples, I first compute the average value of each payout ratio during 
the regulation and the partial (complete) deregulation periods. I then calculate the difference 
between the partial (complete) deregulation average and the regulation average. This difference 
is then averaged over all deregulated firms and, separately, over all control firms. The difference-
in-differences estimator is the difference between the average differences for deregulated firms 
and the average differences for control firms. This analysis is actually the payout ratio 
comparison for surviving firms as only surviving firms have data from the regulation period. 
 Table 17 reports the results from the difference-in-differences analysis of changes in each 
payout ratio from the regulation period to the partial (complete) deregulation period for 
deregulated firms compared to control firms. As shown in the table, deregulated firms actually 
increase their payout ratio in the immediate aftermath of the launch of deregulation (partial 
deregulation), consistent with the previous findings that the propensity to pay increases over the 
same period of time. However, as the deregulation process enters into the complete deregulation 
period, it appears that deregulated firms adjust their dividend policy by reducing dividend 
payment. This is evidenced by the fact that three out of the six measures of dividend payout 
decrease markedly. Control firms exhibit a difference scenario. For example, changes in three out 
of six dividend payout measures from the regulation period to complete deregulation period have 
the positive sign, even though these changes are not statistically different from zero, suggesting 
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that surviving control firms do not adjust their dividend payment over the same time period. This 
finding is consistent with the evidence presented in previous literature that surviving Compustat 
and Worldscope firms experience no decrease in their dividend payment (e.g., Denis and Osobov 
(2008)). More importantly, the difference-in-differences estimates in the last two data columns of 
Table 17 are negative and significant for three out of six dividend payout measures while other 
measures are not statistically significant, suggesting that deregulated firms decrease payout ratio 
more drastically than control firms in response to economic deregulation. The results indicate 
that the economic deregulation induces firms to adjust their dividend payment downward, 
consistent with the prediction in Hypothesis 2. 
 To validate the above results, I impose further restrictions on the sample by requiring that 
firms have non-negative earnings, net income or cash flow and replicate the above difference-in-
differences analysis. Table 18 reports the results. The difference-in-differences estimates between 
the periods of complete deregulation and regulation provide even stronger evidence that 
deregulated firms adjust their payout ratio downward in greater magnitude: four out of the six 
measures of dividend payout are negative and statistically significant, while the other two are not 
significant (one positive and one negative). The estimates between the periods of partial 
deregulation and regulation are mostly statistically insignificant, suggesting the stickiness nature 
of corporate dividends.    
As a robustness check, I replicate the difference-in-differences analysis using expanded 
regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation periods, instead of the “snapshot” 
periods. The expanded period of regulation is defined as from the beginning of our sample period 
(1966) to year -1, the year preceding the year in which the first major deregulation initiative was 
introduced in each industry (year 0). The expanded period of partial deregulation is defined as 
69 
 
 
 
from year 0 to the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was taken in each 
industry. The expanded period of complete deregulation is defined as from year +1, the first year 
after the last major deregulation initiative to the end of the sample period (2008). Table 19 
reports the results from the three expanded periods.  
In Table 19, three out of the six difference-in-differences estimators comparing the period 
of partial deregulation with the period of deregulation are positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent or better level, while the other two are positive but insignificant and dividend yield 
is negative, consistent with my previous findings that deregulated firms increase their dividend 
payouts in the partial deregulation period relative to dividend payout changes in control firms. 
The last two data columns in the table show that three of the six difference-in-differences 
estimates are negative and statistically significant at better than the 1 percent level, one estimate 
is negative but not statistically significant, and the other two are positive but not significantly 
different from zero. These indicate a faster falling-off in dividend payouts for deregulated firms, 
also confirming my previous findings.  
7.2.4 Convergence of determinants of how much to pay between deregulated and non-
regulated firms 
 
 The above analysis has shown that deregulated firms in the regulation period pay 
significantly higher dividends than control firms and the differences narrow down along the 
deregulation process. In the same vein as in the examination of determinants of whether or not to 
pay dividends, in this subsection I investigate whether the elements believed to determine how 
much to pay also converge between deregulated firms and control firms during the post-
deregulation periods. I estimate the following cross-sectional regression which compares the 
determinants of dividends payment between regulated firms and firms in control industries over 
the three “snapshot” periods: 
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Dividend_Payoutt = β0 + β1 (Xit ) + β2 (Xit *Deregit) + β3 (Xit *Deregit*Regit) + εit       (7.3) 
where i and t index firm and year respectively, and X is a vector of explanatory variables. Guided 
by previous research (e.g., Rozeff (1982); Grullon and Michaely (2002)), the explanatory 
variables include firm leverage (Bklev), size (LNAT), ownership (LnCshr), growth opportunity 
(MTB), earnings volatility (StdOibdp), stock return volatility (Volatility), profitability (OCF), and 
sales growth (Saleg). Dereg is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is in one of the five 
deregulated industries and zero otherwise. Reg is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm 
operates in the period of regulation, and zero otherwise. I use the six measures of dividend 
payouts as dependent variables. To account for possible time-series correlation, I adjust the 
standard errors which are robust to cluster at the firm level (Peterson 2009).  
I make two comparisons: differences between firms in deregulated industries and firms in 
control industries during the regulation and partial deregulation periods, and during the 
regulation and complete deregulation periods. The coefficients of interest are β2 and β3, which 
capture differences in the impact of various firm characteristics on corporate decisions of how 
much to pay in dividend between deregulated firms and control firms over different periods. 
While β2 reflects the differences in the decision on how much to pay between deregulated and 
control firms in the partial (complete) deregulation periods, β3 reflects the differences during the 
regulation period. Given that deregulated firms have distinctive payout policies during the 
regulation period, I expect β3 to be significant to reflect the differences in payout policies 
between deregulated firms and control firms in that period. If economic deregulation induces 
deregulated firms to converge their decisions on how much to pay with those of non-regulated 
firms, β2 is expected to be insignificant for most of the variables, especially during the complete 
deregulated period.  
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The comparison for the regulation and partial deregulation periods is reported in Panel A 
of Table 20 and that for the regulation and complete deregulation periods in Panel B. The 
coefficient β1, which captures cross-sectional correlation between dividend payout and its 
determinants for non-regulated firms, is largely consistent with prior empirical results (see, e.g., 
Denis and Osobov (2008); Rozeff (1982); Grullon and Michaely (2002)). That is, dividend 
payout is positively related to firm size and profitability and negatively related to leverage, sales 
growth, earnings volatility and stock return volatility.  
In addition, the slope coefficient β3’s which capture the difference between deregulated 
firms and control firms during the regulation period, are statistically significant for most of the 
explanatory variables except for the interaction term of leverage, growth opportunity, and 
earnings volatility in both Panel A and Panel B, suggesting a significant difference in policy 
decisions on how much to pay between regulated firms and non-regulated firms. More prominent 
are the coefficient estimates of β2’s in regression models for both partial and complete 
deregulation periods. During the partial deregulation period in Panel A, the β2’s for all variables 
but earnings volatility are statistically significant, whereas during the complete deregulation 
period in Panel B, the β2’s for all variables other than sales growth are statistically significant, 
suggesting that the determinants of how much to pay do not converge between deregulated firms 
and control firms along with the progress of economic deregulation process. The same story 
holds for surviving firms. As shown in Panel C and D, the β2’s for all variables other than sales 
growth and earnings are statistically significant during the deregulation period. The above 
evidence indicates that deregulated firms reduce their dividend payout in response to 
deregulation initiatives; however, the determinants of how much to pay in dividend still do not 
converge between deregulated firms and control firms. 
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In an effort to check the robustness of the results, I impose restrictions that require firm-
year observations to have non-negative earnings, net income and cash flow and replicate the test. 
Table 21 reports the results. Panel A shows that the β2’s on the interaction terms of firm size, 
ownership, growth opportunity, and earnings volatility are largely insignificant in the partial 
deregulation period; however, during the period of complete deregulation, only the β2’s on the 
interaction terms of ownership, growth opportunity and earnings volatility remain largely 
insignificant, providing little evidence that the determinants of how much dividends to pay are 
converging between deregulated firms and non-regulated control firms.  
For a further robustness check, I follow Ovtchinnikov (2010a) to use all the non-
regulated Compustat firms as controls and extend the analysis to the period of 1966 to 2008. Reg 
is set to one if a firm operates in the years prior to the initiation of deregulation, and zero 
otherwise. Other variables are as previously defined. Panel A of Table 22 shows the results for all 
firms and Panel B reports the results for the subsample that excludes observations with negative 
earnings, net income or cash flow. Results from both panels are qualitatively similar to those of 
the above tests. For example, in Panel A only the β2’s on the interaction term of firm size are 
statistically insignificant; in Panel B, only the β2’s on the interaction terms of ownership and 
growth opportunity are insignificant. Overall the results offer little support to the prediction of a 
convergence of determinants of dividend payout between deregulated firms and non-regulated 
controls.  
7.2.5 Summary and discussion 
 
 As predicted by the agency theory, regulated firms make significantly higher dividend 
payment during the period of regulation than control firms. After the deregulation is set in 
motion, surviving deregulated firms first increase their dividend payout and then scale down 
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their payout ratio while surviving control firms generally keep their payout ratio unchanged, 
resulting in a narrowing down in the disparity between these two types of firms during the 
complete deregulation period. My difference-in-differences analysis shows that the paring down 
on dividend payout ratio for deregulated firms is significantly greater than the change for control 
firms over the same time period for three out of six measures, providing some evidence that 
deregulation induces affected firms to reduce their dividend payout ratio.       
 While I document limited evidence of a trend of deregulated firms moving toward 
converging their dividend policy with that of non-regulated firms in terms of whether or not to 
pay dividends along the deregulation process, the convergence does not appear to happen for the 
decision on how much to pay, a finer component of firm dividend policy. The results seem to be 
in line with the widely documented dividend stickiness in the literature. Overall, the empirical 
findings in this subsection support the dividend payout prediction in Hypothesis 2, i.e., firms 
have higher dividend payout ratio when their industries are regulated and the ratio declines when 
these firms become deregulated. However, empirical evidence suggests that the determinants of 
how much to pay for deregulated firms do not converge with those of non-regulated firms. 
Combining the evidence on the change in the propensity to pay dividends with that on 
dividend payout ratio, and comparing it to the findings on capital structure of deregulated firms 
documented by Ovtchinnikov (2010a), I can draw a few interesting inferences. Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a) find that firms respond quickly to the operating environment changes induced by 
economic deregulation and ultimately converge their capital structure policies with those of non-
regulated firms. I find that firms do not adjust their dividend policies in terms of whether to pay 
but seem to adjust their policies on how much to pay in response to economic deregulation. 
There is no compelling evidence that the determinants of whether to pay dividends and how 
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much to pay for deregulated firms converge with those for non-regulated firms along the 
deregulation process. This comparison suggests that footprints of dividend policy change in 
response to economic deregulation are distinctively different from those of capital structure 
policy change. While firms can adjust their capital structure policy relatively quickly, dividend 
policies exhibit certain stickiness.  
7.3 Effects of deregulation on speed of adjustment of dividend policy to optimal levels 
Ovtchinnikov (2010a) finds that deregulation also impacts firms’ speed of adjustment of 
capital structure toward optimal levels. Since deregulated firms are expected to formulate their 
dividend policy more closely on permanent, stable corporate earnings in response to economic 
deregulation, the dynamic trade-off theory predicts deregulated firms will adjust dividend payout 
at greater speed toward optimal levels in a competitive environment. In this subsection, I use the 
Lintner (1956) model and its variant, Fama and Babiak (1968) model, to test if firms adjust their 
dividend payouts faster toward optimal levels in reaction to deregulation. 
Lintner (1956) advances an empirical model showing that the firm sets a target dividend 
payout ratio and adjusts its dividend payment toward that ratio, based on corporate earnings. 
Having investigated whether economic deregulation impacts firms’ propensity to pay dividends 
and decision on how much to pay in dividends, it is natural, as well as interesting, to inquire if 
and how economic deregulation affects the speed of adjustment of corporate dividend policy, 
which suggests the sensitivity of dividend policy to corporate earnings. In this subsection, I make 
use of the Lintner (1956) model and its variant Fama and Babiak (1968) model to examine 
progressive changes in dividend policy of deregulated firms during the deregulation process in 
an effort to test whether the dividend policy of firms undergoing deregulation becomes more 
sensitive to corporate earnings. 
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7.3.1 Lintner’s (1956) model and Fama and Babiak’s (1968) model 
 
Lintner’s (1956) partial adjustment model of dividend was the result of a post-World War 
II survey of more than 600 listed companies and the ensuing interviews with 28 firms selected 
from them for detailed investigation. The field work led to the conclusion that dividends were 
basically determined by past dividend levels and current earnings, evolving around a target 
payout ratio. The target dividends (D*it ) are a portion of the earnings: 
D*it = r t E it 
where ri is the target dividend payout ratio. The terse empirical model describes firm i’s dividend 
change from year t-1 to year t as a partial adjustment toward a target dividend payout level, and 
is given in the following equation: 
 Dit = αi + ci (D*it - Di,t-1) + uit 
where    is the “speed of adjustment” and     an error term. Combining the above two equations, 
a new equation for empirical testing is generated after some algebraic manipulations:  
Dit = α i + βiDi,t-1 + γiEit + eit,                                             
where Eit represents firm i’s earnings in year t and     is an error term. In this context, the “speed 
of adjustment” ci = 1- βi and the “target dividend payout ratio” r i = γi /ci.  
The central points of this model are: (1) a firm establishes a target dividend level; (2) 
adjustments to the target dividend level are progressive. The reasons why a firm sets a target 
(optimal) dividend level may be multiple but the simple idea is to have some measures to 
benchmark with, in pursuit of a consistent and stable dividend policy. Lintner (1956) reports that 
dividend payout ratios of firms from the early to the middle of last century were in the range of 
20 percent to 80 percent, with most firms setting their targets between 40 percent and 60 percent, 
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which, from the perspective of the early 21
st
 century, are notably high. Once a dividend decision 
is made, it cannot be easily changed or revoked. Managements thus adopt a conservative 
approach and raise dividends cautiously unless a permanent increase in earnings rests assured. As 
a result, dividend adjustments tend to be gradual and progressive, for the benefit of consistency 
and stability preferable to investors. 
Furthermore, Fama and Babiak (1968) indicate that including the earnings in year t-1 and 
suppressing the constant term in the regression works better than the baseline Lintner (1956) 
model in predicting dividends using out of sample data. The Fama and Babiak (1968) modified 
model is as follows: 
Dit = βiDi,t-1 + γiEi,t + νiEi,t-1 + εit. 
7.3.2 Regression models to test change in speed of adjustment of dividends 
 
To test whether firms adjust their dividend policy faster toward optimal levels in response 
to economic deregulation, I estimate the following regressions: 
     Divcsit = β0 + β1Divcsi,t-1 + β2Ibcomcsi,t + β3Dereg + β4Divcsi,t-1*Dereg  
+ β5* Ibcomcsi,t*Dereg + β6 Dereg*Pdreg + β7 Divcsi,t-1*Dereg*Pdreg  
+ β8Ibcomcsi,t*Dereg*Pdreg + εit.                                                                      (7.4) 
and 
 
     Divcsit = β1Divcsi,t-1 + β2 Ibcomcsi,t + β3Ibcomcsi,t-1 + β4Dereg + β5Divcsi,t-1*Dereg  
+ β6Ibcomcsi,t*Dereg + β7Ibcomcsi,t-1*Dereg + β8Deregit*Pdreg  
+ β9Divcsi,t-1*Dereg*Pdreg + β10Ibcomcsi,t*Dereg*Pdreg  
+ β11Ibcomcsi,t-1*Dereg*Pdreg + εit                                                                    (7.5) 
 
 
Equation (7.4) is formulated based on the Lintner (1956) model and Equation (7.5) on the 
Fama and Babiak (1968) modified model. The dependent variable, Divcsit, is firm i’s annual 
dividend scaled by number of common shares outstanding. The independent variable, Ibcomcsit, 
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is firm i’s earnings per share in year t. The dummy variable, Dereg, is equal to 1 if a firm is in 
one of the five deregulated industries, and 0 otherwise. Pdreg takes the value of 1 if a firm 
operates in the partial (complete) deregulation period, and 0 otherwise. Here I relax the five-year 
constraint in our “snapshot” periods to use expanded regulation period, partial deregulation and 
complete deregulation periods in analysis to make greater use of the observations in our sample 
and present a fuller picture. As in last subsection, the expanded period of regulation is defined as 
from the beginning of our sample period (1966) to year -1, the year preceding the year in which 
the first major deregulation initiative was introduced in each industry (year 0). The expanded 
period of partial deregulation is defined as from year 0 to the year in which the last significant 
deregulatory initiative was taken in each industry. The expanded period of complete deregulation 
is defined as from year +1, the first year after the last major deregulation initiative, to the end of 
the sample period (2008). I estimate the above two models for a sample of deregulated firms and 
control firms and compare the speed of adjustment of dividends toward optimal levels between 
regulation period and partial (complete) deregulation period. To control for possible time-series 
correlation, the calculation of standard errors is adjusted to be robust to cluster at the firm level.      
In Equation (7.4), 1- β1, 1- (β1 + β4), and 1- (β1 + β4 + β7) represent the speed of 
adjustment for control firms, deregulated firms in the regulation period, and deregulated firms in 
the partial (complete) deregulation period, respectively. The corresponding numbers for Equation 
(7.5) are (1- β1), 1- (β1 + β5), and 1- (β1 + β5 + β9). The “target payout ratio” based on Equation 
(7.4) is calculated as β2 / (1-β1), (β2 + β5) / (1- (β1 + β4)), and (β2 + β5 + β8) / (1- (β1 + β4+ β7)) 
for control firms, deregulated firms in regulation period, and deregulated firms in partial 
(complete) deregulation period, respectively while the corresponding numbers are estimated for 
Equation (7.5) are β2 / (1-β1), (β2 + β6) / (1- (β1 + β5)), and (β2 + β6 + β10) / (1- (β1 + β5+ β9)). In 
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addition, I expect a negative sign on β7 (β9) for Equation (7.4) (Equation (7.5)) if deregulation 
leads the affected firms to be more responsive to earnings when formulating dividend policies. 
 
7.3.3 Empirical results on change in speed of adjustment of dividends toward optimal levels 
for deregulated firms 
 
The empirical results are presented in Table 23. Panel A reports results for all firms while 
Panel B for surviving firms. The first two columns of data report the results for the partial 
deregulation period versus regulation period and the last two columns show the results for the 
complete deregulation period versus regulation period. Regression specifications for the first and 
third data columns are based on the Lintner (1956) model while regression specifications for the 
second and fourth data columns are based on the Fama and Babiak (1968) modified model. In 
general, I find a good fit of the Lintner model to the data as evidenced by the high R-squareds for 
both specifications (0.88 and 0.81 in the first two data columns respectively), implying that the 
overwhelming majority of the variations in dividend change are explained by the model. 
Consistent with the previous evidence that Fama and Babiak’s (1968) model fits data better, I 
find that R-squareds are even higher for the specifications based on Fama and Babiak’s model 
(0.91 and 0.84 in the last two columns respectively). However, it seems that this model inflates 
the coefficients on lagged earnings, thus leading to inflated target payout ratios.    
Across all model specifications, the speed of adjustment ranges from 0.096 to 0.374, which 
is within the reasonable range. Previous research on the Lintner (1956) model by Fama and 
Babiak (1968) and Choe (1990) find that the speed of adjustment is typically far from 1.0, an 
indication that dividends adjust slowly toward target payouts. Fama and French (2002) again test 
the Lintner model and report speed of adjustment ranging from 0.27 to 0.33. In contrast, the 
computed target payout ratios based on regression estimates appear much more volatile with a 
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range from 0.076 to 0.979. 
As shown in the bottom of Panel A, the speed of adjustment has increased substantially for 
deregulated firms during post-deregulation period. For example, during the partial deregulation 
period, the speed of adjustment increases from 0.140 to 0.179 for Lintner’s (1956) model and 
from 0.096 to 0.172 for Fama and Babiak’s (1968) model. This upward trend accelerates during 
the complete deregulation period as shown by the data that the speed of adjustment reaches 0.298 
for Lintner’s (1956) model and 0.311 for Fama and Babiak’s (1968) model, more than doubling 
the speed in regulation period and increasing by 80 percent relative to that in the partial 
deregulation period. This increase is economically large. Moreover, the coefficients on the 
interaction term (Divcst-1*Dereg*Pdreg) are significant across all model specifications, 
indicating that the increases is statistically significant. The results point to an interesting fact that 
firms adjust their dividend payout toward target ratio at greater speed based on past and current 
earnings, along with the progress of the deregulation process, suggesting increased sensitivity of 
firm dividend policy to corporate earnings, which is consistent with the predication in 
Hypothesis 3. 
As firms increase the speed of adjustment of dividend payouts toward optimal levels in 
response to economic deregulation, they also lower their target payout ratio. Based on the 
Lintner (1956) model, the target payout ratio decreases from 27.1 percent in the regulation period 
to 19.6 percent in the partial deregulation period and further to 13.4 percent in the complete 
deregulation period, which is consistent with my previous findings that firms lower payout ratio 
along the deregulation process.         
Compared to control firms, I find that deregulated firms during the period of regulation 
have substantially lower speed of adjustment than control firms. It appears that deregulated firms, 
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when under regulation, are highly inert – they adjusted their dividends much slowly relative to 
non-regulated firms. One possibility is that economic regulation insulate firms from competition 
and may have dulled their receptivity of economic signals and shocks; firms in such an 
environment would keep dividend policies as they are for the benefit of consistency. It is also 
possible that the firms under regulation do perceive earnings shocks but are not motivated 
enough to make changes to dividend policies based on trade-off of costs and benefits. If the 
trade-off hypothesis holds true for this situation, then the benefits brought about by a change in 
dividend policy may not more than compensate for the costs of effecting the change. As 
economic deregulation moves along, the disparity in the sensitivity of dividends to earnings 
between non-regulated firms and deregulated firms narrows down, even though the difference 
still exists.  
In line with the previous findings that regulated firms pay higher dividends, the data in 
Panel A show that deregulated firms have much higher target payout ratio than non-regulated 
firms during regulation period. However, the difference decreases along the deregulation process 
as deregulated firms lower their target payout ratio to accommodate the new operating 
environment. Overall, the analysis in this subsection confirms my previous findings that firms 
under regulation make higher dividend payouts than control firms to mitigate the double agency 
problems and the difference in dividend payouts between deregulated firms and non-regulated 
firms becomes smaller as the deregulation process progresses.   
7.3.4 Empirical results on change in speed of adjustment of dividends to optimal levels for 
surviving deregulated firms  
 
Previous research document that the changing dividend policies are mostly driven by new 
entrants. For example, Denis and Osobov (2008) find that the trend of declining propensity to 
pay dividends is caused by new entrants. To investigate whether the documented increased speed 
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of adjustment of dividend payouts toward optimal levels based on corporate earnings is due to 
firms entering into my sample after the initiation of the deregulation drive, I further analyze the 
change in the speed of adjustment for surviving firms based on the Lintner (1956) and Fama and 
Babiak (1968) models. The definition of three time periods remains the same as above for all the 
deregulated and control firms. The surviving firms are defined as firms that exist both in the 
regulation period and the partial (complete) deregulation period. 
Panel B of Table 23 reports the empirical results. The surviving deregulated firms display 
a similar upward trend in the speed of adjustment as observed in our full sample of deregulated 
firms. In addition, the magnitude is also close. Under Lintner’s (1956) model, for example, the 
speed of adjustment for surviving deregulated firms shifts from 0.140 in the regulation period, to 
0.160 in the partial deregulation period, and to 0.277 in the complete deregulation period while 
the corresponding numbers are 0.140, 0.179, and 0.298 for total sample firms, indicating that the 
increased sensitivity of dividends to earnings is not purely driven by new entrants. One exception 
is that the difference in the speed of adjustment of deregulated firms between the regulation 
period and the partial deregulation period is not statistically significant under Lintner’s (1956) 
model (coefficient on the interaction term Divcst-1*Dereg*Pdreg is not significant in the Lintner 
(1956) model of partial deregulation period) even though it is significant in the Fama and 
Babiak’s (1968) model. 
In the meantime, Panel B shows the decline in target dividend payout ratio for surviving 
deregulated firms is consistent with the pattern exhibited by the full sample of deregulated firms. 
The target payout ratio drops from 27.9 percent in the regulation period to 20.6 percent in the 
partial deregulation period and further to 15.9 percent in the complete deregulation period. For 
the full sample of deregulated firms, the corresponding numbers are 27.1 percent, 19.6 percent 
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and 13.4 percent. The evidence indicates that economic deregulation significantly changes the 
operating environment which affects not only new firms entering into the industries but also “old 
firms” that come all the way from the regulation period in terms of the sensitivity of dividends to 
corporate earnings.  
7.3.5 Robustness check using three “snapshot” periods   
 
As a robustness check, I replicate the above analysis using three “snapshot” periods and 
report the results in Table 24. Similar to the above results, both total deregulated firms and 
surviving deregulated firms still exhibit an upward trend in the speed of adjustment and a 
downward trend in the target dividend payout ratio along the deregulation process, and these 
trends accelerate during the complete deregulation period. One exception is that the changes in 
the speed of adjustment and the target dividend payout ratio are not significant during the partial 
deregulation period. The findings indicate that unlike capital structure decisions, dividend 
policies change gradually.     
7.3.6 Summary and discussion 
 
Overall estimates based on the Lintner (1956) model and its variant Fama and Babiak 
(1968) model present explicit dynamics of the evolution of dividend policy of deregulated firms: 
firms increase their speed of adjustment but decrease their target dividend payout ratio in 
response to economic deregulation and the changing operating environment. On the one hand, 
the upward trend in the speed of adjustment shows that firms respond to economic deregulation 
by orienting their dividend policies more closely toward target payout levels, suggesting 
increased sensitivity of firm dividend policy to corporate earnings in response to economic 
deregulation, which is consistent with the findings of Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) that 
firms’ dividends are closely related to past and current earnings. On the other hand, the declining 
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target payout ratio is consistent with the previous findings that firms reduce their dividend 
payout ratio even if they choose to be a dividend payer.    
7.4 Effects of deregulation on information content of dividend policy changes 
 
In this subsection, I investigate changes in the information content of dividend policy in 
response to economic deregulation. The information content theory holds that dividends are 
information-laden, and dividend policy changes are a costly signaling device to reveal 
information that cannot be properly conveyed to the public through other means. If the 
information content theory is valid, I expect that dividends distributed by firms in the period of 
regulation contain less information about the firms, since they are mainly, according to previous 
studies, used as a mechanism to control the double agency problems and create the need for 
subjecting the firms to the monitoring of the financial market and updating the regulators of the 
cost of financing (Easterbrook (1984); Smith (1986); Smith and Watts (1986)). In the aftermath 
of the initiation of economic deregulation, the growing competitive operating environment may 
cause firms to be cautious in disclosing proprietary information to avoid rivals making strategic 
use of the information to their advantage (Darrough (1993)). In the presence of “proprietary 
cost”, it is conceivable that firms are more likely to use dividends to signal information and 
convey their prospects of earnings and profitability. 
I structure two ways to test the evolution of the information content of dividends. First, I 
examine the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the dividend changes along the 
deregulation process. The positive (negative) reaction of stock prices to announcements of 
dividend increases (decreases) reflects the positive (negative) information about the firm value 
that these announcements convey (Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984)). If dividends are more 
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informative after the launch the economic deregulation, it is expected that the magnitude of 
positive (negative) stock market reactions to dividend increases (decreases) will be greater and 
the sensitivity of CARs to the magnitude of dividend changes (dividend response coefficient) 
will be higher along the deregulation process. Second, given that dividend changes trigger 
abnormal stock returns due to new information about the firm’s future earnings and profitability 
conveyed by these changes, I examine the evolution of relations between dividend changes and 
future earnings along the deregulation process. If dividends are more information-laden, the 
relations are expected to be stronger in the deregulation period. 
7.4.1 Evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around announcement of dividend 
changes and dividend responsive coefficients  
 
7.4.1.1 Dividend change sample and data 
 
      To empirically test stock market responses to dividend changes, I construct a dividend-
increase sample and a dividend-decrease sample for deregulated firms. Following Amihud and Li 
(2006), Nissim and Ziv (2001), and Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005), I use the 
following screening criteria: (i) the company must pay a quarterly cash dividend (code No. 1232 
in the CRSP file) in the current and previous quarter, (ii) the company does not declare other 
distribution events (code No. other than 1232 in the CRSP file) between the declaration of the 
previous dividend and 15 days after the declaration of the current dividend, (iii) there are no ex-
distribution dates between the ex-distribution dates of the previous and current dividends, and (iv) 
the company has stock return data for the event window (-1, 1) around the declaration of 
dividend change. Similarly, I construct the corresponding sample for firms in control industries. 
After applying these criteria, there are 2,133 and 1,409 dividend increases, and 133 and 98 
dividend decreases for deregulated firms and firms in control industries, respectively, over the 
85 
 
 
 
three “snapshot” periods. The distribution declaration dates are from the CRSP distribution data 
file. 
As shown in Table 25, for firms that decide to increase dividends, the percentage of 
dividend increase exhibits a downward trend for both deregulated and control firms along the 
three “snapshot” periods. Both mean and median percentage increases of dividends during the 
partial and complete deregulation periods are significantly smaller than those in the regulation 
period, indicating that firms are less inclined to announce large dividend increases. Interestingly, 
control firms have greater average percentage dividend increases than deregulated firms over all 
three periods, possibly because deregulated firms historically pay more and have larger bases in 
dividend payout. Once firms decide to cut dividends, the percentage of dividend cuts for 
deregulated firms is relatively stable over the three “snapshot” periods while it is more volatile 
for firms in control industries. More importantly, I find that more deregulated firms cut dividends 
after the initiation of economic deregulation whereas control firms go the opposite way. (The 
number of dividend cuts for control firms in the three “snapshot” periods is 51, 28 and 19, 
respectively.) Overall, the evidence indicates that both deregulated and control firms are less 
likely to make decision on large dividend increases over time, and more and more deregulated 
firms cut dividends in response to economic deregulation. 
7.4.1.2 Evolution of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement of dividend 
changes       
                  
I use two approaches to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the 
announcement of dividend increases and decreases: market-index adjusted return and size-decile 
adjusted return. Market-index adjusted return is calculated as the sum of differences between 
actual return of individual stocks and the contemporaneous return of the value-weighted market 
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index over the three days around the announcement of dividend changes (event window (-1, 1)). 
Size-decile adjusted return is estimated as the sum of differences between actual stock return and 
the contemporaneous return of the size-decile portfolio into which the stock falls over event 
window (-1, 1). To observe the evolution of stock market response to dividend changes along the 
economic deregulation process, I calculate the CARs separately for three “snapshot” periods. As 
documented by Amihud and Li (2006), there exists a declining information content of dividends 
over time as evidenced by the waning stock price reaction to announcements of dividend 
increases. To account for this general trend, I also estimate the CARs around dividend changes 
for firms in control industries over the same time periods. Table 26 presents market-index 
adjusted CARs in Panel A and size-decile adjusted CARs in Panel B as well as comparisons in 
CARs between deregulated firms and control firms and comparisons between the regulation 
period and the deregulation period.  
Three observations emerge from Panel A of Table 26. First, the magnitude of CARs 
around announcements of dividend increases decreases for deregulated firms along the 
deregulation process with mean (median) value of CARs being 0.012 (0.009), 0.007 (0.004), 
0.002 (0.003) for the periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation, 
respectively. The magnitude of CARs is similar to that documented by Amihud and Li (2006). 
For example, they find that CARs for dividend increases center on 0.010 during the 1960s and 
1970s and decline to around 0.005 in the 1980s. In addition, CARs move toward insignificance 
as deregulation progresses. The changes in CARs in both partial deregulation and complete 
deregulation periods relative to the regulation period are statistically significant. Second, a 
similar declining trend in the magnitude of CARs is also observed for dividend decreases even 
though the time-series change is not significant. For example, mean (median) values of CARs 
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surrounding dividend decreases are -0.032 (-0.015), -0.022 (-0.011), and -0.014 (0.003) for the 
three “snapshot” periods, respectively. The insignificant CARs during the complete deregulation 
period is consistent with the evidence documented by Amihud and Li (2006) that the negative 
CARs at dividend decrease announcements move toward zero. My findings are generally 
consistent with those by Amihud and Li (2006) who document that the mean abnormal returns 
for dividend decreases cluster around -0.020 since the late 1980s and reach -0.010 in certain 
years. Third, firms in control industries generally mirror what happens to deregulated firms 
except that the negative CARs during the complete deregulation period is still significant. 
However, caution should be exercised to interpret this result given the small sample size of 
dividend decreases during the complete deregulation period (only 19 dividend decrease events). 
Moreover, the differences in CARs between deregulated firms and control firms are generally not 
significant. The data in Panel B where size-decile adjusted return is used show a similar picture 
as in Panel A. 
Taken as a whole, these results show a decline in the announcement return of dividend 
increases and a tapering-off of the negative announcement return of dividend decreases toward 
zero, consistent with the findings of Amihud and Li (2006). In general, there is no significant 
difference in the trend between deregulated firms and firms in control industries. The univariate 
analysis of CARs seems to point to a decrease, rather than an increase, in information content of 
dividends along the deregulation process. However, the declining magnitude of CARs around 
dividend changes may be due to the declining magnitude of the percentage dividend changes 
along the economic deregulation. Before drawing a valid conclusion of the declining information 
content of dividends, I need further analysis in a multivariate setting to control for the magnitude 
of dividend changes and other factors affecting CARs.     
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7.4.1.3 Dividend response coefficient to excess announcement returns along the deregulation 
process 
     
The finance literature has used the sensitivity of excess announcement return to change in 
dividend yield to measure the information content of the magnitude of dividend changes. I 
follow Bernheim and Wantz (1995) and Amihud and Li (2006) by estimate the dividend response 
coefficient based on the following baseline model: 
 CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + εj                                                                              (7.6) 
The dependent variable, CARj, is the three-day (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal return of 
stocks in response to dividend increases or decreases. DDIVYj is annualized change in dividend 
yield, estimated as 4*(current quarter cash dividends – previous quarter cash dividends)/Price at 
the end of the month that precedes the month in which the dividend change is announced. If the 
dividend change is informative, a positive sign for α1 is expected. Two control variables are 
included to control for firm size and the effects of factors that affect the level of the firm’s 
dividend yield. SIZEN is the logarithm of stock capitalization in the month immediately 
preceding the dividend announcement month, normalized by the S&P 500 index. Given that 
large firms receive more attention from analysts and investors, which reduces the incremental 
information about the firm provided by the dividend change (Christensen and Prabhala (1995)), a 
negative relation is expected between CARs and SIZEN. LTYLD
 
is the stock’s long-term 
dividend yield, estimated as the sum of cash dividends paid over a 12-month period ending in the 
month prior to the dividend announcement month, divided by the average end-of-month price 
during the three-month period preceding the 12-month period, and deflated by (1+ return on the 
S&P 500 index) for the same 12-month period to adjust for market-wide stock price movements. 
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A positive sign is expected for α3 since dividend changes are more informative in high dividend-
paying firms that have lower growth opportunities.
 
To explore the change in information content of dividends, I extend Equation (7.6) by 
adding two indicator variables, Dereg and Pdreg, and their interactions terms with other 
explanatory variables. The specific model is as follows: 
CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + α4Dereg+ α5 DDIVYj *Dereg  
      + α6SIZENj * Dereg + α7LTYLDj * Dereg + α8Dereg*Pdreg  
      + α9 DDIVYj *Dereg*Pdreg + α10SIZENj *Dereg*Pdreg 
         + α11LTYLDj *Dereg*Pdreg + εj                                                                                                                       (7.7) 
 The dummy variable, Dereg, is equal to 1 if firm i is in one of the five deregulated 
industries, and 0 otherwise. Pdreg takes the value of 1 if firm i operates in the partial (complete) 
deregulation period, and 0 otherwise. The value of α5 represents the difference in dividend 
responsive coefficient between deregulated firms and control firms during the regulation period. 
My primary variable of interest α9 denotes the change in dividend responsive coefficient in 
partial (complete) deregulation period relative to the regulation period. If the changing operation 
environment induced by economic deregulation causes firms to signal information using 
dividends, I expect a positive sign on α9.  
Table 27 presents the regression results for dividend increases in Panel A and dividend 
decreases in Panel B. I report the results for the comparisons between the partial deregulation 
period and the regulation period as well as between the complete deregulation period and the 
regulation period. The positive and significant coefficients on DDIVY in Panel A demonstrate a 
general positive sensitivity of CARs to the magnitude of dividend increases. However, there is 
no significant difference in dividend responsive coefficients between control firms and 
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deregulated firms during the regulation period as evidenced by the coefficients of α5 (α5 = -.104, t 
= 0.824 for the partial deregulation specification; α5 = 0.348, t = 0.511 for the complete 
deregulation specification), inconsistent with the prediction that dividends are more informative 
for firms undergoing deregulation. More importantly, even though the change in the sensitivity of 
CARs to the magnitude of dividend increases during partial deregulation period is not significant, 
there exhibits a significant decline in dividend responsive coefficient during the complete 
deregulation period. The combination of the coefficients of α5 and α9 indicates that the dividend 
responsive coefficient for dividend increases lowers more than half during the complete 
deregulation period relative to the regulation period. For dividend decreases, an F test of 
coefficients of α1 and α5 reveals that the dividend responsive coefficients are not significant for 
deregulated firms during the regulation period, indicating that the market reacts negatively to 
dividend decreases irrespective of the magnitude of dividend decrease. In addition, the 
coefficients of α9 are not significant, suggesting no significant changes in the dividend responsive 
coefficients for dividend decreases during both the partial and complete deregulation periods. In 
sum, the dividend responsive coefficients of both dividend increases and decreases for 
deregulated firms do not exhibit a distinctive upward trend as expected. Hence, the overall 
evidence does not support the hypothesis that firms are more likely to use dividends to signal 
information during the deregulation periods.  
7.4.2 Evolution of relations between dividend changes and future earnings changes 
 
 One of the most important propositions of the information content theory is that dividend 
changes trigger market responses because these changes contain information about future 
earnings and profitability of the firm. Despite theoretical validity of this proposition, empirical 
evidence in support of the proposition is limited. As a matter of fact, financial economists have 
91 
 
 
 
documented mixed evidence as to whether dividend changes convey information about future 
earnings and profitability. Nissim and Ziv (2001), for example, find evidence that “dividend 
changes provide information about the level of profitability in subsequent years, incremental to 
market and accounting data.” On the other hand, Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) 
state that dividend changes do not signal changes in future profitability, taking note of the non-
linear patterns in the behavior of earnings. They argue that after controlling for the non-linear 
patterns, the relation between dividend changes and future earnings is lost.   
Given that economic deregulation induces drastic changes in the operating environment, 
it provides an ideal setting to test this proposition. Even though I find little evidence through the 
analysis of CARs that dividend changes are more informative during the deregulation period, I 
further explore the issue in this subsection by specifically testing the relation between dividend 
changes and future earnings.  
7.4.2.1 Sample and data 
 
The sample construction generally follows the procedures used for the analysis of CARs 
in the above section except that there is no restriction on the availability of stock return data (i.e., 
no item iv). Following Benartzi et al. (1997), I match the dividend announcements made during 
fiscal year t to the earnings in fiscal year t. The annual dividend change is the annualized rate of 
quarterly cash dividend changes which is calculated as RΔDIVt = (1 + ΔDIVt,1)*( 1 + ΔDIVt,2)* 
(1 + ΔDIVt,3)*(1 + ΔDIVt,4) – 1. Table 28 reports summary statistics of the sample. The mean 
(median) annual dividend increase is 15.61 percent (7.19 percent) while the mean (median) 
annual dividend decrease is -39.32 percent (-41.67 percent), higher than quarterly dividend 
increase and decrease reported in Table 24. There are 2,066 annual dividend increases, 136 
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dividend decreases, and 1,903 no-changes.
23
 Firms that announce dividend increases are on 
average bigger in size and more profitable, while firms cutting dividends are less profitable. 
These are consistent with the firm characteristics in prior studies (Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi 
and Thaler (2005); Nissim and Ziv (2001)). 
In the following analysis, I use two linear models proposed by Nissim and Ziv (2001) and 
two nonlinear models proposed by Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) to examine the 
relation between dividend changes, and future earnings changes and future earnings levels.  
7.4.2.2 Test of relations between dividend changes and future earning changes using linear model 
 
I follow Nissim and Ziv (2001) and use the following linear model to test the relations 
between dividend changes and changes in future earnings:  
   1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 3
1 1
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The dependent variable is future earnings changes from year t-1 to year t (year 0 is the event year 
of dividend changes) scaled by book value of equity at the end of year -1 (BE-1). Et  is the 
earnings before extraordinary items in year t. ROEt-1 is computed as earnings before 
extraordinary items in year t divided by the book value of equity in year t-1. ROEt-1 and (E0 - E-
1)/BE-1 are included to control for uniform mean reversion and momentum in earnings. RDIV0 
is the annual dividend change in year 0. Given that the relation between dividend changes and 
earnings changes is not symmetric for dividend increases and decreases (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990); Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997)), different coefficients are allowed for 
on dividend increases and decreases. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for dividend 
                                                        
23
 The number of observations for dividend increases and decreases is slightly different from that reported in Table 
24 for two reasons. First, an annual dividend increase may encompass more than one quarterly dividend increase. 
Second, the sample in this subsection does not require the availability of stock return which is the data requirement 
for Table 24.   
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increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of interest, β1P and β1N, are expected to be 
positive and statistically significant if dividend changes are correlated with future earnings. 
Panel A in Table 29 report the regression results for t = 1 (earnings change from year 0 to 
year 1) and Panel B for t = 2 (earnings change from year 1 to year 2). For t = 1, the coefficients 
on dividend increases are positive and significant for deregulated firms during the periods of 
regulation and partial deregulation and only significant for control firms during the partial 
deregulation period. The coefficients on dividend decreases are positive and significant only 
during the partial deregulation period and the magnitude of the coefficients are similar for both 
deregulated and control firms. For t = 2, the coefficients on dividend increases and decreases for 
deregulated firms are generally not significant. The above analysis indicate that dividend changes 
do not appear to carry more information for firms in control industries than firms under 
regulation during the regulation period and dividends do not become more informative about 
future earnings with the progress of economic deregulation for deregulated firms, thus providing 
little support for the information content hypothesis.      
7.4.2.3 Test of relations between dividend changes and future earnings levels using linear model 
 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) provide an alternative way to examine the relation between 
earnings and dividend changes. In this part analysis, I use the following linear model to estimate 
the relation between dividend changes and future earnings levels: 
 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 1
4 1 3 1 (7.9)
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MTB-1 is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of year -1 and 
SIZE-1 is the logarithm of total assets at the end of year -1. Other variables are as previously 
defined.  
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The results from this analysis are reported in Table 30 with Panel A for t = 1 and Panel B 
for t = 2. For t = 1, the coefficients on dividend changes (including increases and decreases) are 
only significant during partial deregulation period for deregulated firms. For t = 2, the 
coefficients on dividend changes are generally not significant. Moreover, there is no distinctive 
pattern of the coefficients along the economic deregulation process. In sum, neither can we find a 
significantly positive relation nor can we detect any pattern in the coefficients of interest in the 
regression estimates. 
7.4.2.4 Test of relations between dividend changes and future earnings changes using non-linear 
model 
 
 Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005) argue that the coefficients of the 
regressions in Nissim and Ziv (2001) are likely to be biased because the assumption in their 
equation that the rate of mean reversion and the level of autocorrelation are uniform (momentum) 
across all observations may not be valid. They propose an alternative nonlinear regression model 
to test the relations between dividend changes and earnings changes as follows. 
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
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DFE0 is defined as ROE0 – E(ROE0) where E(ROE0) is the fitted value from the cross-
sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of total asset in year -1, the logarithm of the 
market-to-book ratio of equity in year -1, and ROE-1. CE0 is calculated as (E0 - E-1)/BE-1.   
NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 
otherwise. NCED0 (PCED0) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CE0 is negative (positive) and 0 
otherwise. Similarly, if dividend changes are correlated with future earnings changes, we expect 
the coefficients of interest, β1P and β1N, to be positive and statistically significant. 
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Table 31 reveals results similar to those documented earlier. Specifically, the coefficients 
on dividend increases are not significant across all three periods for deregulated firms and the 
coefficients on dividend decreases have the expected sign and are significant only for the 
regulation period when t = 1. Our results are similar to those shown in the annual cross-sectional 
regression coefficients in Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005).   
7.4.2.5 Test of relations between dividend changes and future earnings levels using non-linear 
model 
 
I further use the following nonlinear model to estimate the relations between dividend 
changes and future earnings levels. 
 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
1 1 2 1
( )
( )
(7.11)
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The variables are defined as previously. As shown in Table 32, I still document similar 
results as the above. Specifically, the coefficients on dividend changes are only positive and 
significant for the partial deregulation period for t = 1 and are not significant across all three 
periods for t = 2. The results are also inconsistent for control firms over time. As a whole, this set 
of analyses provides little evidence that dividend changes contain information about future 
earnings changes or earnings levels.  
7.4.3 Summary and discussion 
 
Since, when regulated, firms use dividends mainly as an “artificial” means of getting rid 
of free cash flows and creating needs to go to the financial market to cope with the “double 
agency problems”, rather than as a mechanism to signal future earnings and profitability, it was 
expected that dividends are less informative for firms under regulation relative to non-regulated 
96 
 
 
 
firms. The heightened competition induced by economic deregulation may incentivize firms to 
use dividends to signal information and distinguish good performers from bad performers. If this 
is the case, deregulation should help re-orient the dividend policy of deregulated firms toward 
future earnings and profitability, thus making dividend changes more information-laden. 
I use two ways to test the changing information content of dividends. Analyzing the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) surrounding the announcement of dividend changes along 
the deregulation process, I find the CARs are significant during the regulation period and move 
toward insignificance in the complete deregulation period, indicating that deregulated firms 
follow the pattern of control firms and do not exhibit a distinctive upward trend as predicted. In 
testing the sensitivity of CARs to the magnitude of dividend changes in a multivariate setting, I 
find that the response coefficients for both dividend increases and decreases do not exhibit an 
upward trend either. This first set of analyses indicate that deregulated firms do not differ from 
control firms in market reactions to dividend changes and both group of firms exhibit a declining 
information content of dividends.  
I further test the information content hypothesis by examining the relations between 
dividend changes and future earnings changes and future earnings levels with the assumption of 
both linear and non-linear patterns of earnings behavior. As in Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and 
Thaler (2005) and other studies, I could not find any meaningful and consistent association 
between dividend changes and future earnings changes and earnings levels. In sum, I find little 
empirical evidence in support of hypotheses 4A and 4B that deregulated firms are more likely to 
use dividends to signal information during the deregulation period and thus dividends are 
becoming more informative along the deregulation process.  
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7.5 Effects of Deregulation on Corporate Financing Activities 
There is some evidence that deregulated firms reduce the dividend payout ratio in 
response to economic deregulation. Neither the information content theory of dividends nor the 
clientele theory of dividends could explain this evolution because both theories do not predict a 
downward trend in dividend payout ratio. In addition, my analyses provide little support to the 
claim that dividends become more informative along the deregulation process. It seems that the 
documented downward trend is more consistent with predictions of the agency theory of 
dividends. One possible channel is that deregulated firms are more likely to raise external 
capitals and thus are subject to the monitoring and discipline of the capital market, which reduces 
the need of using dividends to mitigate agency costs. In this subsection, I examine the evolution 
of financing activities along the deregulation process. Specifically, I begin by investigating the 
percentage of firms with external financing activities and then conduct multivariate analyses of 
the probability to seek external financing after controlling for firm characteristics that are related 
to financing needs.  
7.5.1 Evolution of frequency of external financing  
 
Following previous literature (Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004); 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001); Leary and Roberts (2005); Ovtchinnikov (2010a)), I 
consider equity or debt issues to have taken place if the net change in equity or long-term debt 
divided by lagged assets is greater than 5 percent. A firm is considered to have external financing 
if either of equity or debt issues has taken place. Table 33 reports the percent of firms with 
external financing in Panel A, equity issues in Panel B, and debt issues in Panel C for 
deregulated firms and firms in control industries in each relative year over the three “snapshot” 
periods.  
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Data in Panel A show that firms subject to regulation have fewer external financing 
activities than control firms during the regulation period as the percent of firms with external 
financing activities ranges from 34.19 percent to 42.86 percent for both firms under regulation 
and firms in control industries. This evidence suggests that even if regulated firms distribute a 
larger chunk of their cash flows in dividends to create needs to go to the financial market, in 
order to subject the management and their regulators to more frequent market monitoring and 
discipline (Smith (1986)), they still lag behind non-regulated firms in terms of external financing 
activities. With the progress of economic deregulation, deregulated firms become more and more 
active in financing activities. The proportion of firms with external financing starts from 37.50 
percent in the year prior to the beginning of deregulation (year -1), jumps to 43.83 percent, 44.38 
percent, 49.17 percent, 51.27 percent, 42.44 percent in each year of the five-year partial 
deregulation period, respectively, and then continue increases to 51.27 percent, 55.72 percent, 
56.25 percent, 58.41 percent, and 50.53 percent in each year of the five-year complete 
deregulation period, respectively. The firms in control industries follow a similar trend, but the 
magnitude of increase appears smaller. 
Moving down to Panel B and Panel C, two points stand out. For deregulated firms, the 
proportion of firms with equity issues grows from 8.58 percent in year -1 to 8.87 percent, 13.03 
percent, 20.66 percent, 19.39 percent, and 15.27 percent in each year of the five-year period of 
partial deregulation, to 25.81 percent, 28.43 percent, 29.00 percent, 32.79 percent, and 27.26 
percent in each year of the five-year period of complete deregulation, indicating that equity 
issues contribute to the increase in financing activities. Firms in control industries follow a 
similar pattern for equity issues. However, for debt issues, deregulated firms and control firms 
exhibit different trends. While the percent of control firms with debt issues hovers around 23 
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percent, the proportion of deregulated firms with debt issues jumps from 22.73 percent in year -1 
to 29.66 percent, 35.22 percent, 34.34 percent, 36.25 percent, and 29.45 percent in each year 
during the five-year period of complete deregulation. The results indicate that deregulated firms 
increase both equity issues and debt issues after the launch of economic deregulation. 
This univariate analysis provides a vivid picture of increasing financing activities for 
deregulated firms. However, there are two limitations for this analysis. First, neither could I tell 
whether the time-series increase for deregulated firms is significant nor could I draw conclusion 
on whether the differences in financing activities between deregulated firms and control firms are 
significant. Second, both deregulated firm and control firm attributes have changed over time, 
the increasing financing activities may be due to the changing firm characteristics instead of the 
effects of deregulation. To overcome these limitations, I further conduct multivariate analyses to 
control for firm characteristics that are related to financing needs. 
 
7.5.2 Multivariate analysis of financing activities in response to economic deregulation 
 
To test whether economic deregulation induces a significant changing in financing 
activities, I estimate the following logistic regression model: 
Issuer t = Dereg + Pdreg + Dereg *Pdreg + LNATt-1 + MTBt-1 + Earningt-1  
+ Bklevt-1 + CAPXt-1 + εt                                                                                  (7.12) 
The dependent variable, Issuert, is set to 1 if a firm has financing activities in year t. I 
estimate the regression model separately for total financing activities, equity issues and debt 
issues as well as for the partial deregulation versus the regulation period and the complete 
deregulation versus the regulation period. Following prior literature (e.g., Lee and Masulis 
(2009)), I include a set of explanatory variables such as size (LNAT), growth opportunity (MTB), 
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profitability (Earnings), leverage (Bklev), and capital expenditure (CAPX). The variables of 
interest are Dereg which is equal to 1 if a firm is in a deregulated industry and 0 if in a control 
industry, Pdreg which takes a value of 1 for the partial (complete) deregulation period and 0 for 
the regulation period, and the interaction term of Dereg with Pdreg. The coefficient on Dereg 
captures the difference in the financing frequency between control firms and regulated firms 
during the regulation period. The coefficient on Pdreg reflects the change in financing frequency 
in the partial (complete) deregulation period compared to the regulation period. The coefficient 
on the interaction term represents incremental change in financing activities during the partial 
(complete) deregulation period for deregulated firms after controlling for the general trends 
exhibited by control firms. If economic deregulation induces more frequent external financing 
activities, the coefficient on the interaction term is expected to be positive. 
Table 34 reports the regression results. Across all models, none of the coefficient on 
Dereg is positive and statistically significant, indicating that firms under regulation do not go to 
the market for external financing more frequently than control firms during the regulation period, 
affirming the univiarate results. For the comparison between the partial deregulation vs. the 
regulation period (first three data columns), both deregulated firms and control firms have 
increased equity issues, but there is no incremental change for deregulated firms beyond that of 
control firms (coefficient on interaction term = 0.013, p-value = 0.92). Similar to the univariate 
results, debt issues are stable for control firms but are more frequent for deregulated firms during 
the partial deregulated period (coefficient on interaction term = 0.245, p-value = 0.01). Moreover, 
the overall financing activities (equity issues plus debt issues) do not change significantly for 
deregulated firms immediately after the commencement of the deregulation process (coefficient 
on interaction term = 0.092, p-value = 0.29). The comparison between complete deregulation vs. 
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regulation periods (the last three data columns) reveals a different result. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms are positive and significant for total financing activities, equity issues and debt 
issues, indicating that deregulated firms increase external financing activities significantly as 
economic deregulation progresses.                          
7.5.3 Summary and discussion 
 
Dividends are viewed as a means of alleviating agency costs if other control mechanisms 
are not in place. The substitutive nature of dividends suggests that if other control methods are 
available, the role of dividends in alleviating agency conflicts diminishes, which may induce 
firms to decrease dividend payments. I explore one of these other control mechanisms, namely 
the monitoring and discipline from more frequent external financing, which may contribute to a 
lower dividend payout ratio along the deregulation process. My analyses reveal that deregulated 
firms increase equity and debt issues steadily immediately after the deregulation initiatives and 
accelerate the increase with the progress of the deregulation process. This pattern mirrors the 
images I documented earlier for the magnitude of payout ratio. The overall evidence indicates 
that the reduced dividend payment along the deregulation process is partly due to enhanced 
market monitoring and discipline arising from more frequent external financing activities of 
deregulated firms. 
As documented by Kole and Lehn (1999), both internal and external equity ownership 
become more concentrated, CEO pay increases, stock option grants to CEOs increase, and board 
size decreases post-deregulation for airline industry. My explanation does not exclude the effect 
of these governance changes on the downward trends on dividends. Collectively, my evidence, 
together with that from Kole and Lehn (1999) suggests that firms improve their governance 
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mechanisms post-deregulation, thus reducing the needs to use dividends to control agency costs. 
This explanation is consistent with the agency theory of dividends.        
8. Conclusions 
 
In this study, I focus on investigating the dynamics of corporate dividend policy in 
response to changing operating environments induced by economic deregulation from the 1970s-
1990s. Despite voluminous studies on dividends, corporate dividend policy remains as puzzling 
as before. Serving as an exogenous shock to the operating environment of firms subject to 
regulation, economic deregulation provides a promising opportunity to test various theories 
regarding dividends. In this paper, I take a step in the direction by first examining the effects of 
deregulation on firms’ propensity to pay dividends and then studying how deregulation affects 
the amount of dividends paid. I further explore whether deregulation makes firms to adjust their 
dividend policy faster to optimal levels based on past and current corporate earnings. And finally 
I test how the information content of dividend and corporate financing activities change in 
response to deregulation.  
My results reveal that the deregulated firms have a declining propensity to pay dividends 
and this downward trend seems to capture the general trend observed for the universe of 
Compustat and CRSP firms. Economic deregulation does not have incremental effects on firms’ 
decisions on whether to pay dividends. There is some evidence that firms reduce their dividend 
payout ratio in response to economic deregulation and the differences in payout ratio between 
deregulated and non-regulated control firms narrow down along the deregulation process. I also 
find that firms adjust their dividend policy at greater speed toward optimal levels post-
deregulation than pre-deregulation, suggesting stronger links between corporate dividend policy 
and firms’ operating earnings. Moreover, firms experience more external financing activities 
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during the post-deregulation period, which subjects them to more frequent external monitoring 
and market discipline. The increased monitoring from more frequent external financing may 
partly contribute to the reduced dividend payout ratio. However, the empirical results do not 
provide support to hypotheses based on the information content theory of dividends against the 
backdrop of economic deregulation. My findings are in general consistent with predictions of the 
agency theory.   
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Category 1: Dividend payout variables 
Dividend/Earnings = Dividend scaled by earnings for common stock [DVCt/IBCOMt-1] 
Dividend/Assets = Dividend scaled by lagged book assets [DVCt/Att-1] 
Dividend/Sales = Dividend scaled by lagged sales [DVCt/LSALEt-1] 
Dividend/Cash flow = Dividend scaled by cash flow [DVC/(IB + DP)] 
Dividend/Net income = Dividend scaled by net income [DVC/NI] 
Dividend Yield = Dividend scaled by lagged market value of firm [DVCt/(CSHOt-1*PRCC_Ft-1)] 
Category 2: Firm characteristics variables 
AT  = Total assets [AT] 
AGE = Firm age, defined as the years since the firm’s debut in CRSP 
BE  = Shareholder's equity [SEQ] 
Bklev = Book leverage, defined as total debt divided by total assets [(DLTT  + DLC)/AT] 
CE0 = calculated as the difference between year 0 and year 1 earnings scaled by year -1 book equity 
  
[(E0 - E1)/BE-1] 
dAT/AT  = Asset growth, computed as difference between total assets in year t and t-1 divided by total 
  
asset in year t  [(ATt - ATt-1) ) / ATt]  
DDIVY = Annualized change in dividend yield, estimated as 4 * (Current quarter cash dividend 
  
 – Previous quarter cash dividend) / Price 
Dereg = Dummy variable equal to 1 if  firm is in one of the five deregulation industries, and 0 otherwise 
Divcs = Dividend scaled by common shares outstanding [DVC/CSHO] 
DFE0 = Difference between return on equity and expected return on equity in year 0 [ROE0 – E(ROE0)] 
DNC = Dummy variable equal to 1 for dividend decreases, and 0 otherwise  
DPC = Dummy variable equal to 1 for dividend increases, and 0 otherwise 
E  = Earnings before extraordinary items plus interest expense plus income statement 
  
deferred taxes if available [IB + XINT + TXDI] 
E(ROE0) = fitted value from cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of total asset in year -1,  
  
the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in year -1, and E(ROE-1) 
Ibcomcs = Income available for common [IBCOM] 
Issuer = Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm issues equity or debt in year t, 0 otherwise 
LAGE = Logarithm of firm age 
LNAT = Logarithm of total assets 
LnCshr = Logarithm of common/ordinary shareholders 
LTYLD = Stock’s long-term yield, in the year before the dividend announcement 
LVolatility = Logarithm of standard deviation of firm stock return 
MV = Market value of assets [TA - CEQ + CSHO*PRCC] 
MTB   = Market-to-book ratio [CSHO*PRCC_F/CEQ] 
NCED = Dummy variable equal to 1 if CE0 is negative, and 0 otherwise 
NDFED = Dummy variable equal to 1 if DFE0 is negative and 0 otherwise 
NYP = Proxy of fir size, defined as percent of NYSE firms with the same or lower market capitalization at 
  
the end of a firm’s fiscal year 
OCF = Operating income before depreciation over total assets [OIBDP/AT] 
OCF Volatility = Standard deviation of operating income before depreciation [(STD(OIBDP))/AT)] 
Payer  = Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm pays dividend in year t, and 0 otherwise 
PCED = Dummy variable equal to 1 if CE0 is positive, and 0 otherwise 
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PDFED = Dummy variable equal to 1 if DFE0 is positive, and 0 otherwise 
Pdreg = Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is in a period of deregulation, and 0 otherwise 
RDIV = Annual rate of change in the cash dividend payment 
RE   = Retained earnings (RE)  
Reg = Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm is the period of regulation, and 0 otherwise 
ROA = Return on asset, computed as operating income before depreciation divided by total  
  
assets [OIBDP/TA] 
ROE = Return on equity, computed as earnings before extraordinary items dividend by book value  
  
of equity [IB/CEQ] 
Saleg  = Sales growth, computed as difference in sales between year t and t-1, divided by sales in 
  
year t-1 [(SALEt-SALEt-1)/SALEt-1] 
SIZEN  = Logarithm of stock capitalization at the last month prior to the dividend announcement  
  
month, normalized by the S&P 500 index 
StdOibpd = Standard deviation of earnings before extraordinary items over the past five years 
Volatility  = Standard deviation of daily stock returns in a fiscal year 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Percent of deregulated firms in different dividend groups by relative year 
 
Payers are those that pay dividend in year t and non-payers are those who do not. Former payers are those that do 
not pay dividend in year t but paid in a previous year while never-paid are those that have never paid dividends. Year 
0 is the beginning year of deregulation for each industry (characterized by the commencement of first major 
deregulation initiative in that year). Years with negative sign are years in the regulation period. Years from 0 to 4 are 
years in the partial deregulation period. Years with positive sign are years in the complete deregulation period. 
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Figure 2 
Dividend payouts of all deregulated firms and control firms 
 
Dividend payouts for all deregulated (blue) and control (red) firms are presented in this figure using different 
measures. Graph A shows Dividend/Earningst-1, defined as cash dividends divided by previous earnings before 
extraordinary items for common shares. Graph B shows the second measure, Dividend/Assett-1, estimated as cash 
dividends dividend by total assets in the previous year and Graph C the third measure, Dividend/Salest-1, calculated 
as cash dividends divided by revenues in the previous year. Graphs D, E and F show the three Grullon and Michaely 
(2007) measures: Dividend/Cash Flow, Dividend/Net Income and Dividend Yield. The first two are computed as 
cash dividends divided by cash flow (net income + depreciation) and net income, respectively. Dividend yield is 
defined as common cash dividends scaled by previous fiscal year-end market value of equity, which, in turn, is 
computed as common shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year end stock price. Year 0 is the beginning year of 
deregulation for each industry (characterized by the commencement of first major deregulation initiative in that 
year). Years with negative sign are years in the regulation period. Years from 0 to 4 are years in the partial 
deregulation period. Years with positive sign are years in the complete deregulation period. 
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Figure 3 
Dividend payouts of new entrants in deregulated and control industries 
 
Dividend payouts for new entrants into the deregulated industries (blue curve) and control industries (red curve) are 
presented using different measures in this figure. Graph A shows Dividend/Earnings, defined as cash dividends 
divided by previous earnings before extraordinary items for common shares. Graph B shows the second measure, 
Dividend/Asset, estimated as cash dividends dividend by total assets in the previous year and Graph C the third 
measure, Dividend/Sales, calculated as cash dividends divided by revenues in the previous year. Graphs D, E and F 
show the three Grullon and Michaely (2007) measures: Dividend/Cash Flow, Dividend/Net Income and Dividend 
Yield. The first two are computed as cash dividends divided by cash flow (net income + depreciation) and net 
income, respectively. Dividend Yield is defined as common cash dividends scaled by previous fiscal year-end market 
value of equity, which, in turn, is computed as common shares outstanding multiplied by fiscal year end stock price. 
Year 0 is the beginning year of deregulation for each industry (characterized by the commencement of first major 
deregulation initiative in that year). Years from 0 to 4 are years in the partial deregulation period. Years with positive 
sign are years in the complete deregulation period.
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APPENDIX C: TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 
Major initiatives taken to deregulate industries of entertainment, petroleum and gas, utilities, 
telecommunications and transportation (Source: Vicsusi, Harrington and Vernon (2005) and Ovtchinnikov 
(2010a) 
 
Year Initiative 
Entertainment 
1980 Deregulation of cable television (FCC) 
1981 Deregulation of radio (FCC) 
1984 Cable Communications Policy Act 
Petroleum and natural gas 
1978 Natural Gas Policy Act 
1981 Decontrol of crude oil and refined petroleum products (Executive order) 
1989 Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act 
1992 FERC Order 636 
Utilities  
1988 Proposed rules on natural gas and electricity (FERC) 
1992 Energy Policy Act 
1996 FERC Order 888 
1999 FERC Order 2000 
Telecommunications 
1979 Deregulation of satellite earth stations (FCC) 
1980 Deregulation of cable television (FCC) 
1980 Deregulation of customer premises equipment and enhanced services (FCC) 
1981 Deregulation of radio(FCC) 
1982 AT&T settlement 
1984 Cable Television Deregulation Act 
1988 Proposed rules on price caps (FCC) 
1996 Telecommunications Act 
Transportation 
1976 Railroad Revitalization and Reform Act 
1977 Air Cargo Deregulation Act 
1978 Airline Deregulation Act 
1980 Motor Carrier Reform Act 
1980 Household Goods Transportation Act 
1980 Staggers Rail Act 
1980 International Air Transportation Competition Act 
1982 Bus Regulatory Reform Act 
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1984 Shipping Act 
1986 Trading of airport landing rights 
1987 Sale of Conrail 
1993 Negotiated Rates Act 
1994 Trucking Industry and Regulatory Reform Act 
1995 ICC Termination Act 
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Table 2 
Number of deregulated firms in “snapshot” periods of regulation and post-deregulation 
 
This table reports the number of firms in each of the five deregulated industries, namely, entertainment (ENT), 
petroleum and gas (PAG), utilities (UTI), telecommunications (TLC) and transportation (TRA), in each of the three 
“snapshot” periods of regulation, partial deregulation, and complete deregulation. The period of regulation is defined 
as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an 
industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the 
significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The complete deregulation period is defined as the five years immediately 
following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Panel A reports the 
number of total deregulated firms. Panel B reports the number of surviving deregulated firms and Panel C reports 
surviving deregulated firms as percentage of firm in year -1.  
 
Relative Year ENT PAG UTI TLC TRA Total Interval Total 
Panel A: Number of total deregulated firms 
-5 100 165 374 121 120 880 Period of 
-4 99 226 374 144 124 967 Regulation 
-3 104 246 367 158 124 999 
 
-2 105 254 363 164 174 1,060 1,159 firms 
-1 109 269 353 168 172 1,071 (4,977 obs) 
0 107 281 351 162 169 1,070 Period of 
1 109 300 347 171 185 1,112 Partial 
2 120 381 341 169 178 1,189 Deregulation 
3 129 461 335 182 166 1,273 1,481 firms 
4 139 475 333 184 168 1,299 (5,943 obs) 
+1 146 337 295 362 222 1,362 Period of 
+2 155 329 301 411 216 1,412 Complete 
+3 153 344 303 416 216 1,432 Deregulation 
+4 153 350 302 413 206 1,424 1,815 firms 
+5 148 326 297 384 201 1,356 (6,986 obs) 
Total firms 279 827 506 709 441 2,762   
Total Observations (1,876) (4,744) (5,036) (3,609) (2,641) (17,906) 
 
Panel B: Number of surviving deregulated firms 
-1 109 269 353 168 172 1,071   
0 99 261 345 158 167 1,030 Period of 
1 91 252 340 157 164 1,004 Partial 
2 85 245 335 151 154 970 Deregulation 
3 79 233 326 147 140 925 
 
4 75 224 322 139 129 889 (4,818 obs) 
+1 64 101 230 75 44 514 Period of 
+2 56 99 224 67 42 488 Complete 
+3 45 93 219 52 41 450 Deregulation 
+4 45 89 212 48 36 430 
 
+5 41 81 208 49 35 414 (2,296 obs) 
Panel C: Surviving deregulated firms as percent of year -1 firms (%) 
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-1 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00   
0 90.83 97.03 97.73 94.05 97.09 96.17 
 
1 83.49 93.68 96.32 93.45 95.35 93.74 
 
2 77.98 91.08 94.90 89.88 89.53 90.57 
 
3 72.48 86.62 92.35 87.50 81.40 86.37 
 
4 68.81 83.27 91.22 82.74 75.00 83.01   
+1 58.72 37.55 65.16 44.64 25.58 47.99 
 
+2 51.38 36.80 63.46 39.88 24.42 45.56 
 
+3 41.28 34.57 62.04 30.95 23.84 42.02 
 
+4 41.28 33.09 60.06 28.57 20.93 40.15 
 
+5 37.61 30.11 58.92 29.17 20.35 38.66   
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Table 3 
Number of new entrants, exits and existing firms in year t relative to year -1 in deregulated industries 
 
This table reports the number of new entrants, exits and existing firms, by each relative year (relative to year 0 in 
which the first major deregulatory initiative is taken in an industry), in each of the five deregulated industries, 
namely, entertainment (ENT), petroleum and gas (PAG), utilities (UTI), telecommunications (TLC) and 
transportation (TRA), in the periods of partial deregulation and complete deregulation against the backdrop in year -
1. The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the significant deregulatory 
initiative (0, 4). The complete deregulation period is defined as the five years immediately following the year in 
which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Relative year is the year relative to the start 
year of the deregulation process in each regulated industry: those without the plus sign denote the five years 
immediately following deregulation initiation in an industry (period of partial deregulation) and those with the plus 
sign represent the five years in the wake of the last major deregulation initiative in an industry (period of complete 
deregulation). Panel A reports the number of firms in the dynamic change and Panel B reports the firms as 
percentage of year -1 firms.  
 
      Period of 
  
  Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
Industry   -1 0 1 2 3 4 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 
Panel A: Number of firms 
ENT Entrants 0 8 18 35 50 64 82 99 108 108 107 
 
Exits 0 10 18 24 30 34 45 53 64 64 68 
 
Existing 109 99 91 85 79 75 64 56 45 45 41 
  Total 109 107 109 120 129 139 146 155 153 153 148 
PAG Entrants 0 20 48 136 228 251 236 230 251 261 245 
 
Exits 0 8 17 24 36 45 168 170 176 180 188 
 
Existing 269 261 252 245 233 224 101 99 93 89 81 
  Total 269 281 300 381 461 475 337 329 344 350 326 
UTI Entrants 0 6 7 6 9 11 65 77 84 90 89 
 
Exits 0 8 13 18 27 31 123 129 134 141 145 
 
Existing 353 345 340 335 326 322 230 224 219 212 208 
  Total 353 351 347 341 335 333 295 301 303 302 297 
TLC Entrants 0 4 14 18 35 45 287 344 364 365 335 
 
Exits 0 10 11 17 21 29 93 101 116 120 119 
 
Existing 168 158 157 151 147 139 75 67 52 48 49 
  Total 168 162 171 169 182 184 362 411 416 413 384 
TRA Entrants 0 2 21 24 26 39 178 174 175 170 166 
 
Exits 0 5 8 18 32 43 128 130 131 136 137 
 
Existing 172 167 164 154 140 129 44 42 41 36 35 
  Total 172 169 185 178 166 168 222 216 216 206 201 
Total Entrants 0 40 108 219 348 410 848 924 982 994 942 
 
Exits 0 41 67 101 146 182 557 583 621 641 657 
 
Existing 1,071 1,030 1,004 970 925 889 514 488 450 430 414 
  Total 1,071 1,070 1,112 1,189 1,273 1,299 1,362 1,412 1,432 1,424 1,356 
Interval Total   5,943 6,986 
Panel B: Firms as percent of year -1 (%) 
ENT Entrants 0.00 7.34 16.51 32.11 45.87 58.72 75.23 90.83 99.08 99.08 98.17 
 
Exits 0.00 9.17 16.51 22.02 27.52 31.19 41.28 48.62 58.72 58.72 62.39 
 
Existing 100.00 90.83 83.49 77.98 72.48 68.81 58.72 51.38 41.28 41.28 37.61 
  Total 100.00 98.17 100.00 110.09 118.35 127.52 133.94 142.20 140.37 140.37 135.78 
PAG Entrants 0.00 7.43 17.84 50.56 84.76 93.31 87.73 85.50 93.31 97.03 91.08 
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Exits 0.00 2.97 6.32 8.92 13.38 16.73 62.45 63.20 65.43 66.91 69.89 
 
Existing 100.00 97.03 93.68 91.08 86.62 83.27 37.55 36.80 34.57 33.09 30.11 
  Total 100.00 104.46 111.52 141.64 171.38 176.58 125.28 122.30 127.88 130.11 121.19 
UTI Entrants 0.00 1.70 1.98 1.70 2.55 3.12 18.41 21.81 23.80 25.50 25.21 
 
Exits 0.00 2.27 3.68 5.10 7.65 8.78 34.84 36.54 37.96 39.94 41.08 
 
Existing 100.00 97.73 96.32 94.90 92.35 91.22 65.16 63.46 62.04 60.06 58.92 
  Total 100.00 99.43 98.30 96.60 94.90 94.33 83.57 85.27 85.84 85.55 84.14 
TLC Entrants 0.00 2.38 8.33 10.71 20.83 26.79 170.83 204.76 216.67 217.26 199.40 
 
Exits 0.00 5.95 6.55 10.12 12.50 17.26 55.36 60.12 69.05 71.43 70.83 
 
Existing 100.00 94.05 93.45 89.88 87.50 82.74 44.64 39.88 30.95 28.57 29.17 
  Total 100.00 96.43 101.79 100.60 108.33 109.52 215.48 244.64 247.62 245.83 228.57 
TRA Entrants 0.00 1.16 12.21 13.95 15.12 22.67 103.49 101.16 101.74 98.84 96.51 
 
Exits 0.00 2.91 4.65 10.47 18.60 25.00 74.42 75.58 76.16 79.07 79.65 
 
Existing 100.00 97.09 95.35 89.53 81.40 75.00 25.58 24.42 23.84 20.93 20.35 
  Total 100.00 98.26 107.56 103.49 96.51 97.67 129.07 125.58 125.58 119.77 116.86 
Total Entrants 0.00 3.73 10.08 20.45 32.49 38.28 79.18 86.27 91.69 92.81 87.96 
 
Exits 0.00 3.83 6.26 9.43 13.63 16.99 52.01 54.44 57.98 59.85 61.34 
 
Existing 100.00 96.17 93.74 90.57 86.37 83.01 47.99 45.56 42.02 40.15 38.66 
  Total 100.00 99.91 103.83 111.02 118.86 121.29 127.17 131.84 133.71 132.96 126.61 
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Table 4 
Number and percentage of new entrants, exits and existing firms in post-deregulation “snapshot” 
periods relative to year -1 for deregulated industries  
 
This table reports the number of new entrants, exits and existing firms in each of the five deregulated industries, 
namely, entertainment (ENT), petroleum and gas (PAG), utilities (UTI), telecommunications (TLC) and 
transportation (TRA), in the periods of partial deregulation and complete deregulation against the backdrop in year -
1. The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the significant deregulatory 
initiative (0, 4). The complete deregulation period is defined as the five years immediately following the year in 
which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Panel A reports the number of firms in the 
dynamic change and Panel B reports the firms as percentage of year -1 firms.  
 
      Number of firms Percent of firms 
   
Partial Complete Partial Complete 
Industry   Year -1 Deregulation Deregulation Deregulation Deregulation 
ENT Entrants 0 69 145 63.30 133.03 
 
Exits 0 10 45 9.17 41.28 
 
Existing 109 99 64 90.83 58.72 
  Total 109 168 209 154.13 191.74 
PAG Entrants 0 276 320 102.60 118.96 
 
Exits 0 7 168 2.60 62.45 
 
Existing 269 262 101 97.40 37.55 
  Total 269 538 421 200.00 156.51 
UTI Entrants 0 14 105 3.97 29.75 
 
Exits 0 8 121 2.27 34.28 
 
Existing 353 345 232 97.73 65.72 
  Total 353 359 337 101.70 95.47 
TLC Entrants 0 49 501 29.17 298.21 
 
Exits 0 10 91 5.95 54.17 
 
Existing 168 158 77 94.05 45.83 
  Total 168 207 578 123.21 344.05 
TRA Entrants 0 42 226 24.42 131.40 
 
Exits 0 5 128 2.91 74.42 
 
Existing 172 167 44 97.09 25.58 
  Total 172 209 270 121.51 156.98 
Total Entrants 0 450 1297 42.02 121.10 
 
Exits 0 40 553 3.73 51.63 
 
Existing 1,071 1,031 518 96.27 48.37 
  Total 1,071 1,481 1,815 138.28 169.47 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics of sample firms 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of the sample of deregulated firms. There are 2,762 distinctive firms in 
the sample, with a total of 17,906 firm-year observations over three “snapshot” periods (altogether 15 years). 
Deregulated firms are firms in the five deregulated industries, namely, entertainment, petroleum and gas, 
utilities, telecommunications and transportation. The three “snapshot” periods are periods of regulation, partial 
deregulation and complete deregulation, defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the 
first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1), the five years starting from the year of 
the significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4) and the five years immediately following the year in which the last 
significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5), respectively. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 
99
th
 percentile. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
Variable N Mean 25th  Median 75th  Std Dev 
Dividend/Earnings 16,590 0.333 0.000 0.130 0.636 0.439 
Dividend/Assets 16,649 0.017 0.000 0.007 0.029 0.022 
Dividend/Sales 16,513 0.032 0.000 0.009 0.052 0.045 
Dividend/Cash Flow 17,858 0.156 0.000 0.038 0.300 0.205 
Dividend/Net Income 17,901 0.293 0.000 0.022 0.578 0.433 
Dividend Yield 11,470 0.030 0.000 0.010 0.056 0.036 
AT (million) 17,906 2,210.95 24.30 228.31 1,604.90 5,105.25 
MV (million) 12,504 3,096.30 46.40 291.39 1,854.47 8,004.57 
E/AT 16,384 0.003 0.011 0.055 0.078 0.230 
MV/AT 12,504 1.758 1.011 1.188 1.655 2.303 
dAT/AT 16,653 0.079 0.002 0.068 0.170 0.287 
Saleg 16,512 0.272 0.002 0.096 0.255 0.794 
RE/BE 17,590 0.170 0.081 0.376 0.679 3.612 
Bklev 17,883 0.354 0.204 0.346 0.452 0.252 
Volatility 9,287 0.032 0.017 0.027 0.041 0.022 
OCF 17,877 0.093 0.072 0.123 0.171 0.221 
OCF Volatility 12,123 0.066 0.014 0.029 0.061 0.159 
AGE 9,399 30.76 4.000 13.00 48.00 36.83 
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Table 6 
Dynamic changes of dividend payers and non-payers in year -1 over the process of deregulation 
 
This table presents what happens in relative year t to deregulated firms that do and do not pay dividends in year (-1). 
Panel A reports the number (percent in parentheses) of dividend payers in year (-1) that, in the partial deregulation (0, 
4) and the complete deregulation periods (+1, +5), continue to pay, stop paying disappear through merger and 
acquisition, or delist for various reasons. The total number of dividend payers in year -1 is 692. Panel B report 
similar information for dividend non-payers in year -1, which stop paying, do not pay, disappear through merger and 
acquisition, or delist for various other reasons in the deregulation process. The total number of dividend non-payers 
in year (-1) is 379. Relative year is the year relative to the start year of the deregulation process in each regulated 
industry: those without the plus sign denote the five years immediately following deregulation initiation in an 
industry (period of partial deregulation) and those with the plus sign represent the five years in the wake of the last 
major deregulation initiative in an industry (period of complete deregulation). The period of regulation is defined as 
the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an 
industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first 
significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years 
immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). 
Percentages are in parentheses.  
 
Panel A: Dynamic changes of dividend payers in year -1 
Relative Year Continue to pay Stop paying M&A Delist Total 
0 660   (95.38) 15     (2.17) 11     (1.59) 6     (0.87) 692 
1 643   (92.92) 25     (3.61) 14     (2.02) 10     (1.45) 692 
2 614   (88.73) 43     (6.21) 22     (3.18) 13     (1.88) 692 
3 588   (84.97) 41     (5.92) 35     (5.06) 28     (4.05) 692 
4 562   (81.21) 48     (6.94) 45     (6.50) 37     (5.35) 692 
+1 344   (49.71) 47     (6.79) 167   (24.13) 134   (19.36) 692 
+2 318   (45.95) 55     (7.95) 175   (25.29) 144   (20.81) 692 
+3 290   (41.91) 58     (8.38) 181   (26.16) 163   (23.55) 692 
+4 284   (41.04) 53     (7.66) 184   (26.59) 171   (24.71) 692 
+5 272   (39.31) 55     (7.95) 190   (27.46) 175   (25.29) 692 
Panel B: Dynamic changes of dividend non-payers in year -1 
Relative Year Start paying Do not pay M&A Delist Total 
0 31     (8.18) 324   (85.49) 6     (1.58) 18     (4.75) 379 
1 47   (12.40) 289   (76.25) 12     (3.17) 31     (8.18) 379 
2 56   (14.78) 257   (67.81) 20     (5.28) 46   (12.14) 379 
3 56   (14.78) 240   (63.32) 23     (6.07) 60   (15.83) 379 
4 48   (12.66) 231   (60.95) 28     (7.39) 72   (19.00) 379 
+1 26     (6.86) 97   (25.59) 69   (18.21) 187   (49.34) 379 
+2 28     (7.39) 87   (22.96) 72   (19.00) 192   (50.66) 379 
+3 27     (7.12) 75   (19.79) 76   (20.05) 201   (53.03) 379 
+4 23     (6.07) 70   (18.47) 82   (21.64) 204   (53.83) 379 
+5 26     (6.86) 61   (16.09) 85   (22.43) 207   (54.62) 379 
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Table 7 
Descriptive statistics of subsample for test of propensity to pay dividends 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample of deregulated firms. Firm characteristics are Et /ATt, dATt /ATt, 
Salegt, MVt/ATt, REt /BEt, NYPt, MVt , ATt ,AGEt, and Volatilityt. The variables Et, ATt , Salegt, MVt/ATt, REt, BEt, NYPt,, 
MVt , AGEt, and Volatilityt, are earnings before interest but after taxes, total assets, sales growth rate, ratio of market 
value of assets to book value of assets, retained earnings, book value of equity, firm size relative to New York Stock 
Exchange firms, market value of firm, firm age, and stock return volatility, respectively. dATt =ATt  - ATt-1, is the 
year-to-year asset growth. All variables except dummy variable and age are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. The values reported in Panel A are for total firms, including both dividend 
payers and non-payers. Panel B reports values for dividend payers and Panel C for dividend non-payers. 
 
Variable N Mean Median 25th 75th Std 
Panel A: Total firms 
Et /ATt 16,384 0.003 0.055 0.011 0.078 0.230 
dATt /ATt 16,653 0.079 0.068 0.002 0.170 0.287 
Salegt 16,512 0.272 0.096 0.002 0.255 0.794 
MVt/ATt 12,504 1.758 1.188 1.011 1.655 2.303 
REt /BEt 17,590 0.170 0.376 0.081 0.679 3.612 
NYPt 12,516 0.405 0.357 0.059 0.719 0.339 
MVt 12,504 3,096.30 291.39 46.40 1,854.47 8,004.57 
ATt 17,906 2,210.95 228.31 24.30 1,604.90 5,105.25 
AGEt 9,399 30.76 13.00 4.00 48.00 36.83 
Volatilityt 9,287 0.032 0.027 0.017 0.041 0.022 
Panel B: Dividend payers 
Et /ATt 8,130 0.068 0.067 0.050 0.083 0.041 
dATt /ATt 9,224 0.074 0.061 0.017 0.120 0.151 
Salegt 9,212 0.117 0.077 0.007 0.161 0.311 
MVt/ATt 6,466 1.306 1.127 1.000 1.339 0.806 
REt /BEt 9,324 0.480 0.472 0.289 0.706 0.582 
NYPt 6,471 0.568 0.629 0.296 0.851 0.313 
MVt 6,466 4,715.67 991.88 193.41 3,921.75 9,612.61 
ATt 9,510 3,299.43 864.00 166.00 3,233.50 5,915.22 
AGEt 4,855 47.67 38.00 11.00 79.00 40.72 
Volatilityt 4,848 0.020 0.018 0.013 0.025 0.010 
Panel C: Dividend non-payers 
Et /ATt 8,254 -0.062 0.022 -0.071 0.066 0.308 
dATt /ATt 7,429 0.086 0.092 -0.041 0.281 0.396 
Salegt 7,300 0.468 0.159 -0.017 0.496 1.112 
MVt/ATt 6,038 2.241 1.365 1.030 2.157 3.137 
REt /BEt 8,266 -0.180 0.136 -0.412 0.607 5.211 
NYPt 6,045 0.230 0.097 0.016 0.392 0.271 
MVt 6,038 1,362.13 75.80 19.12 405.67 5,284.86 
ATt 8,396 978.05 35.95 5.64 264.63 3,618.49 
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AGEt 4,544 12.69 5.00 2.00 14.00 20.06 
Volatilityt 4,439 0.046 0.040 0.030 0.055 0.024 
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Table 8 
Firm characteristics for different dividend groups of deregulated firms in different periods  
 
This table presents firm characteristics of different dividend groups of deregulated firms in different periods of 
regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation. The numbers are means of annual medians of firm 
characteristic variables in each period. Firm characteristics are Et /ATt, dATt /ATt, Salegt, MVt/ATt, REt/BEt, MVt , ATt , 
AGEt, and Volatilityt. The variables Et, ATt , Salegt, REt, MVt/ATt, REt, BEt, MVt, AGEt, and Volatilityt, are earnings 
before interest but after taxes, total assets, sales growth rate, ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, 
retained earnings, book value of equity, market value of firm, firm age, and stock return volatility, respectively. dATt 
=ATt  - ATt-1, is the year-to-year asset growth. A firm is defined as a Payer if it pays dividends in the year. Non-payer 
takes the value of one if a firm does not pay dividends in the year. Never-paid is a firm that has never paid dividends 
and Former Payer is a firm that paid dividends previous but has ceased to pay dividends. All variables except 
dummy variables and Age are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. The period of regulation is defined as the 
five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry 
(-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant 
deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following 
the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. Panel A shows the values for all deregulated firms and Panel B for surviving deregulated firms, which 
exist in the regulation period and continue to exist in the partial or complete deregulation period. 
 
  Periods of 
    
Partial 
 
Complete 
    Regulation   Deregulation   Deregulation 
Panel A: All deregulated firms 
  N Et /ATt N Et /ATt N Et /ATt 
All Firms 3,990 0.067 5,466 0.062 6,928 0.041 
Payer 2,359 0.072 3,038 0.071 2,733 0.055 
Non-Payer 1,631 0.049 2,428 0.019 4,195 0.008 
Never Paid 1,518 0.050 2,265 0.019 3,865 0.004 
Former Payer 112 0.037 163 0.024 329 0.039 
  N dATt /ATt N dATt /ATt N dATt /ATt 
All Firms 4,627 0.066 5,506 0.072 6,520 0.067 
Payer 3,149 0.066 3,411 0.064 2,664 0.051 
Non-Payer 1,478 0.066 2,095 0.115 3,856 0.096 
Never Paid 1,364 0.073 1,931 0.124 3,527 0.104 
Former Payer 113 0.006 164 0.021 328 0.042 
  N Salegt N Salegt N Salegt 
All Firms 4,612 0.087 5,476 0.099 6,424 0.104 
Payer 3,148 0.074 3,410 0.083 2,654 0.065 
Non-Payer 1,464 0.133 2,066 0.174 3,770 0.169 
Never Paid 1,350 0.142 1,903 0.190 3,442 0.188 
Former Payer 113 0.072 163 0.090 327 0.054 
  N MVt/ATt N MVt/ATt N MVt/ATt 
All Firms 3,214 1.052 4,153 1.181 5,143 1.376 
Payer 2,325 1.051 2,343 1.125 1,803 1.291 
Non-Payer 889 1.078 1,810 1.614 3,340 1.442 
Never Paid 786 1.113 1,659 1.730 3,022 1.467 
Former Payer 102 0.910 151 0.992 317 1.276 
  N REt /BEt N REt /BEt N REt /BEt 
All Firms 4,973 0.419 5,920 0.411 6,697 0.273 
Payer 3,266 0.465 3,450 0.500 2,608 0.436 
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Non-Payer 1,707 0.306 2,470 0.165 4,089 0.056 
Never Paid 1,589 0.296 2,302 0.149 3,759 0.042 
Former Payer 117 0.392 168 0.308 329 0.166 
  N NYPt N NYPt N NYPt 
All Firms 3,214 0.452 4,148 0.311 5,154 0.326 
Payer 2,325 0.595 2,338 0.607 1,808 0.697 
Non-Payer 889 0.153 1,810 0.063 3,346 0.137 
Never Paid 786 0.148 1,659 0.064 3,028 0.119 
Former Payer 102 0.247 151 0.062 317 0.343 
  N MVt N MVt N MVt 
All Firms 3,214 242.23 4,148 192.04 5,142 479.49 
Payer 2,325 551.08 2,338 713.68 1,803 3,096.49 
Non-Payer 889 48.10 1,810 32.21 3,339 193.61 
Never Paid 786 44.78 1,659 30.62 3,021 176.49 
Former Payer 102 161.57 151 56.82 317 542.381 
  N ATt N ATt N ATt 
All Firms 4,977 147.80 5,943 143.66 6,986 466.86 
Payer 3,268 435.37 3,468 622.54 2,774 2468.97 
Non-Payer 1,709 16.21 2,475 10.85 4,212 144.62 
Never Paid 1,591 14.22 2,307 9.39 3,881 130.66 
Former Payer 117 92.76 168 47.954 330 437.48 
  N AGEt N AGEt N AGEt 
All Firms 2,375 23.00 3,044 14.00 3,980 11.00 
Payer 1,607 39.70 1,725 41.20 1,523 30.40 
Non-Payer 768 6.10 1,319 3.80 2,457 6.60 
Never Paid 660 5.20 1,176 3.20 2,155 5.60 
Former Payer 107 34.90 143 11.30 301 23.50 
  N Volatilityt N Volatilityt N Volatilityt 
All Firms 2,334 0.021 3,012 0.026 3,941 0.032 
Payer 1,602 0.016 1,724 0.017 1,522 0.019 
Non-Payer 732 0.036 1,288 0.038 2,419 0.043 
Never Paid 626 0.037 1,151 0.039 2,117 0.045 
Former Payer 105 0.034 137 0.032 301 0.031 
Panel B: Surviving deregulated firms 
  N Et /ATt N Et /ATt N Et /ATt 
All Firms 3,990 0.067 4,369 0.066 2,278 0.050 
Payer 2,359 0.072 2,889 0.071 1,616 0.053 
Non-Payer 1,631 0.049 1,480 0.035 662 0.033 
Never Paid 1,518 0.050 1,331 0.038 485 0.032 
Former Payer 112 0.037 149 0.025 177 0.039 
  N dATt /ATt N dATt /ATt N dATt /ATt 
All Firms 4,627 0.066 4,822 0.067 2,304 0.046 
Payer 3,149 0.066 3,305 0.063 1,640 0.047 
Non-Payer 1,478 0.066 1,517 0.098 664 0.043 
Never Paid 1,364 0.073 1,363 0.109 486 0.044 
Former Payer 113 0.006 154 0.019 178 0.031 
  N Salegt N Salegt N Salegt 
All Firms 4,612 0.087 4,804 0.089 2,304 0.059 
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Payer 3,148 0.074 3,302 0.081 1,641 0.058 
Non-Payer 1,464 0.133 1,502 0.136 663 0.058 
Never Paid 1,350 0.142 1,349 0.143 485 0.058 
Former Payer 113 0.072 153 0.086 178 0.056 
  N MVt/ATt N MVt/ATt N MVt/ATt 
All Firms 3,214 1.052 3,353 1.141 1,526 1.252 
Payer 2,325 1.051 2,272 1.124 1,011 1.246 
Non-Payer 889 1.078 1,081 1.395 515 1.286 
Never Paid 786 1.113 936 1.490 344 1.286 
Former Payer 102 0.910 145 0.979 171 1.280 
  N REt /BEt N REt /BEt N REt /BEt 
All Firms 4,973 0.419 4,817 0.453 2,292 0.404 
Payer 3,266 0.465 3,300 0.493 1,633 0.433 
Non-Payer 1,707 0.306 1,517 0.273 659 0.223 
Never Paid 1,589 0.296 1,363 0.257 481 0.210 
Former Payer 117 0.392 154 0.340 178 0.229 
  N NYPt N NYPt N NYPt 
All Firms 3,214 0.452 4,148 0.425 5,154 0.567 
Payer 2,325 0.595 2,338 0.613 1,808 0.708 
Non-Payer 889 0.153 1,810 0.080 3,346 0.177 
Never Paid 786 0.148 1,659 0.083 3,028 0.062 
Former Payer 102 0.247 151 0.059 317 0.430 
  N MVt N MVt N MVt 
All Firms 3,214 242.23 3,348 330.51 1,526 1,812.62 
Payer 2,325 551.08 2,267 741.97 1,011 3,655.20 
Non-Payer 889 48.10 1,081 41.41 515 262.78 
Never Paid 786 44.78 936 39.62 344 102.90 
Former Payer 102 161.57 145 57.02 171 809.35 
  N ATt N ATt N ATt 
All Firms 4,977 147.80 4,823 287.72 2,306 1,878.86 
Payer 3,268 435.37 3,305 653.65 1,642 2,702.21 
Non-Payer 1,709 16.21 1,518 17.42 664 215.14 
Never Paid 1,591 14.22 1,364 15.27 486 86.30 
Former Payer 117 92.76 154 48.23 178 582.26 
  N AGEt N AGEt N AGEt 
All Firms 2,375 23.00 2,419 22.50 1,228 52.00 
Payer 1,607 39.70 1,667 42.60 873 73.60 
Non-Payer 768 6.10 752 7.50 355 24.50 
Never Paid 660 5.20 618 6.00 194 20.00 
Former Payer 107 34.90 134 11.10 161 34.80 
  N Volatilityt N Volatilityt N Volatilityt 
All Firms 2,334 0.021 2,393 0.022 1,222 0.020 
Payer 1,602 0.016 1,666 0.017 873 0.017 
Non-Payer 732 0.036 727 0.036 349 0.033 
Never Paid 626 0.037 595 0.037 188 0.040 
Former Payer 105 0.034 132 0.032 161 0.029 
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Table 9 
Logit regressions to explain deregulated firm decision to pay or to not pay dividends in three periods 
 
This table reports the coefficients of logit regressions explaining the decision of deregulated firms (all firms), payers 
in year t-1 (payer), and non-payers in year t-1 (non-payers) to pay or not to pay dividends in year t. The dependent 
variable, Payert, takes the value of 1 if a firm pays dividends in year t and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables 
are dATt /ATt, Et /ATt, NYPt, REt /BEt, MVt/ATt, Salegt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt. The variables Et, ATt , Salegt, MVt/ATt, 
REt, BEt, NYPt,, LAGEt, and LVolatilityt, are earnings before interest but after taxes, total assets, sales growth rate, 
ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets, retained earnings, book value of equity, firm size relative to 
that of New York Stock Exchange firms, logarithm of firm age, and logarithm of stock return volatility, respectively. 
dATt =ATt  - ATt-1, is the year-to-year asset growth. Et /ATt, is a proxy of firm profitability; NYPt, computed as the 
percent of NYSE firms with the same or lower market capitalization at the end of a firm’s fiscal year, is a proxy of 
firm size; the growth rate of assets dATt /ATt, ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets MVt/ATt, and sales 
growth rate Salegt are proxies of firm growth opportunities; earned equity REt /BEt is measured as the ratio of 
retained earnings to total book equity. The reported values of the regression coefficients are averaged coefficients 
from annual regressions in each period. Periods 1, 2 and 3 represent periods of regulation, partial deregulation and 
complete deregulation respectively. The period of regulation is defined as the five years immediate preceding the 
year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial 
deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). 
The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following the year in which the last 
significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). The t-statistic is computed by dividing average coefficients 
by their standard error – the time-series standard deviation of the regression coefficient divided by the square root of 
the number of years in the period. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Average Coefficient 
Period Int dATt /ATt  Et /ATt NYPt REt/BEt MVt/ATt Salegt LAGEt LVolatilityt 
Panel A: Regressions using Fama-French (2001) variables 
All Firms 1+2+3 1.487** -0.723*** 14.615*** -3.540 0.580 -0.575*** 
   
  
(2.23) (-3.13) (15.21) (-0.63) (1.59) (-5.00) 
   
 
1 1.651* -0.763** 14.964*** -10.650** 1.435 -0.496** 
   
  
(2.25) (-4.31) (5.57) (-3.24) (1.87) (-3.21) 
   
 
2 2.917*** -0.491 16.048*** -12.249*** 0.225 -0.824*** 
   
  
(7.13) (-0.77) (41.18) (-12.22) (1.68) (-5.85) 
   
 
3 -0.107 -0.916*** 12.834*** 12.279*** 0.079*** -0.404*** 
   
    (-1.41) (-16.17) (25.66) (5.69) (9.35) (-12.85)       
Payer 1+2+3 2.234*** 1.225 17.353*** -4.792 2.299** 0.117 
   
  
(3.10) (1.10) (4.47) (-0.84) (2.73) (0.47) 
   
 
1 0.471 3.341 20.079** 2.975 2.877 0.399 
   
  
(0.51) (2.08) (2.91) (0.58) (1.90) (0.69) 
   
 
2 3.833*** 1.330 21.717** -21.597** 3.208** 0.164 
   
  
(7.58) (0.95) (3.98) (-3.74) (3.83) (0.42) 
   
 
3 2.398*** -0.996*** 10.263** 4.245* 0.811** -0.212*** 
   
    (19.95) (-5.24) (4.30) (2.24) (4.57) (-4.75)       
Non-Payer 1+2+3 -2.175*** 0.824* 9.533*** 0.060 0.147 -0.719*** 
   
  
(-4.85) (2.14) (4.61) (0.03) (1.57) (-3.12) 
   
 
1 -1.336** 0.616 12.570* 0.422 0.383 -1.234** 
   
  
(-3.22) (2.12) (2.74) (0.26) (1.97) (-2.96) 
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2 -2.225** 1.787* 5.400*** -3.150 0.041 -0.428 
   
  
(-3.15) (2.49) (5.39) (-1.51) (1.81) (-1.31) 
   
 
3 -2.964*** 0.069 10.628*** 2.907 0.016 -0.495*** 
   
    (-18.41) (0.31) (5.41) (0.79) (1.82) (-4.63)       
Panel B: Regressions using Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables  
All Firms 1+2+3 -12.586*** 11.115*** 2.354 0.529 -0.295*** -0.485*** 0.449*** -3.230*** 
  
(-12.82) 
 
(10.78) (0.58) (1.61) (-7.07) (-3.00) (5.55) (-13.26) 
 
1 -14.572*** 12.833*** -2.141 1.159 -0.309*** -0.234 0.358*** -3.799*** 
  
(-6.16) 
 
(5.83) (-0.75) (1.58) (-9.85) (-0.86) (4.93) (-7.46) 
 
2 -11.149*** 9.896*** -3.253* 0.317 -0.270** -0.425 0.683*** -2.810*** 
  
(-28.11) 
 
(28.94) (-2.50) (1.39) (-2.91) (-1.81) (18.43) (-18.77) 
 
3 -12.039*** 10.614*** 12.456** 0.111*** -0.305** -0.794*** 0.306** -3.080*** 
    (-18.54)   (10.42) (2.86) (4.81) (-4.57) (-5.59) (3.72) (-35.22) 
Payer 1+2+3 -11.086*** 14.088*** -0.606 2.170** 0.333 1.372 0.413*** -3.191*** 
  
(-6.48) 
 
(3.99) (-0.11) (2.58) (0.90) (1.38) (3.77) (-7.43) 
 
1 -15.193** 
 
17.073** 6.559 3.083* -0.209 4.039** 0.295 -4.246** 
  
(-3.69) 
 
(3.31) (1.00) (2.48) (-0.39) (3.63) (1.72) (-3.47) 
 
2 -8.051** 
 
17.279** -16.592** 2.411 1.154 0.490 0.651*** -2.222*** 
  
(-3.23) 
 
(4.37) (-4.02) (2.02) (1.26) (0.58) (14.18) (-7.46) 
 
3 -10.015*** 7.912 8.215 1.017* 0.054 -0.412 0.294** -3.106*** 
    (-8.62)   (1.80) (1.35) (2.41) (0.23) (-1.44) (4.16) (-10.09) 
Non-Payer 1+2+3 -9.187*** 
 
9.360*** -1.148 0.081 -0.613** -0.189 0.123 -1.807*** 
  
(-7.11) 
 
(5.27) (-0.22) (0.66) (-2.62) (-1.38) (1.53) (-5.61) 
 
1 -10.295** 
 
11.100*** 7.467 0.098 -1.000 -0.153 0.279** -2.026* 
  
(-3.25) 
 
(6.86) (2.02) (0.28) (-1.78) (-0.39) (2.93) (-2.35) 
 
2 -8.965*** 
 
4.384*** -3.799 0.116 -0.180 -0.051 0.191* -1.798*** 
  
(-5.41) 
 
(7.60) (-1.49) (1.53) (-0.87) (-0.23) (2.22) (-5.74) 
 
3 -8.300*** 
 
12.597*** -7.111 0.031 -0.659*** -0.363** -0.101 -1.596*** 
    (-8.91)   (5.39) (-0.55) (1.02) (-9.93) (-3.99) (-0.99) (-6.14) 
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Table 10 
Out of sample estimates from logit regressions of the effect of changing firm characteristics and 
deregulation on percent of firms paying dividends 
 
This table reports the effect of changing firm characteristics induced by economic deregulation on the percent of 
deregulated firms paying dividends in the periods of partial deregulation (0, 4) and complete deregulation (+1, +5). 
The period of regulation (-5, -1) is used as the benchmark period for logit regressions for both deregulated firms and 
control firms. The explanatory variables are Fama and French (2001) variables – NYPt, (firm size relative to that of 
New York Stock Exchange firms), MVt/ATt (growth opportunity), dATt /ATt (growth rate of assets), Et/ATt 
(profitability), and REt /BEt (firm life-cycle stage), and additional Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) 
variables – LAGEt and LVolatilityt. ATt, Et, REt , MVt/ATt, BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt are the firm’s total assets, 
earnings before interest but after tax, retained earnings, market-to-book ratio, book equity, logarithm of firm age and 
logarithm of standard deviation of stock returns in fiscal year t, respectively. NYPt is measured as the percent of 
NYSE firms with the same or lower market capitalization at the end of a firm’s fiscal year.24 dATt = ATt  - ATt-1. The 
values of expected percent are obtained by applying the average logit regression coefficients for each year of the 
regulation period to the values of the explanatory variables for each firm in each relative year in the partial and 
complete deregulation periods, averaging the probability across firms. Actual percent is the percent of payers. I 
report the results for all deregulated firms using Fama and French (2001) variables in Panel A, the results for 
surviving deregulated firms using Fama and French (2001) in Panel B, the results for all deregulated firms using and 
Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables in Panel C, and the results for surviving firms using Grullon, 
Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables in Panel D. 
  
  Regulated Firms Control Firms   
Relative 
 
Actual Expected  Exp- 
  
Actual Expected  Exp- 
 
p value  
Year N Payer Payer Act t-stat N Payer Payer Act t-stat of diff. 
Panel A: All deregulated firms, using Fama and French (2001) variables 
0 584 0.697 0.642 -0.055 -3.71 471 0.603 0.596 -0.007 -0.40 0.04 
1 640 0.639 0.592 -0.047 -3.20 525 0.552 0.563 0.010 0.58 0.12 
2 694 0.598 0.562 -0.036 -2.64 542 0.507 0.524 0.016 0.96 0.02 
3 798 0.499 0.494 -0.004 -0.35 603 0.454 0.465 0.010 0.68 0.46 
4 876 0.445 0.450 0.005 0.40 652 0.414 0.434 0.020 1.45 0.40 
+1 921 0.377 0.442 0.065 4.98 881 0.299 0.337 0.039 3.46 0.13 
+2 944 0.362 0.451 0.089 6.79 939 0.274 0.323 0.049 4.45 0.02 
+3 1,004 0.337 0.423 0.086 6.87 981 0.242 0.329 0.087 8.39 0.96 
+4 1,035 0.311 0.425 0.114 9.32 1,029 0.237 0.315 0.078 7.53 0.03 
+5 1,001 0.336 0.447 0.111 8.48 1,029 0.241 0.302 0.061 5.85 0.00 
Panel B: Surviving firms, using Fama and French (2001) variables 
0 584 0.697 0.642 -0.055 -3.71 471 0.603 0.596 -0.007 -0.40 0.04 
1 618 0.659 0.605 -0.053 -3.58 477 0.600 0.589 -0.010 -0.55 0.07 
2 628 0.645 0.597 -0.048 -3.33 457 0.580 0.570 -0.010 -0.52 0.10 
3 620 0.624 0.579 -0.045 -2.98 440 0.580 0.542 -0.037 -2.08 0.74 
4 595 0.620 0.582 -0.038 -2.45 422 0.571 0.538 -0.033 -1.83 0.82 
+1 327 0.673 0.591 -0.082 -3.74 325 0.554 0.513 -0.040 -1.83 0.19 
+2 312 0.660 0.622 -0.038 -1.62 298 0.534 0.520 -0.014 -0.59 0.47 
+3 302 0.659 0.610 -0.049 -1.97 265 0.509 0.552 0.042 1.75 0.01 
+4 286 0.640 0.617 -0.023 -0.92 250 0.532 0.560 0.028 1.03 0.17 
+5 273 0.659 0.626 -0.033 -1.26 233 0.549 0.539 -0.011 -0.39 0.56 
                                                        
24
 The increase in the number of firms during the period of partial deregulation is caused by data availability, i.e., for some firms 
the data become available in later years to allow estimation and comparison.   
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Panel C: All deregulated firms, using GPUW (2008) variables 
0 402 0.719 0.698 -0.021 -1.29 370 0.659 0.651 -0.008 -0.45 0.62 
1 433 0.674 0.658 -0.016 -1.05 384 0.625 0.652 0.027 1.44 0.07 
2 463 0.637 0.606 -0.031 -1.96 409 0.553 0.589 0.037 1.99 0.01 
3 538 0.532 0.529 -0.002 -0.15 433 0.513 0.557 0.044 2.70 0.03 
4 598 0.460 0.458 -0.002 -0.15 490 0.453 0.524 0.071 4.55 0.00 
+1 668 0.416 0.458 0.042 3.05 669 0.318 0.407 0.089 6.72 0.02 
+2 698 0.403 0.460 0.057 4.30 696 0.309 0.378 0.070 5.20 0.52 
+3 703 0.384 0.422 0.038 2.79 721 0.272 0.337 0.065 5.27 0.14 
+4 721 0.363 0.420 0.057 4.52 735 0.276 0.359 0.082 6.61 0.15 
+5 720 0.383 0.448 0.065 4.79 762 0.273 0.367 0.094 7.73 0.11 
Panel D: Surviving firms, using GPUW (2008) variables 
0 402 0.719 0.698 -0.021 -1.29 370 0.659 0.651 -0.008 -0.45 0.62 
1 421 0.689 0.667 -0.022 -1.38 360 0.664 0.680 0.016 0.79 0.14 
2 422 0.680 0.639 -0.041 -2.57 348 0.629 0.650 0.020 1.02 0.02 
3 418 0.663 0.637 -0.026 -1.57 338 0.621 0.639 0.017 0.93 0.08 
4 398 0.656 0.615 -0.040 -2.35 329 0.608 0.655 0.047 2.42 0.00 
+1 255 0.714 0.690 -0.024 -1.11 259 0.583 0.657 0.074 3.01 0.00 
+2 251 0.705 0.726 0.020 0.99 240 0.575 0.646 0.071 2.76 0.12 
+3 238 0.710 0.694 -0.016 -0.64 216 0.542 0.623 0.082 3.03 0.01 
+4 227 0.705 0.727 0.023 1.01 203 0.581 0.674 0.092 3.24 0.05 
+5 225 0.724 0.771 0.046 2.05 189 0.603 0.697 0.094 3.23 0.19 
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Table 11 
Out of sample estimates from logit regressions of the effect of changing firm characteristics and 
deregulation on percent of firms paying dividends using all Compustat firms as controls 
 
This table reports the effect of changing firm characteristics induced by economic deregulation on the percent of 
deregulated firms paying dividends in each deregulation industry the periods of partial deregulation (0, 4) and 
complete deregulation (+1, +5), using all Compustat firms as control firms for each deregulated industry. The period 
1971 to 1975 is used as the benchmark period for logit regressions for both deregulated firms and control firms to 
obtain coefficients. The explanatory variables are Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables – NYPt, 
(firm size relative to that of New York Stock Exchange firms), MVt/ATt  (growth opportunity), dATt /ATt (growth rate 
of assets), Et/ATt (profitability), REt /BEt (firm life-cycle stage), LAGEt (firm age) and LVolatilityt (return volatility). 
ATt, Et, REt , MVt/ATt, BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt are the firm’s total assets, earnings before interest but after tax, 
retained earnings, market-to-book ratio, book equity, logarithm of firm age and logarithm of standard deviation of 
stock returns in fiscal year t, respectively. NYPt is measured as the percent of NYSE firms with the same or lower 
market capitalization at the end of a firm’s fiscal year. dATt = ATt  - ATt-1. The values of expected percent are 
obtained by applying the average logit regression coefficients for each year of the regulation period to the values of 
the explanatory variables for each firm in each relative year in the partial and complete deregulation periods, 
averaging the probability across firms. Actual percent is the percent of payers. As a robustness check, I report the 
results using Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables in the out of sample estimation. 
 
  Regulated Firms Control Firms   
Relative 
 
Actual Expected  Exp- 
  
Actual Expected  Exp- 
 
p value  
Year N Payer Payer Act t-stat N Payer Payer Act t-stat of diff. 
Panel A: Entertainment 
0 39 0.590 0.626 0.036 0.66 2,409 0.635 0.616 -0.018 -2.46 0.36 
1 44 0.500 0.605 0.105 1.65 2,434 0.593 0.640 0.047 6.24 0.30 
2 45 0.400 0.632 0.232 3.72 2,502 0.537 0.591 0.054 7.20 0.00 
3 52 0.288 0.474 0.185 3.68 2,641 0.490 0.549 0.059 8.31 0.01 
4 61 0.279 0.487 0.209 4.28 2,802 0.442 0.575 0.133 18.99 0.11 
+1 63 0.254 0.415 0.161 3.16 2,833 0.412 0.532 0.120 17.75 0.37 
+2 72 0.208 0.363 0.154 3.84 2,946 0.376 0.470 0.093 14.02 0.16 
+3 78 0.154 0.270 0.116 2.98 3,100 0.347 0.374 0.027 4.39 0.03 
+4 78 0.154 0.301 0.147 4.14 3,087 0.344 0.433 0.089 14.04 0.15 
+5 75 0.173 0.345 0.171 4.21 2,989 0.349 0.491 0.142 21.40 0.49 
Panel B: Petroleum and Gas 
0 143 0.594 0.648 0.053 1.82 2,338 0.694 0.673 -0.021 -2.88 0.01 
1 165 0.521 0.517 -0.004 -0.17 2,430 0.658 0.658 0.000 0.06 0.87 
2 186 0.489 0.415 -0.075 -2.93 2,409 0.635 0.616 -0.018 -2.46 0.04 
3 250 0.352 0.370 0.018 0.95 2,434 0.593 0.640 0.047 6.24 0.24 
4 308 0.276 0.296 0.020 1.21 2,502 0.537 0.591 0.054 7.20 0.13 
+1 201 0.318 0.416 0.098 4.40 3,410 0.310 0.395 0.085 13.94 0.62 
+2 213 0.319 0.470 0.151 6.56 3,636 0.300 0.424 0.125 20.52 0.31 
+3 216 0.329 0.494 0.165 6.90 3,805 0.291 0.407 0.116 19.50 0.06 
+4 216 0.310 0.500 0.189 8.25 4,082 0.280 0.381 0.101 17.76 0.00 
+5 216 0.333 0.470 0.136 5.71 4,330 0.262 0.374 0.112 20.69 0.34 
Panel C: Utilities 
0 101 0.941 0.934 -0.006 -0.35 3,087 0.344 0.433 0.089 14.04 0.01 
1 103 0.951 0.938 -0.014 -0.90 2,989 0.349 0.491 0.142 21.40 0.00 
2 104 0.923 0.933 0.009 0.43 2,952 0.347 0.432 0.085 13.06 0.03 
3 105 0.933 0.927 -0.006 -0.27 3,004 0.341 0.403 0.063 9.56 0.05 
4 107 0.935 0.932 -0.003 -0.11 3,168 0.331 0.392 0.061 9.77 0.06 
+1 105 0.962 0.875 -0.087 -3.73 3,866 0.233 0.273 0.041 7.74 0.00 
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+2 107 0.925 0.898 -0.027 -1.28 3,816 0.222 0.297 0.075 14.18 0.00 
+3 108 0.907 0.855 -0.053 -1.80 3,546 0.224 0.361 0.136 23.57 0.00 
+4 109 0.862 0.903 0.040 1.55 3,322 0.262 0.437 0.174 26.22 0.00 
+5 113 0.867 0.957 0.090 3.07 3,177 0.293 0.509 0.216 30.76 0.00 
Panel D: Telecommunications 
0 46 0.717 0.810 0.093 1.82 2,430 0.658 0.658 0.000 0.06 0.09 
1 49 0.673 0.779 0.106 2.06 2,409 0.635 0.616 -0.018 -2.46 0.02 
2 49 0.694 0.782 0.088 1.82 2,434 0.593 0.640 0.047 6.24 0.44 
3 53 0.623 0.702 0.079 1.67 2,502 0.537 0.591 0.054 7.20 0.62 
4 53 0.566 0.685 0.119 2.48 2,641 0.490 0.549 0.059 8.31 0.24 
+1 178 0.298 0.435 0.137 5.32 4,330 0.262 0.374 0.112 20.69 0.37 
+2 176 0.295 0.363 0.067 2.59 4,282 0.255 0.332 0.076 14.38 0.74 
+3 163 0.270 0.343 0.073 2.76 3,970 0.244 0.318 0.074 13.74 0.97 
+4 190 0.263 0.263 0.000 0.01 3,866 0.233 0.273 0.041 7.74 0.10 
+5 197 0.274 0.356 0.082 3.16 3,816 0.222 0.297 0.075 14.18 0.76 
Panel E: Transportation 
0 73 0.726 0.741 0.015 0.32 2,308 0.688 0.682 -0.006 -0.90 0.65 
1 72 0.736 0.794 0.058 1.25 2,268 0.714 0.742 0.028 3.77 0.47 
2 79 0.709 0.733 0.024 0.60 2,338 0.694 0.673 -0.021 -2.88 0.26 
3 78 0.667 0.701 0.034 0.75 2,430 0.658 0.658 0.000 0.06 0.43 
4 69 0.623 0.625 0.001 0.03 2,409 0.635 0.616 -0.018 -2.46 0.66 
+1 121 0.364 0.519 0.155 3.97 4,082 0.280 0.381 0.101 17.76 0.17 
+2 130 0.362 0.528 0.167 4.52 4,330 0.262 0.374 0.112 20.69 0.15 
+3 138 0.326 0.429 0.102 3.00 4,282 0.255 0.332 0.076 14.38 0.45 
+4 128 0.305 0.443 0.138 4.17 3,970 0.244 0.318 0.074 13.74 0.06 
+5 119 0.328 0.419 0.091 2.41 3,866 0.233 0.273 0.041 7.74 0.19 
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Table 12 
Out of sample estimates from logit regressions of the effect of changing firm characteristics and 
deregulation on percent of firms paying dividends using eight randomly selected industries as controls 
 
This table reports the effect of changing firm characteristics induced by economic deregulation on the percent of 
deregulated firms paying dividends in each deregulation industry the periods of partial deregulation (0, 4) and 
complete deregulation (+1, +5), using eight (seven) randomly selected Fama and French (1997) industries as control 
firms for each deregulated industry. The period 1971 to 1975 is used as the benchmark period for logit regressions 
for both deregulated firms and control firms to obtain coefficients. The explanatory variables are Grullon, Paye, 
Underwood and Weston (2008) variables – NYPt, (firm size relative to that of New York Stock Exchange firms), 
MVt/ATt  (growth opportunity), dATt /ATt (growth rate of assets), Et/ATt (profitability), REt /BEt (firm life-cycle stage), 
LAGEt (firm age) and LVolatilityt (return volatility). ATt, Et, REt , MVt/ATt, BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt are the firm’s 
total assets, earnings before interest but after tax, retained earnings, market-to-book ratio, book equity, logarithm of 
firm age and logarithm of standard deviation of stock returns in fiscal year t, respectively. NYPt is measured as the 
percent of NYSE firms with the same or lower market capitalization at the end of a firm’s fiscal year. dATt = ATt  - 
ATt-1. The values of expected percent are obtained by applying the average logit regression coefficients for each year 
of the regulation period to the values of the explanatory variables for each firm in each relative year in the partial 
and complete deregulation periods, averaging the probability across firms. Actual percent is the percent of payers. 
As a robustness check, I report the results using Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables in the out 
of sample estimation. 
 
  Regulated Firms Control Firms   
Relative 
 
Actual Expected  Exp- 
  
Actual Expected  Exp- 
 
p value  
Year N Payer Payer Act t-stat N Payer Payer Act t-stat of diff. 
Panel A: Entertainment 
0 39 0.590 0.626 0.036 0.66 391 0.611 0.589 -0.022 -1.16 0.35 
1 44 0.500 0.605 0.105 1.65 406 0.552 0.593 0.042 2.21 0.30 
2 45 0.400 0.632 0.232 3.72 431 0.478 0.537 0.059 3.11 0.01 
3 52 0.288 0.474 0.185 3.68 455 0.453 0.502 0.049 2.80 0.01 
4 61 0.279 0.487 0.209 4.28 523 0.363 0.509 0.146 8.85 0.22 
+1 63 0.254 0.415 0.161 3.16 557 0.325 0.460 0.135 8.49 0.61 
+2 72 0.208 0.363 0.154 3.84 589 0.294 0.380 0.086 5.56 0.14 
+3 78 0.154 0.270 0.116 2.98 618 0.249 0.282 0.033 2.30 0.05 
+4 78 0.154 0.301 0.147 4.14 606 0.279 0.370 0.091 5.89 0.21 
+5 75 0.173 0.345 0.171 4.21 584 0.295 0.427 0.133 8.38 0.41 
Panel B: Petroleum and Gas 
0 143 0.594 0.648 0.053 1.82 561 0.697 0.685 -0.012 -0.87 0.03 
1 165 0.521 0.517 -0.004 -0.17 579 0.663 0.663 -0.001 -0.04 0.89 
2 186 0.489 0.415 -0.075 -2.93 576 0.639 0.617 -0.021 -1.57 0.06 
3 250 0.352 0.370 0.018 0.95 588 0.604 0.644 0.040 2.91 0.38 
4 308 0.276 0.296 0.020 1.21 604 0.541 0.603 0.061 4.65 0.06 
+1 201 0.318 0.416 0.098 4.40 712 0.361 0.440 0.079 6.18 0.50 
+2 213 0.319 0.470 0.151 6.56 745 0.354 0.468 0.114 8.80 0.18 
+3 216 0.329 0.494 0.165 6.90 763 0.337 0.456 0.119 9.43 0.09 
+4 216 0.310 0.500 0.189 8.25 788 0.335 0.442 0.107 8.41 0.00 
+5 216 0.333 0.470 0.136 5.71 817 0.337 0.438 0.102 7.86 0.22 
Panel C: Utilities 
0 101 0.941 0.934 -0.006 -0.35 346 0.355 0.418 0.063 3.23 0.01 
1 103 0.951 0.938 -0.014 -0.90 344 0.340 0.437 0.097 5.00 0.00 
2 104 0.923 0.933 0.009 0.43 337 0.344 0.402 0.057 3.41 0.09 
3 105 0.933 0.927 -0.006 -0.27 370 0.314 0.359 0.046 2.63 0.07 
4 107 0.935 0.932 -0.003 -0.11 391 0.322 0.356 0.034 2.07 0.21 
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+1 105 0.962 0.875 -0.087 -3.73 516 0.211 0.259 0.048 3.50 0.00 
+2 107 0.925 0.898 -0.027 -1.28 541 0.216 0.269 0.053 3.98 0.00 
+3 108 0.907 0.855 -0.053 -1.80 512 0.209 0.339 0.130 8.98 0.00 
+4 109 0.862 0.903 0.040 1.55 491 0.230 0.382 0.152 9.45 0.00 
+5 113 0.867 0.957 0.090 3.07 480 0.256 0.435 0.179 10.29 0.01 
Panel D: Telecommunications 
0 46 0.717 0.810 0.093 1.82 591 0.684 0.686 0.003 0.17 0.12 
1 49 0.673 0.779 0.106 2.06 568 0.664 0.661 -0.003 -0.17 0.05 
2 49 0.694 0.782 0.088 1.82 545 0.631 0.694 0.063 3.82 0.66 
3 53 0.623 0.702 0.079 1.67 538 0.591 0.641 0.050 2.89 0.61 
4 53 0.566 0.685 0.119 2.48 562 0.564 0.626 0.062 3.82 0.30 
+1 178 0.298 0.435 0.137 5.32 771 0.326 0.479 0.153 10.97 0.58 
+2 176 0.295 0.363 0.067 2.59 756 0.316 0.413 0.097 7.08 0.34 
+3 163 0.270 0.343 0.073 2.76 707 0.298 0.407 0.108 7.79 0.27 
+4 190 0.263 0.263 0.000 0.01 661 0.300 0.368 0.069 4.91 0.02 
+5 197 0.274 0.356 0.082 3.16 607 0.311 0.435 0.124 8.20 0.17 
Panel E: Transportation 
0 73 0.726 0.741 0.015 0.32 598 0.635 0.666 0.030 2.10 0.74 
1 72 0.736 0.794 0.058 1.25 584 0.647 0.729 0.082 5.27 0.61 
2 79 0.709 0.733 0.024 0.60 593 0.649 0.662 0.013 0.84 0.81 
3 78 0.667 0.701 0.034 0.75 627 0.622 0.646 0.024 1.56 0.83 
4 69 0.623 0.625 0.001 0.03 626 0.609 0.582 -0.026 -1.66 0.58 
+1 121 0.364 0.519 0.155 3.97 1,037 0.285 0.391 0.106 9.94 0.23 
+2 130 0.362 0.528 0.167 4.52 1,087 0.275 0.390 0.115 10.73 0.18 
+3 138 0.326 0.429 0.102 3.00 1,077 0.259 0.346 0.087 8.33 0.67 
+4 128 0.305 0.443 0.138 4.17 977 0.258 0.311 0.053 4.63 0.01 
+5 119 0.328 0.419 0.091 2.41 931 0.259 0.264 0.006 0.49 0.03 
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Table 13 
Dividend abandonment versus failure to initiate 
 
This table presents the analysis of whether the declining propensity to pay dividends is caused by dividend 
abandonment of payers, or failure to initiate by non-payers, or both. We compute the expected number of dividend 
payers by summing the probabilities of dividend payment for each individual firm for the year +5, the last year of 
the five-year period of complete deregulation. Probabilities are computed using the average values for the coefficient 
estimates from Table 10 regressions estimated annually over the period of regulation (-5, -1), the benchmark period. 
The coefficient estimates are then applied to the individual firm’s characteristics. The shortfall in the number of 
dividend payers in year +5 is the difference between the expected number of payers and the actual number of payers. 
Short regression presents values estimated using Fama and French (2001) variables while long regression presents 
values estimated using Grullon, Paye, Underwood and Weston (2008) variables. The period of regulation is defined 
as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an 
industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first 
significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years 
immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Panel A 
reports values for control firms and Panel B for deregulated firms. 
 
  Short Specification Long Specification 
  N Shortfall (Exp-Act) % N Shortfall (Exp-Act) % 
Panel A: Control firms 
Yr-1 Payers 149 -11 -7.38 128 3 2.34 
Yr-1 Non-Payers 83 8 9.64 61 14 22.95 
Post Yr-1 Payers 163 -27 -16.56 131 -13 -9.92 
Post Yr-1 Non-payers 634 92 14.51 442 67 15.16 
Total 1,029 62 6.03 762 71 9.32 
Panel B: Deregulated firms 
Yr-1 Payers 206 -19 -9.22 180 2 1.11 
Yr-1 Non-Payers 66 10 15.15 45 8 17.78 
Post Yr-1 Payers 213 -19 -8.92 165 -26 -15.76 
Post Yr-1 Non-payers 516 139 26.94 330 62 18.79 
Total 1,001 111 11.09 720 46 6.39 
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Table 14 
Convergence of determinants of propensity to pay dividends for partial and complete deregulation periods 
 
This table reports the regression results of determinants of paying dividend for regulated and non-regulated firms 
over the three “snapshot” periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation. The dependent 
variable is Payer, which is equal to 1 if a firm pays dividend in year t and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables 
include NYPt, MVt/ATt, Et /ATt, Salegt , REt /BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt, and their interaction terms with a 
deregulation indicator (Dereg), and a regulation indicator (Reg). ATt, Et, MVt/ATt, REt , BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt are 
total assets, earnings before interest but after tax, market value, retained earnings, book equity, logarithm of firm age 
and logarithm of standard deviation of stock returns in fiscal year t, respectively. NYPt is measured as the percent of 
NYSE firms with the same or lower market capitalization at the end of a firm’s fiscal year. Dereg is equal to 1 if a 
firm is in one of the five deregulated industries, and 0 otherwise. Reg takes the value of 1 if a deregulated firm is in 
the period of regulation and 0 otherwise. The period of regulation is defined as the five years immediate preceding 
the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial 
deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). 
The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following the year in which the last 
significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). The year fixed effects are controlled for in each of the 
regression specifications and standard errors are robust to clustering at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Partial Deregulation Complete Deregulation 
Variable     β p-value     β p-value 
Intercept -10.134*** 0.00 -8.160*** 0.00 
Intercept*Dereg 0.124 0.81 -1.850*** 0.00 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg -2.952*** 0.00 -2.952*** 0.00 
NYP 3.906*** 0.00 3.297*** 0.00 
NYP *Dereg -1.765*** 0.00 -1.155*** 0.00 
NYP *Dereg*Reg 0.309 0.31 0.309 0.31 
MV/AT -0.184*** 0.00 -0.697*** 0.00 
MV/AT*Dereg -0.228*** 0.00 0.285*** 0.00 
MV/AT *Dereg*Reg -0.116 0.31 -0.116 0.31 
E/AT 6.662*** 0.00 8.833*** 0.00 
E/AT*Dereg 1.275 0.16 -0.896 0.29 
E/AT*Dereg*Reg 6.717*** 0.00 6.717*** 0.00 
Saleg -0.726*** 0.00 -0.593*** 0.00 
Saleg*Dereg 0.174 0.30 0.041 0.79 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg 0.211 0.22 0.211 0.22 
RE/BE 0.191*** 0.00 0.079*** 0.00 
RE/BE*Dereg -0.150*** 0.00 -0.037 0.10 
RE/BE*Dereg*Reg 0.105* 0.06 0.105* 0.06 
LAGE 0.556*** 0.00 0.406*** 0.00 
LAGE *Dereg -0.174*** 0.00 -0.025 0.54 
LAGE *Dereg*Reg -0.189*** 0.00 -0.189*** 0.00 
LVolatility -2.167*** 0.00 -1.849*** 0.00 
LVolatility *Dereg -0.115 0.41 -0.433*** 0.00 
LVolatility *Dereg*Reg -0.966*** 0.00 -0.966*** 0.00 
     N 24,895 
 
26,389 
 Pseudo R2 0.48   0.48   
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Table 15 
Convergence of determinants of propensity to pay dividends for all firms, surviving firms, payers and non-
payers after deregulation 
 
This table reports the regression results of determinants of paying dividend for all firms, payers in year t-1 (payer), 
and non-payers in year t-1 (non-payers) after deregulation. The dependent variable is Payer, which is equal to 1 if a 
firm pays dividend in year t and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables include NYPt, MVt/ATt, Et/ATt, Salegt , REt 
/BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt, and their interaction terms with a deregulation indicator (Dereg), and a regulation 
indicator (Reg). ATt, Et, MVt/ATt , REt , BEt, LAGEt and LVolatilityt are total assets, earnings before interest but after 
tax, market value, retained earnings, book equity, logarithm of firm age and logarithm of standard deviation of stock 
returns in fiscal year t, respectively. NYPt is measured as the percent of NYSE firms with the same or lower market 
capitalization at the end of a firm’s fiscal year. Dereg is equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five deregulated 
industries, and 0 otherwise. Reg takes the value of 1 if a deregulated firm is in the period of regulation and 0 
otherwise. The year fixed effects are controlled for in each of the regression specifications and standard errors are 
robust to cluster at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Convergence of determinants for all firms and surviving firms 
  All Firms Surviving Firms 
Variable     β p-value     β p-value 
Intercept -8.700*** 0.00 -8.682*** 0.00 
Intercept*Dereg -0.348 0.13 -2.537*** 0.00 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg -5.316*** 0.00 -4.645 0.25 
NYP 2.173*** 0.00 2.185*** 0.00 
NYP *Dereg 0.153* 0.08 -0.368*** 0.01 
NYP *Dereg*Reg 0.106 0.66 0.576 0.65 
MV/AT -0.316*** 0.00 -0.316*** 0.00 
MV/AT*Dereg -0.032 0.30 0.029 0.61 
MV/AT *Dereg*Reg -0.076 0.31 0.144 0.55 
E/AT 5.798*** 0.00 5.802*** 0.00 
E/AT*Dereg 1.793*** 0.00 2.041*** 0.01 
E/AT*Dereg*Reg 5.606*** 0.00 -4.990 0.55 
Saleg -0.599*** 0.00 -0.602*** 0.00 
Saleg*Dereg -0.091 0.19 0.090 0.39 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg 0.348*** 0.01 0.880 0.25 
RE/BE 0.100*** 0.00 0.100*** 0.00 
RE/BE*Dereg -0.070*** 0.00 -0.046** 0.02 
RE/BE*Dereg*Reg 0.089** 0.03 1.382 0.20 
LAGE 0.434*** 0.00 0.435*** 0.00 
LAGE *Dereg -0.086*** 0.00 0.033 0.39 
LAGE *Dereg*Reg -0.025 0.64 -0.326 0.27 
LVolatility -2.289*** 0.00 -2.283*** 0.00 
LVolatility *Dereg -0.141** 0.03 -0.731*** 0.00 
LVolatility *Dereg*Reg -1.269*** 0.00 -1.042 0.31 
     N 139,334 
 
125,659 
 Pseudo R2 0.46   0.46   
Panel B: Convergence of determinants for dividend payers and non-payers 
  Payers Non-payers 
Variable     β p-value     β p-value 
Intercept -4.435*** 0.00 -16.863 0.87 
Intercept*Dereg -1.104* 0.05 -0.773 0.16 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg -1.911 0.26 -0.420 0.76 
NYP 1.825*** 0.00 0.846*** 0.00 
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NYP *Dereg -0.371 0.12 0.572** 0.01 
NYP *Dereg*Reg 0.876 0.22 0.468 0.39 
MV/AT -0.155*** 0.00 -0.152*** 0.00 
MV/AT*Dereg 0.034 0.62 0.129*** 0.01 
MV/AT *Dereg*Reg -0.351 0.11 -0.559** 0.04 
E/AT 6.766*** 0.00 5.686*** 0.00 
E/AT*Dereg 0.051 0.96 -1.642** 0.04 
E/AT*Dereg*Reg 9.888** 0.04 7.864*** 0.00 
Saleg -0.291*** 0.00 0.045 0.25 
Saleg*Dereg -0.034 0.80 -0.200* 0.06 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg 0.658 0.12 0.215 0.32 
RE/BE 0.077*** 0.00 0.035*** 0.00 
RE/BE*Dereg 0.005 0.88 -0.034* 0.06 
RE/BE*Dereg*Reg 1.492** 0.02 0.064 0.34 
LAGE 0.366*** 0.00 0.084*** 0.00 
LAGE *Dereg -0.058 0.26 -0.148*** 0.00 
LAGE *Dereg*Reg -0.281* 0.08 0.205* 0.08 
LVolatility -2.082*** 0.00 -1.012*** 0.00 
LVolatility *Dereg -0.358** 0.04 -0.245 0.11 
LVolatility *Dereg*Reg -0.389 0.43 0.124 0.75 
     N 57,089 
 
81,388 
 Pseudo R2 0.12   0.04   
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Table 16 
Estimation of effect of regulatory changes on firm dividend payout in “snapshot” periods 
 
This table presents the results of difference analysis of the effect of regulatory changes on dividend payout of 
deregulated firms in the three “snapshot” periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation. The 
difference estimator is computed as follows. For each deregulated firm, I first compute the mean value during the 
regulation and post-deregulation periods. I then calculate the difference between the post-deregulation mean and the 
regulation mean and test whether the difference is significantly different from zero. The period of regulation is 
defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken 
in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first 
significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years 
immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). All 
variables in this table are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable Deregulated Control Dif t-stat dif 
Panel A: Period of regulation 
Dividend/Earnings 0.384 0.187 0.197*** 25.39 
Dividend/Assets 0.020 0.014 0.006*** 12.48 
Dividend/Sales 0.037 0.011 0.026*** 34.90 
Dividend/CashFlow 0.193 0.106 0.086*** 21.93 
Dividend/NetIncome 0.342 0.158 0.184*** 24.29 
Dividend Yield 0.049 0.029 0.020*** 20.15 
Panel B: Period of partial deregulation 
Dividend/Earnings 0.373 0.178 0.196*** 24.05 
Dividend/Assets 0.018 0.013 0.005*** 11.13 
Dividend/Sales 0.036 0.011 0.025*** 34.79 
Dividend/CashFlow 0.172 0.095 0.077*** 20.41 
Dividend/NetIncome 0.321 0.148 0.173*** 22.45 
Dividend Yield 0.034 0.021 0.013*** 17.51 
Panel C: Period of complete deregulation 
Dividend/Earnings 0.263 0.102 0.161*** 22.86 
Dividend/Assets 0.012 0.007 0.006*** 14.98 
Dividend/Sales 0.024 0.007 0.017*** 27.28 
Dividend/CashFlow 0.117 0.054 0.063*** 20.26 
Dividend/NetIncome 0.235 0.085 0.150*** 22.38 
Dividend Yield 0.013 0.007 0.007*** 15.84 
136 
 
 
 
Table 17 
Difference-in-differences estimation of effect of regulatory changes on firm dividend payout in 
“snapshot” periods 
 
This table reports the results from the difference-in-differences analysis of growth rates in each measure of dividend 
payout for deregulated firms compared to control firms in the three “snapshot” periods of regulation, partial 
deregulation and complete deregulation. The difference-in-differences estimator is computed as follows. For each 
deregulated firm and control firm, I first compute the mean value for the regulation and post-deregulation periods. I 
then calculate the difference between the post-deregulation mean and the regulation mean of each firm. The 
difference is averaged over all deregulated firms and control firms. The difference-in-differences estimator is the 
difference between the average differences for deregulated firms and the average difference for control firms. 
Control firms are found through industry matching, i.e., each deregulated industry is matched with a non-regulated 
industry based on the three fundamental factors in dividend decisions: size, growth opportunity and profitability. 
The period of regulation is defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant 
deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years 
starting from the year of the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is 
defined as the five years immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was 
adopted (+1, +5). All variables in the table are winsorized at the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Partial deregulation-Regulation Complete deregulation-Regulation 
Variable Deregulated Control Dif-in-dif t-stat Deregulated Control Dif-in-dif t-stat 
Dividend/Earnings 0.046 0.022 0.023** 2.11 0.032 0.010 0.022 1.10 
Dividend/Assets 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.91 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.63 
Dividend/Sales 0.002 0.000 0.002* 1.96 -0.006 0.002 -0.008*** -3.37 
Dividend/CashFlow 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.42 -0.023 0.002 -0.024*** -2.32 
Dividend/NetIncome 0.039 0.026 0.012 1.06 0.030 0.016 0.014 0.70 
Dividend Yield -0.004 -0.001 -0.004*** -3.24 -0.025 -0.011 -0.014*** -6.23 
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Table 18 
Robustness check of difference-in-differences estimation of effect of regulatory changes on firm 
dividend payout  
 
This table reports the robustness check results from the difference-in-differences analysis of growth rates in each 
variable for deregulated firms in the three “snapshot” periods of regulation, partial deregulation and complete 
deregulation. In this estimation, I require that observations should have non-negative values in earnings, cash flow 
and net income. In this analysis, the period of regulation includes all the years from 1966, the first year of the 
sample period, to year -1, the year preceding the deregulation initiation year (year 0) for each industry; the period of 
partial deregulation includes all the years from year 0 to the year preceding year +1, the year in which the last major 
deregulation initiative was taken in each industry; the complete deregulation period includes all the years from year 
+1 to 2008, the last year of the sample period. Control firms are found through industry matching, i.e., each 
deregulated industry is matched with a non-regulated industry based on the three fundamental factors in dividend 
decisions: size, growth opportunity and profitability. The difference-in-differences estimator is computed as follows. 
For each deregulated firm and control firm, I first compute the mean value for the regulation and post-deregulation 
periods. I then calculate the difference between the post-deregulation mean and the regulation mean of each firm. 
The difference is averaged over all deregulated firms and control firms. The difference-in-differences estimator is 
the difference between the average differences for deregulated firms and the average difference for control firms. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Partial deregulation-Regulation Complete deregulation-Regulation 
Variable Deregulated Control Dif-in-dif t-stat Deregulated Control Dif-in-dif t-stat 
Dividend/Earnings  0.076 0.055  0.026  1.15  0.138  0.100  0.038  0.85 
Dividend/Assets  0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.60 -0.006  0.001 -0.008*** -3.35 
Dividend/Sales  0.001 0.001  0.001  0.67 -0.011  0.008 -0.019*** -5.06 
Dividend/CashFlow  0.015 0.026 -0.011 -1.44 -0.033  0.048 -0.081*** -4.61 
Dividend/NetIncome  0.082 0.087 -0.005 -0.28  0.129  0.197 -0.068 -1.51 
Dividend Yield -0.007 0.000 -0.008*** -5.66 -0.031 -0.013 -0.018*** -6.26 
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Table 19 
Difference-in-differences estimation of effect of regulatory changes on firm dividend payout, 1966-
2008 
 
This table reports the robustness check results from the difference-in-differences analysis of growth rates in each 
variable for deregulated firms compared to control firms expanded time periods. In this analysis, the period of 
regulation includes all the years from 1966, the first year of the sample period, to year -1, the year preceding the 
deregulation initiation year (year 0) for each industry; the period of partial deregulation includes all the years from 
year 0 to the year preceding year +1, the year in which the last major deregulation initiative was taken in each 
industry; the complete deregulation period includes all the years from year +1 to 2008, the last year of the sample 
period. Control firms are found through industry matching, i.e., each deregulated industry is matched with a non-
regulated industry based on the three fundamental factors in dividend decisions: size, growth opportunity and 
profitability. The difference-in-differences estimator is computed as follows. For each deregulated firm and control 
firm, I first compute the mean value for the regulation and post-deregulation periods. I then calculate the difference 
between the post-deregulation mean and the regulation mean of each firm. The difference is averaged over all 
deregulated firms and control firms. The difference-in-differences estimator is the difference between the average 
differences for deregulated firms and the average difference for control firms. All variables are winsorized at the 1st 
percentile and the 99th percentile. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Partial deregulation-Regulation Complete deregulation-Regulation 
Variable Difference-in-differences t-stat dif Difference-in-differences t-stat dif 
Dividend/Earnings 0.018** 2.12 0.000 0.01 
Dividend/Assets                       0.001 0.94 -0.001 -0.81 
Dividend/Sales 0.003*** 2.50     -0.007*** -3.20 
Dividend/CashFlow                       0.006 1.07     -0.025*** -2.20 
Dividend/NetIncome 0.026*** 3.07 0.003 0.20 
Dividend Yield -0.005*** -3.13      -0.012*** -4.66 
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Table 20 
Multivariate estimation of deregulation impact on dividend payout  
 
This table reports parameter estimates of panel ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of dividend payout on the 
determining factors for the deregulated firms and industry-matched control firms. The dependent variables in the 
regressions are six measures of dividend payout, namely, dividends scaled by earnings, dividends scaled by t-1 year 
asset, dividends scaled by t-1 year sales, dividends scaled by cash flow, and dividends scaled by net income, as well 
as dividend yield. The explanatory variables are leverage (Bklev), size (LNAT), ownership (LnCshr), market-to-book 
(MTB), earnings volatility (StdOibpd), stock return volatility (Volatility), profitability (OCF) and sales growth 
(Saleg), and their interaction terms with a deregulation indicator (Dereg), and a regulation indicator (Reg). Dereg is 
equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five deregulated industries, and 0 otherwise. Reg takes the value of 1 if a 
deregulated firm is in the period of regulation and 0 otherwise. The year fixed effects are controlled for in each of 
the regression specifications and standard errors are robust to cluster at the firm level. All variables in the table are 
winsorized at the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile. p-value is in parentheses. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend  
Variable Earnings Assets Sales Cash Flow Net Income Yield 
Panel A: Period of partial deregulation 
Intercept 0.294*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.215*** 0.242*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.130** 0.004 0.029*** 0.022 0.172*** 0.001 
 
(0.011) (0.300) (0.000) (0.447) (0.000) (0.898) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.482*** 0.015*** 0.021* 0.293*** 0.416*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.250*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.209*** -0.173*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.382*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.268*** 0.285*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.058 -0.011* -0.001 -0.088* 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.499) (0.059) (0.925) (0.083) (0.951) (0.924) 
LNAT 0.023*** 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.027*** 0.000 
 
(0.010) (0.716) (0.534) (0.104) (0.001) (0.958) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.025** -0.001 -0.002** -0.013** -0.032*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.011) (0.188) (0.037) (0.010) (0.000) (0.002) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.048*** -0.002** -0.002 -0.017** -0.034*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.035) (0.147) (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) 
LnCshr 0.009 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.010* 0.002 0.003*** 
 
(0.389) (0.001) (0.000) (0.072) (0.879) (0.009) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.054*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.020*** 0.055*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.875) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.015 0.002** 0.006*** 0.012 0.014 0.005*** 
 
(0.283) (0.045) (0.002) (0.130) (0.327) (0.006) 
MTB 0.004 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.248) (0.000) (0.000) (0.300) (0.705) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.010*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.004** -0.005** 0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.000) (0.016) (0.022) (0.364) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.007 0.001* 0.003 0.008 0.007 -0.003** 
 
(0.398) (0.074) (0.120) (0.167) (0.432) (0.013) 
StdOibdp -0.195*** -0.011** -0.012*** -0.109*** -0.143*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.003) (0.025) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
StdOibdp*Dereg 0.070 0.006 0.002 0.051 0.035 0.014* 
 
(0.305) (0.226) (0.741) (0.179) (0.501) (0.057) 
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StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.036 -0.001 0.003 0.057 0.337 -0.007 
 
(0.898) (0.960) (0.905) (0.656) (0.235) (0.723) 
Volatility -3.973*** -0.277*** -0.215*** -2.399*** -3.520*** -0.500*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -2.462*** -0.001 -0.374*** -0.924** -2.530*** -0.135** 
 
(0.000) (0.987) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.049) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -9.932*** -0.448*** -0.831*** -5.156*** -8.170*** -1.478*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF 0.183** 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.073 0.144** 0.017** 
 
(0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.128) (0.040) (0.024) 
OCF*Dereg -0.283*** -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.133*** -0.234*** -0.020** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg -0.346** 0.038** -0.020 -0.399*** -0.514*** -0.046** 
 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.558) (0.000) (0.007) (0.025) 
Saleg -0.034** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.042*** -0.059*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.026) (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Saleg*Dereg 0.026 0.004*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.031* 0.004*** 
 
(0.129) (0.000) (0.268) (0.003) (0.091) (0.001) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.094*** -0.005*** 0.003 -0.077*** -0.143*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.446) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
       R2 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.21 0.44 
N 17,925 17,925 17,925 17,923 17,925 17,756 
Panel B: Period of complete deregulation 
Intercept 0.216*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.133*** 0.181*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.209*** 0.007** 0.034*** 0.104*** 0.233*** 0.010** 
 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.482*** 0.015*** 0.021* 0.293*** 0.416*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.147*** -0.028*** -0.020*** -0.115*** -0.137*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.279*** 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.174*** 0.249*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.058 -0.011* -0.001 -0.088* 0.005 0.001 
 
(0.499) (0.059) (0.925) (0.083) (0.951) (0.924) 
LNAT 0.015*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.017*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.001) (0.196) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.007) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.017*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.048*** -0.002** -0.002 -0.017** -0.034*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.035) (0.147) (0.022) (0.009) (0.006) 
LnCshr 0.038*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.025*** -0.001 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.313) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.015 0.002** 0.006*** 0.012 0.014 0.005*** 
 
(0.283) (0.045) (0.002) (0.130) (0.327) (0.006) 
MTB -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.797) (0.000) (0.000) (0.360) (0.341) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.006*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.000*** 
 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.003) (0.014) (0.006) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.007 0.001* 0.003 0.008 0.007 -0.003** 
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(0.398) (0.074) (0.120) (0.167) (0.431) (0.013) 
StdOibdp -0.051*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.026** -0.035** -0.006*** 
 
(0.008) (0.885) (0.813) (0.024) (0.032) (0.001) 
StdOibdp*Dereg -0.074*** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.032** -0.073*** -0.002 
 
(0.007) (0.018) (0.000) (0.038) (0.003) (0.423) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.036 -0.001 0.003 0.057 0.337 -0.007 
 
(0.898) (0.960) (0.905) (0.656) (0.235) (0.723) 
Volatility -3.286*** -0.213*** -0.144*** -1.923*** -2.846*** -0.400*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -3.148*** -0.064** -0.445*** -1.400*** -3.203*** -0.235*** 
 
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -9.932*** -0.448*** -0.831*** -5.156*** -8.170*** -1.478*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF 0.142*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.091*** 0.110*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF*Dereg -0.241*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.152*** -0.200*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg -0.346** 0.038** -0.020 -0.399*** -0.514*** -0.046** 
 
(0.032) (0.021) (0.558) (0.000) (0.007) (0.025) 
Saleg -0.009* -0.001*** -0.001* -0.013*** -0.020*** -0.001** 
 
(0.073) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) 
Saleg*Dereg 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.009 0.000 
 
(0.926) (0.174) (0.243) (0.659) (0.215) (0.571) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.094*** -0.005*** 0.003 -0.077*** -0.143*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.446) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
       R2 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.23 0.45 
N 18,592 18,592 18,592 18,591 18,592 18,433 
Panel C: Surviving firms: period of partial deregulation 
Intercept 0.296*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.215*** 0.243*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.363*** 0.018*** 0.055*** 0.181*** 0.442*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.247*** 0.001 -0.005 0.133** 0.144 0.054*** 
 
(0.006) (0.870) (0.640) (0.015) (0.128) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.250*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.210*** -0.173*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.331*** 0.016*** 0.017** 0.201*** 0.203** 0.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.033) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.109 0.002 0.014 -0.021 0.088 0.020** 
 
(0.252) (0.652) (0.203) (0.688) (0.359) (0.042) 
LNAT 0.023*** 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.027*** 0.000 
 
(0.010) (0.708) (0.533) (0.104) (0.001) (0.972) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.028** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.019*** -0.036*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.030) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.046*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.030** -0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.589) (0.744) (0.149) (0.025) (0.015) 
LnCshr 0.008 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.010* 0.001 0.003** 
 
(0.417) (0.001) (0.000) (0.081) (0.912) (0.011) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.042*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.023*** 0.042*** 0.006*** 
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(0.007) (0.237) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.027* 0.001 0.005*** 0.010 0.027* 0.004** 
 
(0.079) (0.307) (0.009) (0.217) (0.082) (0.012) 
MTB 0.003 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002*** 
 
(0.288) (0.000) (0.000) (0.344) (0.604) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.006 -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
 
(0.163) (0.004) (0.033) (0.244) (0.302) (0.762) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.004 0.001* 0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.002** 
 
(0.681) (0.062) (0.195) (0.254) (0.562) (0.025) 
StdOibdp -0.211*** -0.012** -0.012** -0.116*** -0.159*** -0.025*** 
 
(0.004) (0.032) (0.014) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
StdOibdp*Dereg -0.228 -0.006 -0.032* -0.114 -0.270 -0.003 
 
(0.209) (0.519) (0.054) (0.197) (0.112) (0.839) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.350 0.013 0.037 0.230* 0.656** 0.013 
 
(0.196) (0.405) (0.141) (0.074) (0.028) (0.544) 
Volatility -3.975*** -0.277*** -0.215*** -2.399*** -3.523*** -0.501*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -6.579*** -0.188*** -0.760*** -3.131*** -7.025*** -0.463*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -5.813*** -0.260*** -0.445** -2.948*** -3.672** -1.149*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000) 
OCF 0.186** 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.073 0.147** 0.017** 
 
(0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.125) (0.039) (0.021) 
OCF*Dereg -0.682*** -0.032*** -0.059*** -0.390*** -0.631*** -0.031** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg 0.050 0.020 -0.000 -0.144 -0.120 -0.036* 
 
(0.783) (0.214) (0.992) (0.227) (0.573) (0.092) 
Saleg -0.032** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.041*** -0.058*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.039) (0.000) (0.268) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Saleg*Dereg 0.022 0.002 0.001 0.012 0.015 0.002 
 
(0.340) (0.135) (0.764) (0.281) (0.505) (0.256) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.092*** -0.003* 0.004 -0.062*** -0.129*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.096) (0.331) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
       R2 0.27 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.23 0.46 
N 7,526 7,526 7,526 7,525 7,526 7,413 
Panel D: Surviving firms: period of complete deregulation 
Intercept 0.296*** 0.016*** 0.006** 0.185*** 0.236*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.363*** 0.022*** 0.061*** 0.211*** 0.450*** 0.017** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.247*** 0.001 -0.005 0.133** 0.144 0.054*** 
 
(0.006) (0.870) (0.640) (0.015) (0.128) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.225*** -0.033*** -0.023*** -0.176*** -0.200*** -0.017*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.306*** 0.011** 0.018** 0.167*** 0.229*** 0.025*** 
143 
 
 
 
 
(0.000) (0.020) (0.026) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.109 0.002 0.014 -0.021 0.088 0.020** 
 
(0.252) (0.652) (0.203) (0.688) (0.359) (0.042) 
LNAT 0.013* -0.000 0.001** 0.006* 0.019*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.053) (0.852) (0.027) (0.097) (0.002) (0.001) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.018 -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.018*** -0.028*** -0.001 
 
(0.113) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.151) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.046*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.030** -0.004** 
 
(0.001) (0.590) (0.744) (0.149) (0.025) (0.015) 
LnCshr 0.036*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.015 -0.000 0.003** 0.012 0.015 0.004*** 
 
(0.290) (0.844) (0.017) (0.111) (0.244) (0.001) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.027* 0.001 0.005*** 0.010 0.027* 0.004** 
 
(0.079) (0.307) (0.009) (0.217) (0.082) (0.012) 
MTB 0.002 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 
(0.435) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.938) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.005 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.005** -0.004 0.000 
 
(0.238) (0.001) (0.005) (0.031) (0.298) (0.579) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.004 0.001* 0.002 0.007 0.005 -0.002** 
 
(0.681) (0.062) (0.195) (0.254) (0.562) (0.025) 
StdOibdp -0.174*** -0.005 -0.008* -0.080** -0.115** -0.019*** 
 
(0.008) (0.294) (0.060) (0.022) (0.014) (0.004) 
StdOibdp*Dereg -0.265 -0.014 -0.036** -0.150* -0.314* -0.009 
 
(0.137) (0.139) (0.028) (0.082) (0.061) (0.574) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.350 0.013 0.037 0.230* 0.656** 0.013 
 
(0.196) (0.405) (0.141) (0.074) (0.028) (0.544) 
Volatility -4.385*** -0.259*** -0.186*** -2.510*** -3.642*** -0.510*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -6.170*** -0.207*** -0.790*** -3.020*** -6.905*** -0.454*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -5.813*** -0.260*** -0.445** -2.948*** -3.672** -1.149*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.001) (0.020) (0.000) 
OCF 0.179** 0.068*** 0.045*** 0.095* 0.129* 0.018*** 
 
(0.017) (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) (0.062) (0.010) 
OCF*Dereg -0.675*** -0.033*** -0.060*** -0.411*** -0.613*** -0.032*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg 0.050 0.020 -0.000 -0.144 -0.120 -0.036* 
 
(0.783) (0.214) (0.992) (0.227) (0.573) (0.092) 
Saleg 0.002 -0.003** -0.000 -0.024** -0.045*** -0.001 
 
(0.930) (0.011) (0.842) (0.020) (0.006) (0.449) 
Saleg*Dereg -0.012 0.000 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.631) (0.774) (0.829) (0.656) (0.908) (0.437) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.092*** -0.003* 0.004 -0.062*** -0.129*** -0.011*** 
 
(0.004) (0.096) (0.331) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) 
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R2 0.27 0.38 0.34 0.33 0.24 0.48 
N 6,956 6,956 6,956 6,956 6,956 6,860 
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Table 21 
Robustness check on multivariate estimation of deregulation impact on dividend payout: excluding 
observations with negative earnings, net income or cash flow  
 
This table reports parameter estimates of panel ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of dividend payout on the 
determining factors for the deregulated firms and industry-matched control firms with non-negative earnings, net 
income and cash flow. The dependent variables in the regressions are six measures of dividend payout, namely, 
dividends scaled by earnings, dividends scaled by t-1 year asset, dividends scaled by t-1 year sales, dividends scaled 
by cash flow, and dividends scaled by net income, as well as dividend yield. The explanatory variables are leverage 
(Bklev), size (LNAT), ownership (LnCshr), market-to-book (MTB), earnings volatility (StdOibpd), stock return 
volatility (Volatility), profitability (OCF) and sales growth (Saleg), and their interaction terms with a deregulation 
indicator (Dereg), and a regulation indicator (Reg). Dereg is equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five deregulated 
industries, and 0 otherwise. Reg takes the value of 1 if a deregulated firm is in the period of regulation and 0 
otherwise. The year fixed effects are controlled for in each of the regression specifications and standard errors are 
robust to cluster at the firm level. All variables in the table are winsorized at the 1st percentile and the 99th 
percentile. p-value is in parentheses. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend  
Variable Earnings Assets Sales Cash Flow Net Income Yield 
Panel A: Period of partial deregulation 
Intercept 0.297*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.223*** 0.279*** 0.047*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.117** 0.004 0.029*** 0.013 0.123** 0.001 
 
(0.025) (0.300) (0.000) (0.658) (0.014) (0.898) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.482*** 0.015*** 0.021* 0.292*** 0.468*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.256*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.214*** -0.154*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.409*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.275*** 0.304*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.021 -0.011* -0.001 -0.089* -0.045 0.001 
 
(0.806) (0.059) (0.925) (0.081) (0.608) (0.924) 
LNAT 0.028*** 0.000 0.000 0.008* 0.033*** 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.716) (0.534) (0.096) (0.000) (0.958) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.026*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.013** -0.032*** -0.003*** 
 
(0.010) (0.188) (0.037) (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.047*** -0.002** -0.002 -0.016** -0.037*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.035) (0.147) (0.028) (0.008) (0.006) 
LnCshr 0.005 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.010* -0.003 0.003*** 
 
(0.613) (0.001) (0.000) (0.096) (0.771) (0.009) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.058*** 0.000 0.003*** 0.021*** 0.062*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.000) (0.875) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.010 0.002** 0.006*** 0.011 0.007 0.005*** 
 
(0.519) (0.045) (0.002) (0.166) (0.633) (0.006) 
MTB 0.003 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.001*** 
 
(0.390) (0.000) (0.000) (0.316) (0.546) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.009** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.004** -0.005** 0.000 
 
(0.012) (0.002) (0.000) (0.018) (0.031) (0.364) 
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MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.009 0.001* 0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.003** 
 
(0.339) (0.074) (0.120) (0.159) (0.353) (0.013) 
StdOibdp -0.179*** -0.011** -0.012*** -0.108*** -0.149*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.003) (0.025) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
StdOibdp*Dereg 0.052 0.006 0.002 0.051 0.035 0.014* 
 
(0.410) (0.226) (0.741) (0.181) (0.494) (0.057) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.048 -0.001 0.003 0.058 0.356 -0.007 
 
(0.858) (0.960) (0.905) (0.651) (0.191) (0.723) 
Volatility -3.850*** -0.277*** -0.215*** -2.443*** -3.753*** -0.500*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -2.610*** -0.001 -0.374*** -0.875** -2.340*** -0.135** 
 
(0.000) (0.987) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.049) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -9.563*** -0.448*** -0.831*** -5.144*** -8.202*** -1.478*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF 0.117 0.067*** 0.044*** 0.044 -0.042 0.017** 
 
(0.130) (0.000) (0.000) (0.378) (0.579) (0.024) 
OCF*Dereg -0.231*** -0.049*** -0.039*** -0.113** -0.108 -0.020** 
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.190) (0.014) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg -0.374** 0.038** -0.020 -0.398*** -0.660*** -0.046** 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.558) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) 
Saleg -0.037** -0.005*** -0.002 -0.045*** -0.088*** -0.005*** 
 
(0.017) (0.000) (0.238) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Saleg*Dereg 0.024 0.004*** 0.002 0.029*** 0.047** 0.004*** 
 
(0.152) (0.000) (0.268) (0.002) (0.022) (0.001) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.107*** -0.005*** 0.003 -0.078*** -0.158*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.446) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
       R2 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.44 
N 17,495 17,925 17,925 17,739 17,243 17,756 
Panel B: Period of complete deregulation 
Intercept 0.212*** 0.017*** 0.007*** 0.134*** 0.175*** 0.037*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.203*** 0.007** 0.034*** 0.102*** 0.227*** 0.010** 
 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.482*** 0.015*** 0.021* 0.292*** 0.468*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.129*** -0.028*** -0.020*** -0.111*** -0.075** -0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.008) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.282*** 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.172*** 0.225*** 0.036*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.021 -0.011* -0.001 -0.089* -0.045 0.001 
 
(0.806) (0.059) (0.925) (0.081) (0.608) (0.924) 
LNAT 0.019*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.023*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.196) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.007) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.017*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
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LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.047*** -0.002** -0.002 -0.016** -0.037*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.035) (0.147) (0.028) (0.008) (0.006) 
LnCshr 0.037*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.027*** -0.001 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.313) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.010 0.002** 0.006*** 0.011 0.007 0.005*** 
 
(0.519) (0.045) (0.002) (0.166) (0.633) (0.006) 
MTB -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 -0.002* -0.001*** 
 
(0.538) (0.000) (0.000) (0.340) (0.080) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.004** -0.000*** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.003) (0.041) (0.006) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.009 0.001* 0.003 0.009 0.009 -0.003** 
 
(0.338) (0.074) (0.120) (0.159) (0.353) (0.013) 
StdOibdp -0.056*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.027** -0.048*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.004) (0.885) (0.813) (0.019) (0.005) (0.001) 
StdOibdp*Dereg -0.071** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.030** -0.066*** -0.002 
 
(0.011) (0.018) (0.000) (0.047) (0.010) (0.423) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.048 -0.001 0.003 0.058 0.356 -0.007 
 
(0.858) (0.960) (0.905) (0.651) (0.190) (0.723) 
Volatility -3.291*** -0.213*** -0.144*** -1.940*** -2.993*** -0.400*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -3.168*** -0.064** -0.445*** -1.377*** -3.100*** -0.235*** 
 
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -9.563*** -0.448*** -0.831*** -5.144*** -8.202*** -1.478*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF 0.130*** 0.030*** 0.023*** 0.088*** 0.068*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
OCF*Dereg -0.245*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.158*** -0.217*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg -0.374** 0.038** -0.020 -0.398*** -0.660*** -0.046** 
 
(0.024) (0.021) (0.558) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025) 
Saleg -0.011** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.013*** -0.025*** -0.001** 
 
(0.039) (0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) 
Saleg*Dereg -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.016** 0.000 
 
(0.854) (0.174) (0.243) (0.565) (0.030) (0.571) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.107*** -0.005*** 0.003 -0.078*** -0.158*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.446) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
       
R2 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.45 
N 18,145 18,592 18,592 18,404 17,885 18,433 
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Table 22 
Robustness check on multivariate estimation of deregulation impact on dividend payout: using all 
Compustat firms from 1966 to 2008  
 
This table reports parameter estimates of panel ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of dividend payout on the 
determining factors for the deregulated firms and all non-regulated Compustat firms. The dependent variables in the 
regressions are six measures of dividend payout, namely, dividends scaled by earnings, dividends scaled by t-1 year 
asset, dividends scaled by t-1 year sales, dividends scaled by cash flow, dividends scaled by net income, and 
dividend yield. The explanatory variables are leverage (Bklev), size (LNAT), ownership (LnCshr), market-to-book 
(MTB), earnings volatility (StdOibpd), stock return volatility (Volatility), profitability (OCF) and sales growth 
(Saleg), and their interaction terms with a deregulation indicator (Dereg), and a regulation indicator (Reg). Dereg is 
equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five deregulated industries, and 0 otherwise. Reg takes the value of 1 if a 
deregulated firm is in the period of regulation and 0 otherwise. The year fixed effects are controlled for in each of 
the regression specifications and standard errors are robust to cluster at the firm level. All variables in the table are 
winsorized at the 1st percentile and the 99th percentile. p-value is in parentheses. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend/ Dividend  
Variable Earnings Assets Sales Cash Flow Net Income Yield 
Panel A: Panel A: All Compustat firms 
Intercept 0.244*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.160*** 0.235*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.145*** 0.005** 0.027*** 0.052*** 0.149*** 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.628) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.525*** 0.015*** 0.022** 0.333*** 0.473*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.062*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.068*** -0.057*** -0.002* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.090) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.160*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.102*** 0.145*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.119 -0.010** 0.015 -0.053 0.021 0.026*** 
 
(0.118) (0.030) (0.201) (0.238) (0.784) (0.004) 
LNAT 0.007*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.002** 0.005*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.004 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.004* -0.007 0.000 
 
(0.379) (0.215) (0.010) (0.088) (0.112) (0.269) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.057*** -0.002*** -0.003* -0.023*** -0.036*** -0.009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.071) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
LnCshr 0.033*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.026*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.023*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.711) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.021* 0.002** 0.007*** 0.016** 0.006 0.009*** 
 
(0.087) (0.015) (0.000) (0.018) (0.617) (0.000) 
MTB -0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.891) (0.006) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.018) (0.002) (0.331) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.002 0.001* 0.003* 0.006 0.003 -0.005*** 
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(0.774) (0.051) (0.076) (0.237) (0.724) (0.000) 
StdOibdp -0.060*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.034*** -0.049*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
StdOibdp*Dereg -0.062*** -0.003** -0.008*** -0.022** -0.057*** -0.003** 
 
(0.002) (0.011) (0.000) (0.032) (0.002) (0.035) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg -0.014 -0.002 0.016 0.055 0.300 -0.015 
 
(0.962) (0.902) (0.431) (0.661) (0.305) (0.528) 
Volatility -3.278*** -0.196*** -0.148*** -1.956*** -3.152*** -0.330*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -2.772*** -0.069*** -0.389*** -1.085*** -2.587*** -0.135*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -9.691*** -0.412*** -0.925*** -5.256*** -8.009*** -1.734*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF 0.063*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.008*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF*Dereg -0.156*** -0.003 -0.007* -0.091*** -0.129*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.296) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg -0.395*** 0.036** -0.050 -0.458*** -0.639*** -0.072*** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Saleg -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Saleg*Dereg 0.008 0.001** 0.001 0.006** -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.275) (0.026) (0.261) (0.045) (0.799) (0.890) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.051** -0.005*** 0.004 -0.077*** -0.137*** -0.005** 
 
(0.014) (0.001) (0.284) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
       R2 0.19 0.24 0.28 0.22 0.15 0.37 
N 93,103 93,109 93,109 93,099 93,106 92,399 
Panel B: Firms with non-negative earnings, net income and cash flow 
Intercept 0.249*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.162*** 0.254*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Intercept*Dereg 0.134*** 0.005** 0.027*** 0.050** 0.128*** 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.628) 
Intercept*Dereg*Reg 0.528*** 0.015*** 0.022** 0.331*** 0.504*** 0.104*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev -0.050*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.066*** -0.024* -0.002* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.090) 
Bklev*Dereg 0.178*** 0.007*** 0.017*** 0.102*** 0.164*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bklev*Dereg*Reg 0.077 -0.010** 0.015 -0.055 -0.053 0.026*** 
 
(0.316) (0.030) (0.201) (0.222) (0.498) (0.004) 
LNAT 0.009*** -0.000 0.001*** 0.002** 0.009*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) 
LNAT*Dereg -0.004 -0.000 -0.001*** -0.004 -0.006 0.000 
 
(0.445) (0.215) (0.010) (0.109) (0.201) (0.269) 
LNAT *Dereg*Reg -0.057*** -0.002*** -0.003* -0.022*** -0.036*** -0.009*** 
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(0.000) (0.008) (0.071) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
LnCshr 0.035*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg 0.027*** -0.000 0.003*** 0.008*** 0.026*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.711) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
LnCshr*Dereg*Reg 0.016 0.002** 0.007*** 0.015** -0.005 0.009*** 
 
(0.220) (0.015) (0.000) (0.027) (0.714) (0.000) 
MTB -0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.000 -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.828) (0.000) (0.000) 
MTB*Dereg -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.003** -0.000 
 
(0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.023) (0.030) (0.331) 
MTB*Dereg*Reg 0.003 0.001* 0.003* 0.007 0.006 -0.005*** 
 
(0.662) (0.051) (0.076) (0.219) (0.487) (0.000) 
StdOibdp -0.064*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.035*** -0.059*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
StdOibdp*Dereg -0.060*** -0.003** -0.008*** -0.021** -0.053*** -0.003** 
 
(0.003) (0.011) (0.000) (0.044) (0.006) (0.035) 
StdOibdp*Dereg*Reg 0.001 -0.002 0.016 0.055 0.317 -0.015 
 
(0.998) (0.902) (0.431) (0.659) (0.260) (0.528) 
Volatility -3.416*** -0.196*** -0.148*** -1.989*** -3.484*** -0.330*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg -2.728*** -0.069*** -0.389*** -1.052*** -2.424*** -0.135*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility*Dereg*Reg -9.330*** -0.412*** -0.925*** -5.236*** -7.701*** -1.734*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
OCF 0.041*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.030*** -0.013 0.008*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.149) (0.000) 
OCF*Dereg -0.151*** -0.003 -0.007* -0.091*** -0.131*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.000) (0.296) (0.100) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
OCF*Dereg*Reg -0.414*** 0.036** -0.050 -0.455*** -0.749*** -0.072*** 
 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.118) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Saleg -0.021*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.023*** -0.039*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Saleg*Dereg 0.007 0.001** 0.001 0.006** -0.002 0.000 
 
(0.356) (0.026) (0.261) (0.044) (0.783) (0.890) 
Saleg*Dereg*Reg -0.062*** -0.005*** 0.004 -0.079*** -0.153*** -0.005** 
 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.284) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) 
       
R2 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.23 0.19 0.37 
N 90,852 93,109 93,109 91,815 89,544 92,399 
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Table 23 
Regression-based evidence based on Lintner and Fama-Babiak models of partial adjustment of 
dividend policy, 1966-2008 
 
The table reports parameter estimates based on the Lintner (1956) model and its variant Fama-Babiak (1968) model 
in analysis of corporate dividend policy impacted by economic deregulation. The Lintner model is Dit = α i + βiDi,t-1 
+ γiEit + eit, whereas the Fama-Babiak model adds lagged earnings as regressand. The deregulated industries are 
entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications, and transportation. This table reports 
estimates between the partial deregulation period and regulation period, and between complete deregulation period 
and regulation period, separately. To capture the dynamics of overall changes, I use the expanded definition of the 
three periods: the period of regulation includes all the years from 1966, the first year of the sample period, to year -1, 
the year preceding the deregulation initiation year (year 0) for each industry; the period of partial deregulation 
includes all the years from year 0 to the year preceding year +1, the year in which the last major deregulation 
initiative was taken in each industry; the complete deregulation period includes all the years from year +1 to 2008, 
the last year of the sample period. The dependent variable is annual dividend scaled by common shares outstanding 
(Divcst) and the independent variables are previous year dividend (Divcst-1), current earnings (Ibcomcst) and 
previous year earnings (Ibcomcst-1), and their interaction terms with a deregulation indicator (Dereg), and a post-
deregulation indicator (Pdreg). Dereg is equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five deregulated industries, and 0 
otherwise. Pdreg takes the value of 1 if a firm is in the partial (complete) deregulation period, and 0 otherwise. The 
dependent and independent variables are scaled by the number of shares outstanding of each year. Panel A reports 
estimates for all firms and Panel B reports estimates for surviving firms. All variables except the dummies are 
winsorized at 1% on both tails. p-value is in parentheses. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
  Period of 
 
Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
  Lintner Fama-Babiak Lintner Fama-Babiak 
Panel A: All Firms 
Intercept 0.067*** 
 
0.056*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Divcs t-1 0.678*** 0.692*** 0.626*** 0.644*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst-1 
 
0.005 
 
0.003 
  
(0.607) 
 
(0.584) 
Deregit 0.054*** 0.112*** 0.065*** 0.112*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Divcst-1* Dereg 0.182*** 0.212*** 0.234*** 0.259*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg -0.022** 0.033* 0.013** 0.069*** 
 
(0.018) (0.056) (0.048) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg 
 
-0.081*** 
 
-0.079*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Dereg*Pdreg -0.017 -0.008 -0.007 0.002 
 
(0.233) (0.525) (0.643) (0.897) 
Divcst-1* Dereg*Pdreg -0.039* -0.076*** -0.158*** -0.214*** 
 
(0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg*Pdreg -0.003 -0.053*** 0.002 -0.061*** 
 
(0.650) (0.001) (0.745) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg*Pdreg 
 
0.069*** 
 
0.088*** 
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(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
     
Adj. R2 0.88 0.91 0.81 0.84 
N 42,461 42,438 61,153 61,059 
     Speed of adjustment 
Control firms 0.322 0.308 0.374 0.356 
Firms under regulation 0.140 0.096 0.140 0.097 
Firms after deregulation 0.179 0.172 0.298 0.311 
Target dividend payout ratio 
Control firms 0.186 0.198 0.067 0.067 
Firms under regulation 0.271 0.979 0.271 0.959 
Firms after deregulation 0.196 0.238 0.134 0.103 
Panel B: Surviving Firms 
Intercept 0.047*** 
 
0.045*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 Divcs t-1 0.745*** 0.741*** 0.806*** 0.804*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.032** 0.026 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.138) 
Ibcomcst-1 
 
0.016 
 
0.017 
  
(0.287) 
 
(0.135) 
Dereg 0.074*** 0.112*** 0.076*** 0.112*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Divcst-1* Dereg 0.115*** 0.163*** 0.054 0.100** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.152) (0.011) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg -0.022* 0.038* 0.006 0.067*** 
 
(0.073) (0.060) (0.666) (0.003) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg 
 
-0.092*** 
 
-0.094*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Dereg*Pdreg 0.009 0.016 0.063*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.577) (0.309) (0.007) (0.002) 
Divcst-1* Dereg*Pdreg -0.020 -0.049** -0.137*** -0.201*** 
 
(0.368) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg*Pdreg -0.006 -0.044*** 0.006 -0.064*** 
 
(0.412) (0.009) (0.459) (0.001) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg*Pdreg 
 
0.053*** 
 
0.100*** 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.000) 
     
Adj. R2 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.91 
N 33,667 33,659 26,789 26,780 
     Speed of adjustment 
Control firms 0.255 0.259 0.194 0.196 
Firms under regulation 0.140 0.096 0.140 0.097 
Firms after deregulation 0.160 0.145 0.277 0.298 
Target dividend payout ratio 
Control firms 0.239 0.216 0.165 0.133 
Firms under regulation 0.279 0.979 0.271 0.959 
Firms after deregulation 0.206 0.345 0.159 0.097 
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Table 24 
Regression-based evidence based Lintner and Fama-Babiak model of partial adjustment of 
dividend policy in “snapshot” periods 
 
The table reports robustness check results of parameter estimates based on the Lintner (1956) model and its variant 
Fama-Babiak (1968) model in analysis of corporate dividend policy impacted by economic deregulation, using the 
three “snapshot” period of regulation, partial deregulation and complete deregulation. The period of regulation is 
defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken 
in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first 
significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years 
immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). The 
Lintner (1956) model is Dit = α i + βiDi,t-1 + γiEit + eit, whereas the Fama-Babiak (1968) model adds lagged earnings 
as regressand. The deregulated industries are entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications, 
and transportation. The dependent variable is annual dividend (Divcst) and the independent variables are previous 
year dividend (Divcst-1), current earnings (Ibcomcst) and previous year earnings (Ibcomcst-1), and their interaction 
terms with a deregulation indicator (Dereg), and a post-regulation indicator (Pdreg). The dummy variable, Dereg, is 
equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five deregulated industries, and 0 otherwise. Pdreg takes the value of 1 if a firm 
operates in the partial (complete) deregulation period, and 0 otherwise. The dependent and independent variables are 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding of each year. Panel A reports estimates for all firms and Panel B reports 
estimates for surviving firms. All variables except the dummies are winsorized at 1% on both tails. P-value is in 
parentheses. Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively.  
 
  Period of 
 
Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
  Lintner Fama-Babiak Lintner Fama-Babiak 
Panel A: All Firms 
Intercept 0.013 
 
0.057*** 
 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.000) 
 Divcs t-1 0.768*** 0.817*** 0.684*** 0.696*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst 0.073*** 0.086*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
Ibcomcst-1 
 
-0.029* 
 
0.005 
  
(0.071) 
 
(0.650) 
Dereg 0.085*** 0.091*** 0.042** 0.091*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
Divcst-1* Dereg 0.091 0.073 0.176*** 0.194*** 
 
(0.135) (0.190) (0.005) (0.001) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg -0.040** -0.024 -0.001 0.030 
 
(0.018) (0.343) (0.952) (0.152) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg 
 
-0.014 
 
-0.048** 
  
(0.588) 
 
(0.035) 
Dereg*Pdreg 0.010 0.017 0.027 0.035* 
 
(0.556) (0.309) (0.160) (0.062) 
Divcst-1* Dereg*Pdreg -0.032 -0.040 -0.172*** -0.208*** 
 
(0.323) (0.220) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg*Pdreg 0.004 -0.006 0.014 -0.020 
 
(0.663) (0.778) (0.177) (0.396) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg*Pdreg 
 
0.014 
 
0.049* 
  
(0.538) 
 
(0.058) 
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Adj. R2 0.90 0.92 0.82 0.85 
N 16,026 16,020 18,918 18,894 
     Speed of adjustment 
Control firms 0.232 0.183 0.316 0.304 
Firms under regulation 0.141 0.110 0.140 0.110 
Firms after deregulation 0.173 0.150 0.312 0.318 
Target dividend payout ratio 
Control firms 0.315 0.470 0.104 0.109 
Firms under regulation 0.234 0.564 0.229 0.573 
Firms after deregulation 0.214 0.373 0.147 0.135 
Panel B: Surviving Firms 
Intercept 0.005 
 
0.036** 
 
 
(0.611) 
 
(0.015) 
 Divcs t-1 0.812*** 0.834*** 0.735*** 0.754*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst 0.069*** 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.072*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ibcomcst-1 
 
-0.015 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.376) 
 
(0.820) 
Dereg 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.062*** 0.091*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Divcst-1* Dereg 0.047 0.056 0.124* 0.136* 
 
(0.349) (0.335) (0.097) (0.086) 
Ibcomcst* Dereg -0.037** -0.014 -0.035* -0.009 
 
(0.023) (0.567) (0.090) (0.744) 
Ibcomcst-1* Dereg 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.039 
  
(0.278) 
 
(0.124) 
Dereg*Pdreg 0.014 0.021 0.131*** 0.142*** 
 
(0.449) (0.233) (0.000) (0.000) 
Divcst-1*Dereg*Pdreg -0.012 -0.027 -0.148*** -0.199*** 
 
(0.698) (0.406) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ibcomcst*Dereg*Pdreg -0.001 -0.015 0.017 -0.031 
 
(0.903) (0.453) (0.160) (0.322) 
Ibcomcst-1*Dereg*Pdreg 
 
0.020 
 
0.069** 
  
(0.367) 
 
(0.044) 
     
Adj. R2 0.90 0.93 0.86 0.89 
N 14,762 14,757 11,228 11,223 
     Speed of adjustment 
Control firms 0.188 0.166 0.265 0.246 
Firms under regulation 0.141 0.110 0.141 0.110 
Firms after deregulation 0.153 0.137 0.289 0.309 
Target dividend payout ratio 
Control firms 0.367 0.458 0.257 0.293 
Firms under regulation 0.227 0.564 0.234 0.573 
Firms after deregulation 0.203 0.343 0.173 0.104 
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Table 25 
Magnitude of dividend increases and decreases during the process of deregulation 
 
This table shows evolution of the magnitude of dividend increases and decreases by firms in formerly regulated 
industries in the three “snapshot” periods along the process of deregulation. The five deregulated industries are 
entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications and transportation. The period of regulation 
is defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was 
taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of 
the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years 
immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Dividend 
increases and decreases are defined as changes in quarterly dividend per share. The means and medians of dividend 
increases and decreases for deregulated firms and control firms in partial (complete) deregulation periods are 
compared with those in the regulation period. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
   
Period of 
 
    Regulation Partial Deregulation Complete Deregulation 
    No. Mean Median No. Mean Median No. Mean Median 
Increases Deregulated 772 0.149 0.091 954 0.122** 0.067*** 387 0.096*** 0.048*** 
 
Control 641 0.198 0.146 473 0.178* 0.143** 295 0.146*** 0.111*** 
 
t-Stat Dif 
 
5.06 11.10 
 
3.54 14.03 
 
2.82 9.39 
Decreases Deregulated 37 -0.312 -0.333 51 -0.346 -0.375 45 -0.367 -0.405 
 
Control 51 -0.245 -0.200 28 -0.425*** -0.478*** 19 -0.394*** -0.500*** 
  t-Stat Dif   1.38 0.93   -1.41 -1.08   -0.39 -0.73 
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Table 26 
Dividend announcement CARs during different periods of the deregulation process 
 
This table shows three day (-1, 1) event period cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of stock in response to 
announcements of dividend increases and dividend decreases of firms in the five deregulated industries in the three 
“snapshot” periods along the process of deregulation. The five deregulated industries are entertainment, petroleum 
and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications and transportation. The period of regulation is defined as the five years 
immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). 
The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant 
deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following 
the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Dividend increases and decreases 
are defined as changes in quarterly dividend per share. Panel A reports market-index adjusted announcement CARs 
of all dividend increases and decreases in the sample, while Panel B displays size-decile adjusted announcement 
CARs. In the parentheses are p-values.  
 
    Period of p-value of mean dif 
  
Regulation Partial Deregulation Complete Deregulation Partial- Complete- 
    Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Regulation Regulation 
Panel A: Market-index adjusted three-day (-1, 1) CARs  
Increase Regulated 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.003 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) (0.16) 
  
 
Control 0.015 0.011 0.01 0.007 0.002 0.002 (0.04) (0.00) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.49) 
  
 
p-value Dif (0.31) (0.32) (0.20) (0.17) (0.84) (0.82) 
  Decrease Regulated -0.032 -0.015 -0.022 -0.011 -0.014 0.003 (0.42) (0.19) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.14) (0.69) 
  
 
Control -0.022 -0.024 -0.019 -0.005 -0.033 -0.017 (0.75) (0.44) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
    p-value Dif (0.41) (0.68) (0.79) (0.92) (0.26) (0.05)     
Panel B: Size-decile adjusted three-day (-1, 1) CARs 
Increase Regulated 0.012 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.004 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.17) (0.02) 
  
 
Control 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.002 0.002 (0.06) (0.00) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) (0.33) 
  
 
p-value Dif (0.48) (0.44) (0.15) (0.11) (0.96) (0.54) 
  Decrease Regulated -0.033 -0.018 -0.020 -0.007 -0.012 0.004 (0.30) (0.12) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) (0.20) (0.83) 
  
 
Control -0.023 -0.017 -0.017 -0.007 -0.031 -0.008 (0.62) (0.56) 
 
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.09) (0.01) (0.01) 
    p-value Dif (0.39) (0.60) (0.81) (0.86) (0.25) (0.06)     
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Table 27 
Estimation of dividend response coefficients during the process of deregulation 
 
The regression model to estimate dividend response coefficient for the three period of deregulation is: 
CARj = α0 + α1DDIVYj + α2SIZENj + α3LTYLDj + α4Dereg+ α5 DDIVYj *Dereg  
      + α6SIZENj * Dereg + α7LTYLDj * Dereg + α8Dereg*Pdreg  
      + α9 DDIVYj *Dereg*Pdreg + α10SIZENj *Dereg*Pdreg 
         + α11LTYLDj *Dereg*Pdreg + εj
 
Consistent with Amihud and Li (2006), CARj is the three-day (-1,1) cumulative abnormal return of stocks in 
response to dividend increases or decreases; DDIVYj is annualized change in the dividend yield. SIZENj is the stock 
capitalization normalized by the S&P 500 index to control for firm size. LTYLDj is the stock’s long-term yield, in the 
year before the dividend announcement. Dereg is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is in one of the five 
deregulated industries, and 0 otherwise. Pdreg is also a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm operates in 
the partial (complete) deregulation period, and 0 otherwise. The period of regulation is defined as the five years 
immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). 
The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant 
deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following 
the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). In parentheses are p values. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
  Period of 
 
Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
Variable Coef. t-statistic Coef. t-statistic 
Panel A: Dividend increases 
Intercept 0.002 0.698 -0.005* 0.079 
DDIVY 2.572*** 0.000 2.120*** 0.000 
SIZEN -0.040 0.233 0.025 0.342 
LTYLD 0.028 0.536 0.124** 0.040 
Dereg -0.000 0.965 0.006 0.216 
DDIVY*Dereg -0.104 0.824 0.348 0.511 
SIZEN*Dereg 0.003 0.954 -0.063 0.168 
LTYLD*Dereg 0.021 0.708 -0.076 0.278 
Dereg *Pdreg -0.001 0.849 -0.002 0.792 
DDIVY*Dereg*Pdreg 0.170 0.745 -1.260* 0.092 
SIZEN*Dereg*Pdreg 0.005 0.917 0.142 0.593 
LTYLD*Dereg*Pdreg -0.074 0.132 -0.096 0.221 
     
Adj. R2 0.08 
 
0.07 
 N 2,261 
 
1,704 
 Panel B: Dividend decreases 
Intercept 0.031 0.237 0.002 0.922 
DDIVY 1.572*** 0.003 1.255** 0.045 
SIZEN -0.236 0.313 0.060 0.745 
LTYLD -0.080 0.705 -0.342 0.199 
Dereg -0.078 0.154 -0.048 0.372 
DDIVY*Dereg -2.348* 0.064 -2.031 0.139 
SIZEN*Dereg 0.721 0.163 0.426 0.415 
LTYLD*Dereg -0.965* 0.054 -0.703 0.200 
Dereg *Pdreg 0.054 0.397 0.042 0.481 
DDIVY*Dereg*Pdreg 1.047 0.421 1.462 0.281 
SIZEN*Dereg*Pdreg -0.409 0.453 -2.345* 0.078 
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LTYLD*Dereg*Pdreg 0.601 0.374 1.778*** 0.007 
     
Adj. R2 0.24 
 
0.24 
 N 97   104   
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Table 28 
Summary statistics of the subsample of firms that increase, decrease or maintain dividends 
 
This table reports the firm characteristics of those that increase dividends, reduce dividends or keep dividends 
unchanged. RDIV is the annual rate of change in the cash dividend payment. MV is the market value of firm equity. 
MTB is the market-to-book equity ratio. ROE is computed as the earnings before extraordinary items dividend by the 
book value of equity. ROA is computed as the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Variable 
definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
Variable N Mean Median P25 P75 
A: Dividend Increases 
RDIV 2,066 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.17 
MV ( $ Million) 2,027 2,021.29 384.45 94.36 1,423.92 
MTB 2,027 1.61 1.37 1.07 1.76 
ROE 2,050 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.17 
ROA 2,045 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.19 
B: Dividend Decreases 
RDIV 136 -0.39 -0.42 -0.50 -0.23 
MV ( $ Million) 122 1,672.99 468.6 54 1,697.96 
MTB 122 1.51 1.38 1.03 1.83 
ROE 130 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.16 
ROA 130 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.21 
C: No-changes 
RDIV 1,903 0 0 0 0 
MV ( $ Million) 1,839 2,273.10 410.72 84.43 1,534.64 
MTB 1,839 1.83 1.42 1.03 1.95 
ROE 1,889 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.17 
ROA 1,886 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.19 
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Table 29 
Regressions of future earnings changes on dividend changes using linear model 
 
This table reports estimates of regressions of future earnings changes on dividend changes in year 0 (event year). 
The model used is the linear model in Nissim and Ziv (2001): 
   1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 3
1 1
 
t t
P N t t
E E E E
DPC R DIV DNC R DIV ROE
BE BE
      
 
 
           
Et is earnings before extraordinary items in year t. BE-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1 (year 0 is the 
event year). R DIV0 is the rate of change in cash dividend payment in year 0. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. ROE t-1 is computed as earnings before extraordinary 
items in year t divided by the book value of equity at the end of year t-1. The period of regulation is defined as the 
five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry 
(-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant 
deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following 
the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). In parentheses are p values. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Period of 
 
Regulation Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
Variable Deregulated Control Deregulated Control Deregulated Control 
Panel A: t = 1 
β0 0.043*** 0.022*** 0.004 -0.010 0.002 -0.047* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.13) (0.83) (0.09) 
β1P 0.028* 0.013 0.044** 0.040** -0.010 0.161 
 
(0.06) (0.56) (0.03) (0.04) (0.81) (0.29) 
β1N 0.068 0.041 0.103* -0.103** -0.081 -0.087 
 
(0.17) (0.54) (0.06) (0.03) (0.23) (0.76) 
β2 -0.169*** -0.028*** 0.061*** 0.182*** 0.023** -0.018 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.33) 
β3 -0.382*** 0.051 -0.606*** -0.506*** -0.522*** -0.406*** 
 
(0.00) (0.27) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Adj. R2 0.133 0.030 0.273 0.196 0.111 0.029 
N 1,246 974 1,638 979 1,053 705 
Panel B: t = 2 
β0 0.051** 0.022** 0.006 0.031 0.027** 0.021 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.48) (0.35) (0.03) (0.35) 
β1P -0.036 0.143*** 0.001 0.034 -0.029 0.007 
 
(0.67) (0.00) (0.98) (0.77) (0.65) (0.95) 
β1N 0.099 0.107 -0.336*** -0.138 0.017 0.761*** 
 
(0.72) (0.45) (0.00) (0.63) (0.87) (0.00) 
β2 -0.073 -0.022** -0.062 -0.135 -0.146*** 0.002 
 
(0.45) (0.03) (0.12) (0.40) (0.00) (0.80) 
β3 0.068 -0.753*** -0.219*** -0.114 -0.375*** -1.291*** 
 
(0.73) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) 
161 
 
 
 
       
Adj. R2 0.001 0.078 0.023 0.002 0.041 0.276 
N 1,246 974 1,638 979 1,053 705 
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Table 30 
Regressions of future earnings levels on dividend changes using linear model 
 
This table reports estimates of regressions of earnings levels on dividend changes in year 0 (event year). The model 
used is the linear model in Nissim and Ziv (2001): 
 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 3 0 1
4 1 5 1
t P N t
t
ROE DPC R DIV DNC R DIV ROE ROE ROE
MTB SIZE
    
  
 
 
         
    
ROEt is computed as earnings before extraordinary items in year t divided by the book value of equity at the end of 
year t-1. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. R DIV0 is 
the rate of change in cash dividend payment in year 0. ROEt-1 is lagged ROE; ROE0 is return on equity in year 0 and 
ROE-1 is return on equity in year -1. MTB -1 is market-to-book ratio of equity in year -1 and SIZE-1 is the logarithm 
of firm total assets in year -1. The period of regulation is defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in 
which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation 
is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of 
complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following the year in which the last significant 
deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Variable definitions are in Appendix A. In parentheses are p values. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
  Period of 
 
Regulation Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
Variable Deregulated Control Deregulated Control Deregulated Control 
Panel A: t = 1 
β0 0.110*** 0.163 0.099*** 0.018 -0.002 -0.200 
 
(0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.31) (0.95) (0.50) 
β1P 0.009 0.077 0.087*** 0.035 0.017 0.083 
 
(0.72) (0.60) (0.00) (0.12) (0.63) (0.87) 
β1N 0.111 3.629*** 0.440*** -0.006 0.007 1.183 
 
(0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.91) (0.91) (0.21) 
β2 0.383*** -0.141 -0.053 0.548*** 0.357*** -2.276*** 
 
(0.00) (0.68) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
β3 -0.207** 0.114 -0.364*** -0.082 -0.399*** -1.574** 
 
(0.02) (0.74) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.01) 
β4 0.022** 0.028 0.026*** 0.021** 0.039*** 0.439** 
 
(0.05) (0.54) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
β5 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.052 
 
(0.16) (0.91) (0.31) (0.13) (0.31) (0.23) 
       
Adj. R2 0.032 0.064 0.221 0.178 0.295 0.108 
N 1,229 953 1,602 972 1,026 697 
Panel B: t = 2 
β0 0.229*** 0.137 1.153 -0.070 -0.060 -0.148 
 
(0.00) (0.23) (0.20) (0.71) (0.46) (0.63) 
β1P 0.042 0.152 0.223 -0.051 -0.009 0.170 
 
(0.19) (0.38) (0.85) (0.84) (0.94) (0.74) 
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β1N 0.098 -0.069 4.195 0.125 -0.039 -6.425*** 
 
(0.37) (0.91) (0.23) (0.84) (0.83) (0.00) 
β2 -0.405*** -0.041 -8.583*** 0.196 0.171** 0.016 
 
(0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.58) (0.04) (0.68) 
β3 -0.249*** -0.007 -5.884*** -0.639 -0.044 0.550 
 
(0.01) (0.86) (0.00) (0.26) (0.15) (0.20) 
β4 0.046*** 0.079 1.125** 0.001 0.137*** -0.020 
 
(0.00) (0.11) (0.02) (0.99) (0.00) (0.89) 
β5 -0.007* -0.011 -0.023 0.041 0.005 0.048 
 
(0.08) (0.59) (0.86) (0.18) (0.60) (0.29) 
       
Adj. R2 0.100 0.005 0.028 0.003 0.027 0.057 
N 1,228 952 1,598 972 1,026 695 
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Table 31 
Regressions of future earnings change on dividend changes using nonlinear model 
 
This table reports estimates of regressions of future earnings changes on dividend changes in year 0 (event year). 
The model used is the nonlinear model in Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005): 
1 ( 1) 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
( ) /
( )
( )
t t P N
t
E E BE DPC R DIV DNC R DIV
NDFED NDFED DFE PDFED DFE DFE
NCED NCED CE PCED CE CE
  
   
    
 
       
      
       
 
Et is earnings before extraordinary items in year t. BE-1 is the book value of equity at the end of year -1 (year 0 is the 
event year). DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. R 
DIV0 is the rate of change in cash dividend payment in year 0. DFE0 is defined as ROE0 – E(ROE0) where E(ROE0) 
is the fitted value from the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of total asset in year -1, the 
logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of equity in year -1, and ROE-1. CE0 is calculated as (E0 - E-1)/BE-1. NDFED0 
(PDFED0) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. NCED0 (PCED0) is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if CE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. The period of regulation is defined as the 
five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry 
(-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant 
deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following 
the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. In parentheses are p values. *, ** and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level respectively. 
 
  Period of 
 
Regulation Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
Variable Deregulated Control Deregulated Control Deregulated Control 
Panel A: t = 1 
β0 0.013** 0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.025 
 
(0.03) (0.47) (0.63) (0.90) (0.94) (0.52) 
β1P 0.018 -0.006 0.020 0.017 -0.012 0.296** 
 
(0.22) (0.78) (0.23) (0.29) (0.75) (0.04) 
β1N 0.118** 0.028 0.064 -0.082** -0.039 0.002 
 
(0.02) (0.68) (0.18) (0.05) (0.54) (0.99) 
γ1 0.062 -0.226 -0.061 0.076 0.227*** -0.250 
 
(0.78) (0.29) (0.59) (0.57) (0.00) (0.69) 
γ2 -0.694** -0.302 -0.466** -0.143 -0.310 0.935 
 
(0.03) (0.27) (0.01) (0.51) (0.19) (0.33) 
γ3 -0.358 -0.019*** -0.337*** 0.351*** 0.888*** 0.416 
 
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.20) 
γ4 -4.579*** 1.618 -0.016 -0.808 -0.012*** 0.141 
 
(0.00) (0.18) (0.45) (0.21) (0.00) (0.69) 
λ1 0.209** 0.420*** 0.562*** 0.372*** -0.452*** 0.638 
 
(0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.38) 
λ2 0.211 -0.021 -0.137 -0.150 0.828*** -1.667* 
 
(0.40) (0.94) (0.54) (0.50) (0.00) (0.07) 
λ3 1.664** 0.814 1.052*** 0.853*** 0.684*** -0.231** 
 
(0.04) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
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λ4 -0.110 -0.304*** -1.558*** -0.961*** 0.270 -6.594*** 
 
(0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) 
       
Adj. R2 0.24 0.16 0.12 0.40 0.29 0.15 
N 1,229 953 1,602 972 1,026 697 
Panel B: t = 2 
β0 0.024 0.008 0.023** 0.070 0.006 0.052** 
 
(0.49) (0.67) (0.03) (0.13) (0.71) (0.02) 
β1P -0.042 0.110** 0.025 0.046 -0.035 -0.087 
 
(0.64) (0.01) (0.53) (0.70) (0.59) (0.27) 
β1N -0.010 0.004 -0.446*** -0.189 -0.001 -0.416*** 
 
(0.97) (0.98) (0.00) (0.53) (0.99) (0.01) 
γ1 0.506 -0.933** -0.776*** 0.076 -0.314** -0.745** 
 
(0.71) (0.03) (0.00) (0.94) (0.02) (0.03) 
γ2 -0.513 1.228** 1.027** -0.245 0.269 -0.850 
 
(0.79) (0.02) (0.02) (0.88) (0.50) (0.11) 
γ3 0.326 0.010 0.233* -0.095 -0.404 -0.694*** 
 
(0.86) (0.21) (0.09) (0.92) (0.21) (0.00) 
γ4 -7.299 5.995** 0.200*** -5.101 0.016** -0.188 
 
(0.45) (0.01) (0.00) (0.27) (0.02) (0.34) 
λ1 0.478 0.601** -0.269 -1.089 0.087 -0.432 
 
(0.42) (0.02) (0.30) (0.23) (0.73) (0.28) 
λ2 -0.677 -1.407*** 0.204 2.147 -0.405 2.641*** 
 
(0.65) (0.01) (0.70) (0.18) (0.35) (0.00) 
λ3 -1.342 -0.458 -0.989 2.684 0.336* 1.113*** 
 
(0.79) (0.68) (0.19) (0.21) (0.08) (0.00) 
λ4 0.480 -2.324*** 0.516 1.472 -0.371 0.554 
 
(0.63) (0.00) (0.19) (0.53) (0.23) (0.45) 
       
Adj. R2 0.01 0.24 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.70 
N 1,229 953 1,602 972 1,026 697 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
 
 
Table 32 
Regressions of future earnings levels on dividend changes using nonlinear model 
 
This table reports estimates of regressions of future earnings levels on dividend changes in year 0 (event year). The 
model used is the nonlinear model in Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi and Thaler (2005):  
0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
1 2 0 3 0 0 4 0 0 0
1 1 2 1
( )
( )
t P N
t
ROE DPC R DIV DNC R DIV
NDFED NDFED ROE PDFED ROE ROE
NCED NCED CE PCED CE CE
MTB SIZE
  
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   
  
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      
      
      
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ROEt is computed as earnings before extraordinary items in year t divided by the book value of equity at the year of 
year t-1. DPC (DNC) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for dividend increases (decreases) and 0 otherwise. R DIV0 is 
the rate of change in cash dividend payment in year 0. MTB-1 is market-to-book ratio in year -1 and SIZE-1 is the 
logarithm of firm total assets in year -1. DFE0 is defined as ROE0 – E(ROE0) where E(ROE0) is the fitted value from 
the cross-sectional regression of ROE0 on the logarithm of total asset in year -1, the logarithm of the market-to-book 
ratio of equity in year -1, and ROE-1. CE0 is calculated (E0 - E-1)/BE-1. NDFED0 (PDFED0) is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if DFE0 is negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. NCED0 (PCED0) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if CE0 is 
negative (positive) and 0 otherwise. The period of regulation is defined as the five years immediate preceding the 
year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial 
deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). 
The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following the year in which the last 
significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  Period of 
 
Regulation Partial deregulation Complete deregulation 
Variable Deregulated Control Deregulated Control Deregulated Control 
Panel A: t = 1 
β0 0.095*** 0.246* -0.011 -0.029 -0.029 -0.305 
 
(0.00) (0.07) (0.46) (0.19) (0.25) (0.24) 
β1P 0.001 0.012 0.034* 0.008 0.007 -0.103 
 
(0.97) (0.93) (0.06) (0.72) (0.82) (0.81) 
β1N 0.101 3.313*** 0.153*** -0.076 0.000 4.410*** 
 
(0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (1.00) (0.00) 
γ1 0.409 -0.837 0.863*** 0.998*** 0.793*** 0.699 
 
(0.12) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) 
γ2 0.043 -0.423 -0.081 -0.106 -0.279*** 0.083 
 
(0.84) (0.59) (0.16) (0.34) (0.00) (0.92) 
γ3 0.358 -0.045** 0.766*** 0.736*** 0.651*** 8.751*** 
 
(0.42) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
γ4 0.384 2.499 -0.208*** -0.074 -0.045*** 0.406 
 
(0.64) (0.26) (0.00) (0.84) (0.00) (0.50) 
λ1 -0.078 -0.196 0.217** 0.014 -0.303** -1.868 
 
(0.57) (0.81) (0.04) (0.93) (0.02) (0.38) 
λ2 0.167 4.548** -0.005 0.146 0.108 4.707* 
 
(0.66) (0.01) (0.98) (0.53) (0.59) (0.06) 
λ3 1.192 5.088 -0.381 -0.228 -0.321*** 0.576** 
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(0.36) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) (0.00) (0.02) 
λ4 -0.097 0.126 -0.879*** -0.372 0.286* 2.094 
 
(0.38) (0.86) (0.00) (0.36) (0.06) (0.60) 
 0.014 0.048 -0.022*** -0.011 0.013 0.084 
 
(0.26) (0.38) (0.00) (0.27) (0.34) (0.57) 
 -0.003 0.003 0.004** 0.004* 0.005 0.054 
 
(0.27) (0.87) (0.03) (0.08) (0.12) (0.14) 
       
Adj. R2 0.04 0.08 0.50 0.31 0.44 0.38 
N 1,229 953 1,602 972 1,026 697 
Panel B: t = 2 
β0 0.133*** 0.191 0.426 -0.190 -0.071 -0.132 
 
(0.00) (0.25) (0.68) (0.48) (0.39) (0.71) 
β1P -0.012 0.201 -0.666 -0.007 0.001 0.169 
 
(0.73) (0.25) (0.58) (0.98) (0.99) (0.77) 
β1N 0.018 0.069 4.624 0.178 -0.015 -10.293*** 
 
(0.87) (0.91) (0.17) (0.78) (0.93) (0.00) 
γ1 -0.135 -0.932 -1.516 -0.822 0.536*** -2.078 
 
(0.69) (0.39) (0.71) (0.66) (0.00) (0.12) 
γ2 0.405 -1.001 -5.549 1.947 -0.798*** -0.573 
 
(0.12) (0.30) (0.16) (0.16) (0.00) (0.62) 
γ3 -2.368*** -0.060** -7.628*** 0.001 -0.148 -2.727*** 
 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (1.00) (0.69) (0.01) 
γ4 1.445 -0.500 -1.269 5.717 -0.031*** 0.999 
 
(0.16) (0.85) (0.14) (0.20) (0.00) (0.22) 
λ1 0.190 1.595 2.562 0.055 -0.756* 0.040 
 
(0.29) (0.11) (0.56) (0.98) (0.06) (0.99) 
λ2 1.999*** -4.307** -24.646** -2.903 0.601 3.058 
 
(0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36) 
λ3 13.044*** -8.942** 17.786 -3.903** -0.087 0.782** 
 
(0.00) (0.04) (0.34) (0.05) (0.74) (0.02) 
λ4 -0.281** -0.499 -0.910 -0.638 0.671 0.181 
 
(0.05) (0.57) (0.62) (0.90) (0.17) (0.97) 
 0.008 0.160** 1.219** -0.082 0.111*** 0.175 
 
(0.61) (0.02) (0.02) (0.51) (0.01) (0.39) 
 -0.000 -0.009 -0.077 0.054* 0.009 0.086* 
 
(0.92) (0.68) (0.54) (0.08) (0.36) (0.08) 
       
Adj. R2 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.11 
N 1,257 992 1,645 1,002 1,071 730 
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Table 33 
Comparison of number of deregulated and control firms seeking external financing along the 
deregulation process 
 
This table reports the number and percentage of total securities issuers, equity issuers and debt issuers of deregulated 
and control firms in each relative year in the three “snapshot” periods of regulation, partial deregulation and 
complete deregulation. Deregulated firms are firms in the five industries that undergo the deregulation process: 
entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, telecommunications and transportation. Control firms are found 
through industry matching, i.e., each deregulated industry is matched with a non-regulated industry based on the 
three fundamental factors in dividend decisions: size, growth opportunity and profitability. The period of regulation 
is defined as the five years immediate preceding the year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was 
taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of 
the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years 
immediately following the year in which the last significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Panel A 
reports the number and percentage of firms that issue equity/debt in a year. Panel B reports the number and 
percentage of equity issuers. Panel C reports the number and percentage of debt issuers.    
 
Relative Regulated Control 
Year Count Percent Count Percent 
Panel A: Total equity and debt issuer 
-5 231 35.54 152 34.70 
-4 227 34.19 150 33.94 
-3 247 36.27 179 38.74 
-2 309 42.86 184 40.44 
-1 261 37.50 171 37.75 
0 309 43.83 175 37.88 
1 324 44.38 155 32.70 
2 384 49.17 194 36.26 
3 443 51.27 241 42.50 
4 407 42.44 234 37.80 
+1 486 51.27 381 44.98 
+2 565 55.72 426 47.76 
+3 585 56.25 457 48.88 
+4 639 58.41 516 52.65 
+5 529 50.53 477 47.60 
Panel B: Equity Issuer 
-5 68 11.06 40 10.18 
-4 34 5.50 31 7.81 
-3 36 5.75 35 8.62 
-2 47 7.57 42 10.50 
-1 53 8.58 41 9.90 
0 54 8.87 53 12.18 
1 83 13.03 70 15.18 
2 145 20.66 86 16.54 
3 152 19.39 121 22.83 
4 138 15.27 111 18.56 
+1 222 25.81 227 27.85 
+2 253 28.43 260 30.70 
+3 266 28.98 305 34.46 
+4 321 32.79 357 37.78 
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+5 265 27.26 339 35.06 
Panel C: Debt Issuer 
-5 186 23.34 122 20.61 
-4 206 23.76 129 21.01 
-3 230 24.16 153 24.36 
-2 283 28.97 154 24.80 
-1 235 22.73 150 25.08 
0 288 27.80 136 23.09 
1 276 26.49 109 18.38 
2 303 28.13 130 21.70 
3 368 32.37 157 23.68 
4 333 27.50 143 20.11 
+1 374 29.66 201 20.81 
+2 447 35.22 230 22.03 
+3 453 34.34 223 20.76 
+4 486 36.05 239 21.19 
+5 387 29.45 214 18.87 
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Table 34 
Multivariate analysis of changes in deregulated firms’ external financing activities 
 
This table reports results of logit regression of a firm’s probability of seeking external financing on Dereg, an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is in a deregulated industry and 0 otherwise, Pdreg, an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if a firm is in a period of deregulation, and 0 otherwise, and their interaction term, and other variables identified 
as correlated with the probability of seeking external financing. The model being estimated is as follows:  
Issuert  = Dereg + Pdreg + Dereg*Pdreg + LNATt-1 + MTBt-1 + E t-1/ATt-1 + Bklevt-1 + CAPXt-1 
The dependent variable, Issuer, is equal to 1 if a firm issues equity/debt in year t. LNATt-1 is the logarithm of total 
assets, MTBt-1 is market-to-book ratio, E t-1/ATt-1 is defined as earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets, Bklevt-1 is total debt over total assets, and CAPXt-1 is capital expenditure scaled by total assets. The five 
industries that undergo the deregulation process are: entertainment, petroleum and natural gas, utilities, 
telecommunications and transportation. Control firms are found through industry matching, i.e., each deregulated 
industry is matched with a non-regulated industry based on the three fundamental factors in dividend decisions: size, 
growth opportunity and profitability. The period of regulation is defined as the five years immediate preceding the 
year in which the first significant deregulatory initiative was taken in an industry (-5, -1). The period of partial 
deregulation is defined as the five years starting from the year of the first significant deregulatory initiative (0, 4). 
The period of complete deregulation is defined as the five years immediately following the year in which the last 
significant deregulatory initiative was adopted (+1, +5). Variable definitions are in Appendix A. *, ** and *** 
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
  Period of 
 
Partial Deregulation Complete Deregulation 
  Total  Equity Debt Total  Equity Debt 
Intercept -1.460*** -2.481*** -1.606*** -1.425*** -2.452*** -1.784*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dereg -0.118* -0.137 -0.079 0.008 -0.020 -0.069 
 
(0.08) (0.20) (0.27) (0.90) (0.85) (0.32) 
Pdreg 0.081 0.419*** -0.106 0.265*** 0.923*** -0.110 
 
(0.23) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
Dereg*Pdreg 0.092 0.013 0.245*** 0.266*** 0.303*** 0.508*** 
 
(0.29) (0.92) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
LNAT t-1 -0.103*** -0.157*** -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.110*** -0.010 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.26) 
MTB t-1 0.187*** 0.291*** -0.033** 0.321*** 0.381*** 0.027** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
E t-1/ATt-1 0.341* 0.005 0.634*** -0.789*** -1.191*** 0.437*** 
 
(0.07) (0.98) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Bklevt-1 1.568*** 1.034*** 1.357*** 0.617*** -0.019 0.900*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (0.00) 
CAPX t-1 4.750*** 1.818*** 4.852*** 3.781*** 1.259*** 4.391*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.06 
N 11,177 11,166 11,262 13,913 13,890 10,299 
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I investigate the evolution of corporate dividend policy in response to the changing 
operating environment induced by economic deregulation from the 1970s-1990s. Specifically, I 
examine the impact of deregulation on the firm’s propensity to pay dividends, dividend payout 
ratio, the sensitivity of corporate dividend policy to earnings, changes in the information content 
of dividends, and changes in corporate financing behavior along the deregulation process. 
Empirical results reveal that economic deregulation does not have significant incremental 
impacts on firms’ propensity to pay dividends. However, it seems that firms reduce dividend 
payout along the deregulation process and adjust their payout ratio closer to that of non-regulated 
firms. I also find that deregulated firms’ dividend policy becomes more sensitive to past and 
current earnings following deregulation. In addition, deregulated firms become more active in 
external financing activities in the new operating environment, which subjects them to more 
frequent and closer monitoring of financial markets. The findings are in general consistent with 
predictions of the agency theory of dividends. However, the empirical results provide little 
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support to hypotheses based on the information content theory and the clientele theory of 
dividends in the setting of economic deregulation.  
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